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Summary 
The Renovation of Western Hegemony 
European Alternatives in International Relations 
George Moody 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Sussex 
 
European intellectual production on international relations is central to the renovation of 
Western hegemony in the post-Cold War, ‘post-American’ world.  This includes both policy and 
academic discourses and a focus of this work is an account of the fields in which these 
discourses are generated that relates them at a deep level.  
 
Working within ‘Amsterdam School’ accounts of European integration, I develop the focus on 
class formation and the internal relation between class and the international for the post-Cold 
War era. The ‘shift to Europe’ within the previously Anglo-centric Atlantic transnational 
capitalist class alongside developments in the EU’s ability to cohesively project power  means 
that a developing bi-polar West must be considered within any understanding of attempts to 
maintain and reformulate Western hegemony 
 
I consider the EU policy field in this context, focusing on the EU think tank field, as it relates to 
the ‘global power Europe’ discourse; this discourse concerned with harnessing the 
international legitimacy of the concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ for military interventions. I 
map the ‘global power Europe’ think tank network, and assess its position within the formation 
of a hegemonic bloc.  
 
Turning to the field of IR I give a novel reading of the principal salient features of the field’s 
development, as well as allowing an exploration of the field’s limitations and possibilities 
through tracing the trajectories of European approaches to security, seen as the 
operationalization of European difference within IR.  This methodology, focusing on 
trajectories rather than paradigms, allows an understanding of the effects of IR theories, as 
well as the limits and possibilities inherent from their conditions of production, beyond that 
which can be gleaned from the surface of theoretical debates and configurations. 
 
Approached from these two different directions – through policy institutes as a capital-policy 
nexus, and academic discourse as related to its social conditions of production – and exploring 
the homologies across them gives a non-reductive grasp on the interaction of the ideational 
and material in the renovation of Western hegemony. 
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Introduction 
 
… if the US is no longer in itself sufficiently large and resourceful to 
manage the considerably expanded world economy of the twenty-
first century, then what kind of accumulation of political power 
under what kind of political arrangement will be capable of taking its 
place, given that the world is heavily committed still to capital 
accumulation without limit? 
Harvey 2003 
The next administration, even if it seeks to recapture the position 
the United States held previously, will have to rely on international 
cooperation to a greater extent than before.  Its preferred partners 
ought to be the European Union, the broader community of 
democracies and international civil society.   
Soros 2006 
 
European intellectual production on international relations is central to the renovation of 
Western hegemony in the post-Cold War, ‘post-American’ world.  This includes both policy and 
academic discourses and a focus of this work is an account of the fields in which these 
discourses are generated that relates them at a deep level.  
This renovation of Western hegemony is visible in the emergence to dominance of human 
security and cosmopolitan ethics in legitimising and structuring Western interventions globally. 
However in accounts focused on this shift in global governance by the West it is not related to 
the crisis of US-led Western hegemony indicated in the opening quotations, and is seen as 
explicable as a result of ‘problem solving’ responses to difficulties faced by ‘the West’ as an 
undifferentiated whole.  My argument is that the shift post-Cold War from a US-led to a ‘bi-
polar’ US-EU West underlies the changes in global governance discourse and practice.  This 
shift to a bipolar West contains material, ideational, and military factors, out of which emerges 
the significance of European intellectual production on international relations.   
In this introductory chapter I first outline the need to relate the post-Cold War changes in 
global governance to this development of a bi-polar West, and in turn to the EU’s self-
conception as a different kind of international actor.  This is not a deterministic relationship, 
and I suggest that neither can be understood without the other, and comprehension requires a 
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synthesis of the ideational and material.   The second section relates the argument to the 
‘Amsterdam School’, the principal body of work that I build upon. 
I then draw out the relation to the International Relations discipline (IR)1.  This third section 
looks at the problem of US IR as a constitutive part of the preceding US led hegemony, as well 
as the difficulties of defining a European IR.  Such an attempt is necessary however as the 
elision between US and Western IR is a lacuna that weakens broader attempts to overcome 
the ‘problem’ of US IR through going ‘beyond the West’ – attempts that nonetheless 
demonstrate the relation between IR production and hegemony. Finally I outline the structure 
of the thesis and indicate where the many and various difficulties encountered in making such 
an argument are addressed.  
 
Global governance and the ‘new EU way of doing International Relations’   
The US has given up on hegemony through consent and resorts 
more and more to domination through coercion. 
Harvey 2003: 201 
 
My argument casts European difference, as it asserts itself against the assumptions of the 
preceding US-led Western hegemony,  as part of a process of renovating this Western 
hegemony; more specifically the re-legitimising of post- Iraq War (Western) intervention on 
human security  grounds, developing the preceding justification centred around  democracy 
promotion.    
 
The invasion and occupation of Iraq marked the nadir of US hegemonic power, representing a 
crystallisation of the ‘terminal crisis of US hegemony’ (Arrighi 2005: 61).  In this reading the 
neo-conservative moment was a reaction to the decline of hegemony, an attempt to shore up 
and secure pre-eminence through direct use of the most powerful military machine ever 
known. Its failure - immediate in diplomatic terms, more drawn-out militarily - demonstrates 
this crisis of US led hegemony, in both coercive and consensual aspects.  It supports one of the 
principal insights of theorising on hegemony, that raw domination cannot persist and some 
                                                             
1 As is standard practice I refer to the discipline as International Relations or abbreviated IR, with the 
object of study as international relations. 
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level of consent is required.  The nature of the shift in the West this crisis precipitated is well 
captured by Alvaro de Vasconcelos, then Director of the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS) the EU’s agency analysing foreign policy and defence: ‘There is no going back to 
the nineties when US benign hegemony was happily supported by Europe.  The day has come 
for a change of paradigm in Euro-American relations’ (de Vasconcelos 2009: 2). 
 
Now ‘[t]he European approach to world problems matters [and] the European approach is the 
right approach’.  Writing in the febrile aftermath of Barack Obama’s election to US President 
he suggests that with an American shift towards this European approach, the European Union 
and its ‘moral superiority’ is no longer the ‘only hope for the world’.  Nonetheless, a unified 
West remains central as ‘the European project for global governance relies on the engagement 
of the US’. Significant is that this is a global governance approach – not a construction of the 
‘West against the rest’ but an ‘all-inclusive order’ (ibid: 1-2). The change of paradigm then is 
one in which EU as morally superior international actor takes the lead, in defining the global 
management project at least. 
 
The idea of post-World War Two Europe as in some way a different international actor, 
operating outside the expectations of traditional foreign policy and academic international 
relations, was captured most influentially by François Duchêne’s notion of a ‘civilian power 
Europe’ in the 1970s, a conception that has since dominated the debate on Europe’s role in 
the world (Orbie 2006).  Despite, or indeed because of, the frequent vagueness of the nature 
of this supposed difference in the on-going debate on Europe’s role in the world, and the 
similar looseness of the use of ‘Europe’, this idea of difference has only strengthened post-Cold 
War, with variations such as ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002), and, in the wake of US 
– European differences over the 2003 Iraq invasion, ‘post-modern Europe’ also gaining traction 
(Cooper 2003).  Capturing this difference specifically in relation to the EU and what this 
political formation means for theorising within social science, alongside the relation of this to 
its global political role is ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ (Beck, Grande and Cronin 2007).  The EU itself 
has also consciously sought to set itself apart from the rest of the world as an actor motivated 
by humanitarian concerns, most notably in the nature of the Petersberg Tasks and the 
adoption of human security rhetoric (if not a human security doctrine).  Underlying all these 
various rubrics is a common belief in the progressive, humane, nature of this difference , seen 
as a genuine alternative to realpolitik and constituting ‘a new EU way of doing International 
Relations’  (Howorth 2011: 22). 
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However, it is significant that interpretations of European difference as a meaningful 
‘alternative’ stem largely from within Europe or the EU itself, rather than from the US – the 
supposed other against which this difference is defined.  There, in foreign policy, when EU 
difference is not seen as a delusion born of powerlessness (Kagan 2003), it is more usually 
subject to analyses of the optimum uses of hard and soft power, in the context of an enduring 
Atlantic Alliance.  The focus after Western differences arose over the invasion of Iraq therefore 
being on creating ‘a renewed relationship animated by redefined goals and objectives and 
sustained by a modified division of labour among the participants’ (Ilgen 2006: 3).  The 
difference then is in the tools each is best placed to use in a project of Western global 
management, as things stand embodying a ‘good cop/bad cop dynamic’ (Nye 2006: 34). That 
such a difference is not seen as an alternative is clear from the prescribed evening up of hard 
and soft capacities in both the US and EU (Nye 2004, 2006, the combination being termed 
‘Smart Power’ Nossel 2004, Nye 2009). 
The idea of a ‘modified division of labour among the participants’ is however based on a static 
view of the discourse and practice of Western interventions – with re-division assumed to have 
minimal effect on the Western global management project.  Against this are studies of the 
change within post-Cold War discourses and practices of global governance finding it 
‘incontestable that the dominant discourses of international security have been transformed 
over the last fifteen years’ (Chandler 2008a: 467).  Human security and cosmopolitan ethics are 
central to this transformation with contestation centring over the best way in which to 
interpret how this shift is related to Western power (Duffield 2007, Chandler 2008a, 2008b, 
Owens 2012).2 
The nature of the shift itself is significant containing a major change of principle in the 
intervention norm in international politics: sovereignty becomes conditional, most evidently in 
its development into the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, where focusing security on individuals 
creates a duty to intervene for their protection, with the conditions set by the ‘international 
community’, to whom sovereignty for the area passes if the conditions are not met. It also 
reverses the burden of justification, previously on the intervening powers, by talking of a state 
having to justify its ‘moral claim to be treated as legitimate’ (ICISS 2001: 136, Chandler 2004: 
64-5). 
                                                             
2 I use Mark Duffield, David Chandler and Patricia Owens as leading, contesting, mutually critical analysts 
of this shift: Mark Duffield as exemplar of the ‘biopolitics’ approach, Chandler the ‘political realist’, and 
Owens casting it within the ‘rise of the social’. 
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The introduction of a cosmopolitan ethics creates a shift within the overarching narrative of 
democracy promotion too, as it defines the individual not as the liberal individual as political 
subject, but as a social subject requiring empowerment in order to act within a legal and 
political framework.  I take this up in the second half of the thesis, but here note that this 
merging with development discourses legitimates the increasing tendency to place target 
societies under Western institutions’ enduring patronage as part of democracy promotion.  It 
is this construction of the individual as a social subject that gives such strength to the 
biopolitical interpretation of human security as a form of control, aimed not so much at the 
protection of individuals in target states but the transformation of these societies as a whole. 
As a form of global governance human security is thereby seen as seeking the pacification of 
the ‘global South’ through the ‘‘socialisation’ and disciplining of states’, intended to ‘prevent 
disruption to the circulation of global capital and the infliction of mass casualties on the 
consumer societies of ‘the West’’ (Duffield 2007: 38; Owens 2012: 566).3 
Despite this suggesting a relation to a specifically European history of social control under 
capitalism, and Foucault’s understanding of neoliberalism, this specificity is not taken up in 
analysing the relation to Western power.4  The shift is seen as a ‘problem solving’ one, a 
response to failures in state building as well as shifts in the functional needs of capital with 
pacification not inclusion or integration of the South the overriding need.  So whilst grasping 
the shift in global governance, within this it is this ‘the West’ that remains static, understood 
through the lens of the West and the rest.  The policy shift then, for example, ‘reflected the 
needs of policy elites and reinforced existing hierarchies of power’ by operating in interests of 
the ‘dominant states and their international organisations’ (Chandler 2008a: 463, Owens 2012: 
564) with no consideration of the mutability of these categories of ‘elites’ or ‘dominant states’. 
I argue that If we wish to understand ‘[w]hy is it that leading Western states and state-based 
international institutions, from the EU to the UN, feel more at home with a post-national, post-
territorial, post-interest agenda of securing the ‘human’ rather than the traditional object of 
securing the nation-state’ (Chandler 2008c: 466) we should also look for change within the 
                                                             
3 The shift sees the West ‘no longer concerned with helping support an often conservative pro-Western 
alliance of Southern elites; it is now in the business of transforming whole societies’ (Duffield 2007: 39). 
4 Patricia Owens explores some of this relation to European history and theory, but relates human 
security to a generalised ‘rise of the social’ within the ‘West’.  I address her approach in chapter five, 
placing it within the process she critiques, but note here that writing of political realism as merely ‘a 
description of government under capitalism rather than a theory of politics’ suggests why the shift 
within the West cannot be grasped. 
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West itself, and how this understood.  The role of the EU as supposed ‘post-national, post-
territorial, post-interest’ cosmopolitan international actor within the West being a good place 
to start.  
 
The Renovation of Western Hegemony 
I term the shifts identified above a renovation for three reasons.  Firstly to stress the core 
structural and ideological continuity under change; this is not a new structure but a process of 
improving the ‘structure’ of the West in response to crisis.   Secondly, to mark this as a willed, 
conscious strategic process, related to this structural change in the West, against accounts that 
see it as ‘problem solving’ in a strategic void (Chandler 2006). Thirdly, as a loose 
metaphorically  architectural  link to the primary literature I  seek to build on, that of the 
‘Amsterdam school’.   The preceding two points are combined in locating where I differ from 
these literatures and seek to make a contribution, so my positioning in relation to this existing 
literature is the focus here. 
The ‘Ruined Fortress’ 
The main body of work I seek to build upon (or better, within) is that of the Amsterdam 
School.5  Whilst the origins of the school in the late 1970s and 1980s work of Otto Holman, 
Henk Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl ‘predate the whole ‘neo-Gramscian turn’’ (van Apeldoorn 
2004: 110), it is usually identified as one of two ‘strands’ in neo-Gramscian International 
Political Economy (IPE).   Much is shared with this broader perspective, but the distinctions 
both to ‘neo-Gramscianism’ more generally, and the seminal figure of this broader ‘turn’ 
Robert Cox, are significant.6 I develop my engagement with the Amsterdam School in chapters 
one and two, so here highlight the significance of these differences, and introduce the 
development I seek to make in the terms of the argument above. 
The Amsterdam approach developed against the contemporaneous mainstream 
understandings of European integration, which neglected both the significance of social power 
and class and of the Cold War context for integration (Overbeek 2004).  Within it European 
                                                             
5 Internally there is a clear preference for the ‘Amsterdam Project’, unsurprising as such projects tend to 
get labelled as schools in disciplining moves by their critics (as for example did both the English School 
and Copenhagen School).  Nonetheless, externally Amsterdam School is the usual term used when 
differentiating amongst strands of ‘neo-Gramscian’ IR/IPE, and I use it accordingly. 
6 Indeed, Amsterdam School work is often specifically excepted from critiques of neo-Gramscianism 
more generally.  See for example: Shilliam 2004; Worth 2008; Budd 2013. 
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integration is placed in an Atlantic setting and class is introduced in a related ‘particular class-
theoretical framework’ in which  ‘formation of (capitalist) classes transnationally is seen as a 
key process through which politics itself is increasingly transnationalised’ (van Apeldoorn 2004: 
111).  European integration is thus not simply internally generated, either politically or 
functionally, but related to the Cold War strategy/ies of a developing Atlantic ruling class.  The 
US national capital formation is in the driving seat for this ‘American Plan for Europe’, but the 
result is a product of intra-capitalist struggle and consensus generation across the Atlantic (van 
der Pijl 2012 [1984]).  This base serves to inoculate against the tendency in ‘neo-Gramscian’ 
work more broadly to a ‘global capital’ view that theorises a global (transnational) ruling class 
and an associated global capitalist discipline (especially for example Leslie Sklair 2001 and 
William Robinson 2005, cf. Carroll et al 2010: 2-7). 
It also stands in contrast particularly to Robert Cox, as whilst his ‘work has helped to open the 
IR door to Marxists’ his approach is not Marxist, and his introduction of Gramscian concepts 
must be understood in context as a reaction to the state centricity of IR, particularly Robert 
Keohane’s After Hegemony (Budd 2013: 1-4; Worth 2008: 635).7 The problems generated by 
this are twofold: firstly, that his approach is additive to the state-centric model, generating a 
‘Weberian pluralism’ (Worth 2008: 642; Burnham 1991); secondly, that in importing the 
concept of hegemony he renders the combination of coercion and consent essentially as 
opposites, and abstracts the relevance of hegemony conceptually away from its class base, in 
contrast to the Amsterdam School’s ‘orthodox class based analysis of hegemony’ (Worth 2008: 
636, cf. Budd 2013: passim).   
There is considerable significance here for the conceptualisation of global governance.   For 
the Amsterdam School a central concept is ‘comprehensive concepts of control’, the 
ideological development of competing hegemonic projects.  These concepts express the 
‘ideological and […] hegemonic structure of particular historical configurations of capital’, 
through which the dialectic of structure and agency is expressed (Overbeek and van der Pijl 
2002: 3).  That is, the struggle between competing comprehensive concepts of control allows 
us to grasp the inter-relation between the grounding structural conditions for, and the 
strategic agency of, blocs within the bourgeoisie, crystallised in this process of class formation.  
                                                             
7 Henk Overbeek provides an enlightening  ‘genealogy’ of the Amsterdam Project, particularly useful 
here in outlining the debates this work developed within and against before it began ‘[t]alking to the 
International Relations discipline’ (Overbeek 2004: 126). 
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The transnational nature of class formation gives a transnational field of contest for such 
concepts which allows us into the transnationalisation of politics, with obvious significance for 
changing ideas of global governance. 8  Comprehensive concepts of control, as the crystallising 
resolution of intra-capitalist struggle through strategy are comprehensive in incorporating an 
ideology of hegemonic control of conflicts both intra- and inter-class, and domestic and 
external through the construction of a universalising ‘general interest’. As the struggle 
between concepts incorporates more of the globe through the expansion of the field of 
contest as well as the geographical expansion and social deepening of the effects of their 
hegemony, world politics is increasingly transnationalised towards a ‘global domestic politics’ 
(van der Pijl 1989: 19).  Such an approach gives a solid theoretical grounding to the 
interrelation between the shifts within the West and within the discourse of global governance 
argued for above.  Nonetheless, it is in this specific instance that my development of the 
school’s approach lies. 
The key difference to this approach can be summarised here by reference to the driving 
assumption of the (at least at the time) ‘leading collection of the Amsterdam School, A Ruined 
Fortress?’ (Anderson 2011: 132).  In the preface, Alan Cafruny and Magnus Ryner explain the 
title as ‘raising the question of whether European integration has generated a ‘fortress Europe’ 
capable of challenging American supremacy in the world’ to which the contributions in the 
volume answer that ‘[i]f there ever were such ambitions in the re-launch of European 
integration in the 1980s, the project is now in ruin’. The result of this lack of challenge is an EU 
‘subordinated into a much larger neoliberal, transnational, structural, and institutional 
ensemble under American leadership’(Cafruny and Ryner 2003: vii). 9 
Contesting this, arguing for an emergent bi-polar West, also challenges the related conception 
that we do not see a new ‘’ethicopolitical’ conception - the defining feature of a hegemonic, or 
a counterhegemonic, movement’ (ibid: viii).   Whilst the shift in global governance clearly does 
not represent counter-hegemony it does represent a renovation of hegemony and a new 
‘ethicopolitical’ conception or comprehensive concept of control.    Overall the move within 
global governance towards a conception of global domestic politics in the cosmopolitan sense 
of ethically ‘transcending’ sovereignty, understood as a comprehensive concept of control, 
                                                             
8 As noted above the field of contest is not ‘global’; the Atlantic West historically the sphere where rival 
comprehensive concepts of control competed. 
9 The question mark in the title reflects the contingency of this situation and acts ‘as an implicit appeal 
for change in practices’, albeit one they are pessimistic about. 
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relates to a shift in global domestic politics in this Amsterdam School sense of struggle and 
consensus building within transnational class formation. 
European Alternatives in International Relations 
The relationship between European International Relations and the renovation of Western 
hegemony is not straightforward.  I cover the theoretical and methodological challenges and 
my approach in chapters four and five, so here, as in the preceding section, I offer a summary 
in line with the overall argument of the thesis.  To understand the relationship it is necessary 
to first grasp the relationship of IR to the preceding US led Western hegemony, and then the 
different developmental context for European IR, particularly as constituted as an alternative 
to both the preceding US led hegemony and the role of US IR within it.  Doing so reveals an 
overall similarity in role but a more complex relationship between theory and practice.  In 
looking at European alternatives in International Relations then I am not offering a survey of 
the field of IR in Europe, constituted in and of itself as somehow an alternative to US IR in 
theoretical terms, but the role and relation of a specifically European IR in this Western 
renovation.10 
Approaching this relationship builds also on the preceding discussion of the Amsterdam School 
in which comprehensive concepts of control are constitutive of class formation.  Kees van der 
Pijl’s work on US IR is significant in this respect relating as it does directly to the formation and 
expansion of the transnational state-society complex allowing the formation of a transnational 
ruling class, and its concrete development and hegemony.  It is also a natural development of 
this work’s origins, developed against contemporaneous mainstream understanding of 
European integration, and their imbrication with the construction itself.   In this sense the 
European IR I examine is, in its cosmopolitanism derived from its theorisation of the EU, 
antithetical to the Amsterdam School understanding of the development of the EU.  The 
extension here is to the comprehension of the externally oriented elements of this 
comprehensive concept of control, which are currently submerged by the understanding of the 
EU in a subordinate role.   In continuity with US IR there is in this relationship an untheorised 
and /or ideologically accepted EU exceptionalism replacing the preceding foundation in 
American exceptionalism. 
                                                             
10
 In this, methodologically similar to Kees van der Pijl in his assessment of US IR which is not an attempt 
at a comprehensive overview but just such a selective representation generated from this organic 
relation (van der Pijl 2014: xiv). 
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Cold War International Relations was an ‘American Social Science' in two ways.  Firstly, to the 
extent the discipline existed globally it was dominated by the US academy both in terms of 
numbers of scholars and volume of scholarly production and in terms of the theoretical terrain 
of the discipline.  It was however also politically an American social science, its rise and 
development organically interlinked to the development of the US led West, both in providing 
the intellectual support needed and in shaping the form of that hegemony through this 
intellectual input.    It is this second meaning of IR as an American social science – in the 
seminal characterisation of being ‘too close to the fire’ (Hoffman 1977: 59) - that truly makes 
Cold War IR American.   
Whilst disciplinary IR is set in a longer history of Atlantic class formation and concomitant 
founding of policy networks and think-tanks – the ‘founding’ of IR in 1919 with the creation of 
the Woodrow Wilson chair at Aberystwyth must be understood in the context of its intimate 
connections with the Milner Group, the leading policy grouping of the British ruling class, for 
example  (van der Pijl 2014: 80-82, 67) -  the development of IR theory as a distinct enterprise 
lies in the post-World War II American context.  As such it was part of the broader ‘political 
studies enlightenment’ – central figures of which were friends and fellow émigrés Hannah 
Arendt and Hans Morgenthau, in political science and IR respectively (Katznelson 2004; 
Williams 2013cf. Rösch 2013). 
The project of this enlightenment was to refound liberalism, after the near fatal blow of the 
Second World War and the Holocaust, rescuing its core values but ‘(all-importantly) without 
the unrealistic optimism and naiveté of so many of their predecessors’ (Jones 2005: 544). The 
attempt, for classical realism too, was to ‘move beyond both 19th-century visions of ‘classical’ 
liberalism and its 20th-century ‘progressive’ forms’ as ‘only a liberal politics shorn of its 
‘utopian’ elements — both epistemic and political — could […] be suitably equipped to 
advance a renewed liberal politics’ (Williams 2013: 652).  ‘IR theory is thus better understood 
as a case of intellectual irredentism, resisting its own integration into American social science’ 
understood as this liberal idealism (Guilhot 2011: 129–130; cf. van der Pijl 2014: 8).  Within this 
creation of IR theory foundations and policy networks were still central, Nicolas Guilhot 
extensively tracing these connections highlighting its ‘codification’ at the Rockefeller 
Foundation sponsored 1954 Conference on Theory (Guilhot 2007, 2008, 2011). 
Tracing the European antecedents of realist thought, and the role of European émigrés has to 
be understood in this context (cf. Guzzini 2013b). The supposed fundamental tension of 
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worldviews within the IR field (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013) – the ‘poles’ of liberalism and 
realism - being therefore fundamentally over the means of bringing about a liberal world 
order, through the use of US power. Underpinning IR theory was US exceptionalism, as in this 
realist ‘enlightenment’ ‘the United States was central to any hope for the future of a liberal 
politics in its political meaning as well as its geopolitical power. America needed to provide a 
non-rationalist liberal alternative with both intellectual and political power — and the 
discipline of IR needed to support this enterprise’ (Williams 2013:654).  It is this task and 
shared US exceptionalism that constitutes the political content of the field, and marks Cold 
War IR as US social science.  Nonetheless in understanding the forms of this theory and its 
shaping of the hegemonic project the structure of the academic field and forms of theoretical 
expression within it once again acquire significance.    
This leads to one final important point of the role of realist IR theory in disguising this power 
and its use. This role was captured by Ekkehart Krippendorff as the ‘great lie’ of IR of ‘a big 
power such as the United States’, which masked the constitutive role of overweening US 
power in world order behind the façade of an anarchic states system (Krippendorf 1987).  This 
acquires even greater significance when the problem of US IR’s hegemony is understood 
primarily in terms of a hegemony within theory, divorced from this constitutive relation to 
power.  Such an understanding, a ‘single’ theoretical reading of the field, is responsible for 
many of the problems of ‘critical’ IR theory – based in reacting to this theoretical façade, 
rather than the power it is part of - that have been painfully revealed as such critical discourses 
find themselves uncomfortably contiguous with the new global governance discourse of which 
realism is no longer a component (McCormack 2009; Hynek and Chandler 2013).11   
Post-Cold War IR has developed rapidly across the globe in institutional and formal disciplinary 
terms.  In the sense of the weight of scholars and production US IR is still dominant, but that 
dominance is declining, is less than in many other academic disciplines, and it is increasingly 
hard to make the case that IR is still an American social science in those terms (Kristensen 
2013, Turton 2013).   What this means in terms of the second political reading of the discipline 
is the focus of the research and argument of this thesis.  This marks a contribution to both the 
                                                             
11 This role of ‘second order’ hegemony I address in part two of the thesis. One sees this most notably in 
those IR ‘dissidents’ who see the logic of realism, the internal/external division it is based upon and/or 
its positivist neo-realist rendering as the problem (seminally Ashley 1981, 1984, 1987; Walker 1987; 
Walker 1989; Walker 1993): writing together they define disciplinary ‘dissidence’ as an ‘insistence on 
regarding sovereignty as a question’, Ashley and Walker 1990: 368). The problem persists: ‘if critical 
international theory objects to anything it is sovereignty’ (Devetak 2007: 172-3).   
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exiting sociologies of IR - here I consider those focusing on Europe - and to the Amsterdam 
School understanding of this relationship. 
In the European case the most notable recent considerations of IR in a European, rather than 
national, context are those by Ole Wæver and  Jörg  Friedrichs (Friedrichs 2004, Wæver 1998, 
Friedrichs and Wæver 2009).  Within these accounts (Western) Europe is constructed as a 
semi-periphery - the structuring assumption is that the most ‘fundamental fact of life’ for non-
US scholarship is the ‘situation of intellectual hegemony exercised by the American core of the 
discipline’ (Friedrichs 2004: 10).  Their analysis is then constructed within this assumption of 
continuing academic hegemony, the aim to construct a strategic approach to the development 
of a ‘Euro-discipline’ through  reflecting on different national/sub-regional academic strategies 
to ‘cope with’ US hegemony.  Reflecting the longer held focus on theoretical hegemony as the 
central  problem with IR, principally of realism and its positivist development in this longer 
history (cf. MacLean 1988, Smith 200212), this Euro-discipline would be a home for theoretical 
pluralism – a (secular) ‘house of many mansions’ (Friedrichs 2004).    
Given the nature of the IR discipline, and especially of IR theory as a ‘codification’, outlined 
above this has all along been the wrong target, with the resultant wrong solution prescribed.  
In Bourdieusian terms, in considering European IR Friedrichs and Wæver compound a single 
reading of the IR field – that is of its theoretical terrain divorced from its political content – 
with a similarly single reading of the specific European terrain, again understood in theoretical 
and professional strategic terms only.  Whilst the difficulties of all such surveys are then in 
seeing what is significant politically, they are nonetheless essential given the importance of the 
theoretical field, understood as semi-autonomous, in shaping the form of expression of 
political content of academic work, in turn giving particular shape to hegemonic projects with 
which it is entwined or used.  Therefore, having considered these issues in more depth in 
chapter four, I use such ‘sociologies’ in tandem with a political reading of the field to give an 
account of the context in which the Europeans alternatives I consider are set. 
Amsterdam School work has thus far set the shifts on global governance within a framework of 
continuing US hegemony.  The general shift is therefore seen as it is refracted within US policy 
                                                             
12 I use these two considerations as whilst they do not restrict themselves to seeing neo-realism as the 
central problem they illustrate the central difficulty of locating the political within the epistemological, 
based on a related scholasticism that sees theory preceding policy and/or politics.  
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discourse – significant shifts are noted, for example in the ‘outlaw’ nature of ‘the very appeal 
to sovereign equality’ set in the context of ‘the projection of global justice’, and the 
development of  contingent and ‘shared sovereignty’ (van der Pijl 2013: 25; van der Pijl 2014: 
227; van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012; cf. Duffield 2007: 122 for this US shift in the wider 
shift in discourse to human security)  – and set within the continuity of the discourse of the 
War on Terror, which Europeans have reacted against (van der Pijl 2013: 25, van Apeldoorn 
and  de Graaff 2012).  Nonetheless the changing centre of gravity within the global political 
economy,   the crisis of US hegemony, and continued US reliance on coercion to overcome a 
deficit in legitimacy when acting outside of broader formations are all noted – solutions to this 
however are seen to be related to the internal US network of state and policy planning, which 
cannot set them within the hegemonic search for legitimacy through establishing a general 
interest.   Whilst there is no doubt that the US remains dominant within the West, this 
hegemonic crisis and the ‘shift to Europe’ within the Atlantic transnational capitalist class 
(Carroll 2010), suggest that these shifts in global governance – distinct from the assertion of US 
coercive power and the War on Terror - must be seen within the context of a rebalancing 
within the West, towards a bipolar West.  This I argue gives a better grasp of policy shifts and 
their relation to IR – giving concomitantly greater significance to the IR- policy relation within 
Europe.   
 
This brings me to the different developmental context for the relationship of European IR to 
this shift, particularly as it is constituted as an alternative to both the preceding US led 
hegemony and the role of US IR within it, which is a notable feature of cosmopolitan rhetoric – 
seeking to bind the US in to a European led model.  The most significant element within this 
for academic IR as a field is that unlike the original creation of IR theory it is no longer 
developing in a relative vacuum: IR theory and its relation to the preceding hegemony already 
exists. Indeed this is central to the development of cosmopolitanism within Europe as in 
seeking to ‘transcend’ sovereignty it is reacting precisely to this preceding relationship.    
The institutional context for development is also different.  The considerations of Friedrichs 
and Wæver above are aimed in large part at overcoming the limitations of fragmentation that 
the separation into national IR communities within Europe entails.  As Peter Kristensen’s 
recent work uncovers this is less significant than it has been, with the networks of ‘Western IR’ 
forming transnationally across US and Western Europe (and in the US case to Israel also) 
(Kristensen 2013). More significant given the nature of the preceding relationship to US 
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hegemony is a less developed role for foundations and the think tank field in continental 
Europe.  Whilst moving in the US direction, the number and size of foundations and think tanks 
is considerably smaller in continental Europe especially, and US foundations and think tanks 
have a strong role in the European field, in a way that is not replicated vice versa. As I will 
show however, the links are certainly there and there is a developing US style revolving door 
between politics, academia, policy institutes and business, as well as development towards a 
think tank style political culture more generally.   
This development in the direction of the US model underlies the research in the first part of 
the thesis.  The less developed nature also however conveys an advantage in forcing me to 
consider the relationship between academic production and its social conditions of production 
more generally.  As Kees van der Pijl notes, his study of US IR is not only selective in the 
material covered – a practice I follow in delineating the object of study through its link to 
Western power, though in my case not excluding ‘progressive currents’ these being the self-
identified core of the ‘European alternative’ – but also does not treat ‘its representatives as 
humans’ but as representative (van der Pijl 2014: xiv).  With the US terrain so institutionally 
dense this presents less of a problem as direct and mechanical links between academia, policy 
making and state and private institutions are similarly dense.  In the more sparsely networked 
European policy-academia environment understanding the role of scholars necessitates 
reintegrating them as just that –human scholars. Part two undertakes this task, taking 
seriously the genuine motivation, centrally salient for cosmopolitan work, of a desire for a 
better world, and particularly an ‘alternative politics’.  From this the relationship between 
expression in academia and policy must also be understood in Bourdieusian terms as 
homologous – the expression of a similar politico-ethical drive and common understanding 
derived from the social context in different fields.  In this the role of EU exceptionalism, of  the 
internalisation of and common understanding of the EU, its creation and relation to the end of 
the Cold War, is analogous to the role of American exceptionalism in the preceding 
relationship of IR to hegemonic projects. The theoretical and methodological work undertaken 
in chapter four is thereby also framed as a contribution enriching the tools available to 
understand such interlinkages. 
Europe within ‘Western IR’ 
Theories that take seriously the implications of geopolitics for the sociology of knowledge in IR 
have gained increasing prominence within disciplinary self-reflection since turn of the century.  
This reflects two shifts within the discipline: firstly, the continuing move away from even 
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nominal adherence to positivism in the US discipline, a trend started during the Cold War but 
gaining considerable pace thereafter, which gives a less markedly hostile environment to such 
considerations within the ‘global discipline’; secondly, the changing centre of gravity within the 
discipline as it grows outside the US.  There are now significant IR communities around the 
world, and in facing up to the problems with understanding and applying established US IR 
work, or in assessing US IR’s role in the reproduction of global power relations from their 
perspectives, the relation of geopolitics to knowledge production becomes more readily 
apparent. 
Thus far, however, whilst containing invaluable insights, these enriching perspectives have yet 
to sufficiently consider the elision between the US and the ‘West’ or ‘core’ definitive of Cold 
War considerations of the global political structure more generally; a conflation sitting 
alongside broad brush critiques of a formative and continuing ‘Euro-centrism’ (cf. Onar and 
Nicolaïdis 201313).   This is hardly surprising as the intent of most such accounts is to 
‘decolonize’, ‘decenter’, or ‘think past’ or ‘beyond’ Western IR, and Western political thought 
more generally (Jones 2006; Nayak and Selbin 2010; Bilgin 2008; Shani 2008; Acharya and 
Buzan 2009; Shilliam 2010; Tickner 2013; Tickner and Wæver 2009; though see Onar and 
Nicolaïdis 2013, n.1 below).  However, as Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney put it ‘moving 
beyond the hegemony of the West requires the rediscovery and reimagination of the West’, 
yet ‘[r]eimagining the West is beyond us’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, 15). Whilst they are 
referring to the daunting size of the project, it is their approach, characteristically focused on 
culture and ‘civilisation’ that hobbles this aspect of their reimagining.  Divorced from the 
changing patterns of class formation identified earlier, such an approach gives a flattened 
monolithic West.14 
Europe and its intellectual production is often a minimal presence within this, buried under an 
assumed continuation of a ‘US hegemony’ within the discipline, and the elision of US and 
Western IR. In a sense this is correct, as the ‘global discipline’ is still structured around the idea 
                                                             
13 This is a very thoughtful account, noting that with the rise of the US ‘Eurocentrism was thus 
embedded in a broader western-centrism with two twists: not all western-centrism is Eurocentric; and 
some forms of Eurocentrism patently challenge American-centrism’.  They also seek to integrate 
consideration of European studies and its policy influence and European IR.  The weakness is a focus on 
cultural ’civilizational’ discourses, divorced from both class and material power. Nonetheless, this is 
precisely the kind of differentiation needed. 
14  I pick Inayatullah and Blaney as exemplar here as theirs is a more IPE oriented account than most; 
they also explicitly seek to go ‘beyond and within Western IR’, by which they mean reconceptualising 
Western IR through provincialising it as a Western discipline, not examining the cleavages within it. 
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of US hegemony – a residual ‘second order’ hegemony that ever less reflects the first order 
reality of academic production within the discipline15; what it misses is the intra-Western shift I 
have focused upon, and the increasingly central significance of the changing patterns of 
intellectual production within it.   
Recent empirical investigations of the declining ‘domination’ of the US within the discipline, 
along with this proliferation of ‘de-centering’ accounts of IR itself,  coupled with serious 
concerns from within the US IR mainstream that the discipline there is in a parlous state – 
weakened through a combination of parochialism and an enervating form of 
‘professionalization’ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013) – means this picture of Western IR as 
essentially a US hegemony is unsustainable. Even from within the citadel it is seen that 
contemporary ‘laments about the ‘end of IR theory’ might be the dying gasp of the ‘American 
social science’’ (Jackson and Nexon 2013, 560).  Consideration of Western IR as a whole in the 
post-Cold War period, focusing on the neglected area of European IR, is therefore necessary. 
Where European IR has so far been considered it has been from within this same frame of ‘US 
hegemony’, without reference to the changing geopolitical context.  Western European IR 
remains a ‘semi-periphery’ ‘coping with hegemony’ (Friedrichs 2004; Friedrichs and Wæver 
2009); Central and Eastern European a true periphery to the US discipline (Drulák 2009; Bátora 
and Hynek 2009a).  This continental IR is also separated from the presumed continuity of the 
‘Anglo-American’ condominium, or wider ‘Anglo-sphere’, where Australia and Canada tend to 
be included in a subordinate role, within US hegemony (Vucetic 2010; cf. Cox and Nossal 
2009). Against this is a smaller body of work more alive to contemporary differences within the 
‘Anglosphere’ that sees non-US Anglosphere work more within the ‘European’ camp, 
separated from an insular US standing alone (Sharman and True 2011; Smith 2002; Sylvester 
2013).16 As we’ve seen, work within such a context then tends to focus on professional and 
institutional strategies for coping or even overcoming these subordinate positions – the 
                                                             
15 Indeed, as chapter four addresses, it is this focus on this idea of a continued US hegemony that is 
more significant than the actually significantly declining empirical US domination within the discipline in 
terms of publications, conferences etc. (Kristensen 2013). 
16 My focus is on the post-Cold War shift as it relates to the US and Europe, the first part of this thesis 
supporting this specific focus. Nonetheless the significant role both Canadian and Japanese work has 
played in developing the human security concept supports the idea of a renovated ‘trilateral’ West 
following the crisis of US hegemony – reconceptualised in this way, Nik Hynek’s study on these 
developments in Canada and Japan marks a useful entry, focusing on the specific state-society contexts 
of their divergent developments of the concept (Hynek 2012).  
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professional practice necessary for creating a ‘Euro-discipline’ - not on the meaning of changes 
within Western hegemony and its relation to European IR. Through this framing European IR is 
considered outside of ‘the West’, and constitutive of a challenge to hegemony (Tickner and 
Wæver 2009). 
Within the renovation of Western hegemony, European IR as well as the EU as an actor are 
significant if we are to understand contemporary ‘Western IR’, its hegemony and effects; given 
the development of the argument above this follows naturally as the next stage of the 
argument – that where not ‘willed’ or artificial, European IR will relate in some way to the shift 
to the bi-polar West, albeit in a variety of possible forms. This marks a development in 
sympathy with many of the critiques of ‘Western IR’ identified above that are founded on just 
such an idea of an organic relationship between a hegemonic Western discipline and Western 
hegemony. Albeit approached in various different ways, they are broadly unified in seeing a 
continuity from a colonial West to a post-colonial Western hegemony, and the social scientific 
role within this refracted through and focused within IR.   
Further differentiating within this conceptualisation of continuity beneath change, here 
focusing within the West, is significant because it explains the shift in global governance, less 
marked but of a kind with a shift from formal to informal imperialism.   Finally, as seen in the 
preceding section, this also marks a necessary continuation of the recent work done by Kees 
van der Pijl in delineating IR as The Discipline of Western Supremacy.  Van der Pijl’s focus here 
remains on the American discipline of IR, operating ‘as the handmaiden of a power that 
disciplines the world’ (Katzenstein 2014).  As the preceding section suggests, this 
understanding of the development of IR is the bedrock for my own - I want to push such an 
analysis further however, in line with the argument so far of a developing bi-polar West, to 
account for the post-Cold War evolution of this discipline of Western supremacy, breaking 
down the elision of the US and Western disciplines to consider the European role.17 
Structure of the Thesis 
The argument develops in two parts.  In the first part, I build towards an understanding of the 
global power Europe project, focusing on the think tank network involved in the policy 
                                                             
17 I note here that I worked under Kees van der Pijl’s supervision on a British Academy funded pilot study 
that contributed to Kees book, covering the spread of Anglo-American IR to Central and Eastern Europe.  
Indeed, Kees has generously credited me with this work in his account (van der Pijl 2014: xiii, 215; 
Moody 2010).  This thesis and Kees’ book represent divergent developments from this point on – 
constructed independently of one another following Kees retirement from Sussex.   
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preparations for the European Council meeting in December 2013 dedicated to military issues, 
its relation to a forming European transnational capitalist class, and positioning within a 
broader hegemonic bloc.  The second part develops an understanding of related European 
academic discourse through the concept of cosmopolitan power Europe - homologous to the 
cleavages and debates within considerations of global power Europe, although in an 
abstracted form. 
The first chapter starts by developing my overall understanding of the linkages between class 
and the states system.  I develop a political realist approach, noting it as antithetical to the 
concept of politics within cosmopolitanism.  I then consider the contemporary debate within 
Marxist thought on New Imperialism and from this the need for a focus on class formation and 
the constitutive nature of transnational class formation for understanding global politics.  The 
focus on class formation leads to consideration of hegemony, both stressing the coercive 
moment within it, and then developing the contemporary role of ideology and think tanks 
within this.   
The second chapter develops the specifically European context, making the case for 
understanding the West as an emergent bi-polar entity of the EU and US, and engaging with 
the development of Amsterdam School work through this.  It covers the Lockean structure of 
the EU, the need to reconceptualise neoliberalism within the Amsterdam School to understand 
Europe’s role, the evidence for the existence of a European transnational capitalist class, and 
the military dimension of this bipolarity.   
I analyse the global power Europe project in the third chapter.  I start by setting the global 
power Europe discourse in the context of European self-perception, and its relation to 
conceptions of normative power Europe and cosmopolitanism.  I then map the network 
involved in policy preparation for the December 2013 European Council meeting.  This 
develops to a focus on the central institution within this network, George Soros’ European 
Council on Foreign Relations, developing the understanding of the global power Europe project 
itself and from this focus then building back out to the relation to a wider hegemonic 
formation. 
 
Part two begins with the necessary elaboration of the theoretical framework and of the 
methodology to be followed in the section.  Chapter four therefore focuses on the relative 
autonomy of the academic field, relating Bourdieu to Gramsci to do so and introducing the 
Bourdieusian concepts of homology and field and habitus that will be used.  The synthesis 
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between the two gives the overall need for a political realist dual reading of academic fields, 
grounded in class analysis.  The rejection of either a political or a philosophical reading of 
theory in favour of a ‘dual reading’ that grasps the ambiguity of academic expression  is 
refracted back through political realist approach so that one must look not only at the effects 
of theory, but also the intention motivating it to understand it as whole.  I then cover the 
methodology to be used, firstly how it relates to the understanding of first and second order 
hegemony in IR that structures chapter five, and then the focus on ‘persons not paradigms’ 
that structures chapter six. 
 
Chapter five applies this first part of the methodology to consider cosmopolitan Europe 
conceptualisations as inherently related to cosmopolitan power Europe, understood as the 
external application of EU exceptionalism.  The difficulties of coherence in the application of 
this concept are seen as driving the shift within cosmopolitanism to an Arendtian republican 
cosmopolitanism.  Significant within this is the political ontology it contains, shifting from the 
political individual of the earlier cosmopolitanism to a social individual in tune with a European 
neoliberalism.  The core element of tension in this self- conceptualisation, of the means of the 
establishment of normatively preferred social orders outside of Europe, are related to the 
more policy oriented discourses of the first half.  It then considers the role of first and second 
order hegemony in formation of European IR, illustrating this via curricula analysis of the IR 
theory course at the Central European University.   
 
Chapter six develops the focus on the problem of founding cosmopolitan political orders 
derived from the preceding chapter through two intellectual trajectories in the European field 
– again understood as developed in chapter five, that is in the relationship between peace 
research, IR and security studies, and the temporal crossing of these boundaries through these 
intellectual careers.  I first take the ‘easy’ case of Mary Kaldor, a central figure in much critical 
analysis of cosmopolitanism, structuring my consideration around her self-identification as a 
critical intellectual.  Secondly I consider a ‘hard’ case, of Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen 
School, seemingly removed from such cosmopolitan discourses, structuring my analysis around 
its consistent political core, widely missed or misunderstood in considerations and 
development of the school’s work.  I develop these cases as applied cosmopolitanism, both 
concerned with this central question of the founding of cosmopolitan political orders and 
fundamentally related to the social condition of their production. They represent a European 
alternative through their explicit rejection of the preceding US led approach, and the 
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fundamental structuring organic link to the European Cold War experience and its 
understanding. This gives an understanding of their relationship to one another that the 
common theoretical split between human security and securitisation that pits one against the 
other, as well as the attempts to bridge the divide through a ‘critical human security studies’, 
cannot grasp. It thereby demonstrates the need for an analysis such as mine to understand the 
academic relation to shifts in global governance. 
 
In conclusion I summarise and reflect on the two parts of the thesis together, bringing out 
their inter-relation; neither global power Europe nor cosmopolitan power Europe are  
explicable in isolation from the other and must be understood in this way together.  This brings 
out the deep structuring role of social conditions of production – as noted earlier in this 
introduction this is true of the Amsterdam School approach also, and therefore my own 
development - just from the  ‘other side’ so to speak, where class analysis is central rather 
than presented as ‘outmoded’.  The central place this accords EU exceptionalism does 
however give some indication of where hope, and potential for fruitful engagement with these 
discourses lie.  The tension at the heart of the discourse makes for a far less self-confident 
assertion of power, and in so far as it is built upon the conception of the citizen (rather than 
the preceding homo-economicus), developed in artificial isolation from its relation to 
capitalism, offers scope for development through being brought into contact with class 
analysis. 
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Part 1 – Global Power Europe 
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1. Theory I: Class and the States System 
Introduction 
This theoretical chapter covers the understanding of the relation between class and the states 
system that is integral to the thesis as a whole.  I start by outlining a political realist approach 
as this both gives a relational understanding of power that develops the idea of 
comprehensive concepts of control as representing the dialectic of structure and agency,  and 
provides the foundation for understanding the nature of the cosmopolitanism integral to the 
European alternatives covered here.  I then consider the recent ‘New Imperialism’ debate as 
the latest iteration of Marxist debate over the nature of imperialism, demonstrating the need 
for the approach I take which identifies class as containing the internal relation between the 
supposed ‘two logics’ of capital and (a hierarchical) geopolitics, and as comprising the agency 
within imperialism.  
The second half of the chapter focuses upon the concept of hegemony, seen as comprising the 
‘how’ of this exercise of power.  Firstly rejecting the discursive turn of much ‘neo-
Gramscianism’ (or ‘Gramsciology’) I argue coercion and consent must be seen as ‘moments’ 
within one another within hegemony, developing the political realist concept of politics against 
the cosmopolitan assertion of an ontologically separable ‘political’  consensual sphere.  I then 
turn to consider ideology, giving a depth model of ideology.  This then allows a differentiation 
between the political contestation of hegemonic projects through comprehensive concepts of 
control, and the underlying core principles of liberalism and neoliberalism. It is this conception 
of ideology that underpins the differentiation from Amsterdam school conceptualisations of 
neoliberalism as laissez faire, that I take up in the next chapter. 
The subsequent interrogation of the role of think tanks as central ‘ideological apparatus’ 
introduces the need for a theoretical understanding that can grasp the significance of 
differentiation within the think tank field as well as its relative autonomy as it this that gives it 
power within the neoliberal politics of expertise.  In considering this need for these most 
directly ‘organic intellectuals’ this prefigures too the further development of an approach able 
to integrate the relative autonomy of intellectual fields in the second theory chapter (chapter 
four) dealing with intellectuals in academic settings. 
It is this theoretical framework that I use in the second chapter analysing the development of a 
bi-polar West.  The specific study of a think tank network in chapter three is set within this 
theoretical framework as a whole, which allows it to provide an exploration of class formation. 
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Class and the states system 
Political realism 
The approach taken in this work is a Marxist political realism, taking Lenin’s question of ‘Who, 
Whom?’ as the fulcrum of politics.  In this it is inspired by Raymond Geuss’s use of the 
question, extended to ‘Who <does> what to whom for whose benefit?’, expanding it thus to 
four variables: who; what; to whom; for whose benefit?.  This gives an approach ineluctably 
drawn to ‘think about agency, power, and interests, and the relations among them’ (Geuss 
2010: 25).   
Framing issues with this question gives a concept of politics that cannot remain abstract, that 
must embed its notions of the good or rational in ‘the more motivationally active parts of the 
human psyche’ and must do so within the context of existing, rather than idealised, social and 
political institutions. As a Marxist approach these institutions reflect, at varying distances and 
therefore levels of determination, underlying class struggle.  Taking motivations and interests 
seriously in the production of political theory in this context we then arrive at Lenin’s principle 
of partisanship: every theory is partisan and takes side in an ongoing war of worldviews (ibid: 
29; cf. Cox 1981).  
The four variables of the framing question give Lenin’s stark dichotomy a necessary complexity.  
Firstly it opens up class to individuals, and therefore the networks they are embedded in, 
giving space to breathe to  ‘the inner structure of these intellectual networks which shapes 
ideas, by their patterns of vertical chains across the generations and their horizontal alliances 
and oppositions’ (Collins 1998: 2). However it also necessarily embeds them in their context by 
asking the fundamental question of the actual political implications of theory - for whose 
benefit it operates.   
Integrating this classical focus of cui bono further allows us to give significance to the 
mediating class – the ‘specific stratum of functionaries’ needed for the ‘control and direction 
of collective labour, and the task of maintaining social cohesion under conditions of advanced 
division of labour’ (van der Pijl 1998: 137).  These managers and planners have become 
increasingly important, and whilst they operate primarily in the interests of their employers, 
and thereby capital, they also, through their social management and socialisation role 
constitute ‘the class representing classless society within the limits of class society’ (ibid: 138). 
Kees van der Pijl refers to this as the cadre class to invoke a genealogy to ‘link the existence 
and orientation of the cadres explicitly to the process of socialisation’, but possible alternatives 
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in the literature such as ‘intellectuals’, ‘professional élites’, ‘experts’, or the ‘professional-
managerial class’, make clear this class’s central significance for this work (ibid).  The 
formulation, separating the ‘who’ from ‘for whose benefit’, allows both the tendency to 
operate in the interests of the ruling class and the tension of this with their own interests and 
worldview to feature. 
Nonetheless, of note here is that Lenin saw this war at the meta- theoretical level as between 
materialism and idealism: the former the worldview of the proletariat, the latter of the 
bourgeoisie, and the conflict between them therefore reflects this class conflict.  This 
materialism is of course a dialectical materialism, not a ‘crude, simple, metaphysical 
materialism’: the concomitant critique of idealism is that it is ‘a one-sided, exaggerated 
development of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge, into an absolute, divorced 
from matter, from nature, apotheosised’ a development anchored in the class interests of the 
ruling classes (Lenin 1981 [1915]: 361). This insight structures particularly the assertion that 
the developments in European IR that I study constitute a reformulation of Western hegemony, 
particularly through their idealist concept of politics.  
Raymond Geuss develops his position to attack the nature of abstraction in contemporary 
political philosophy, specifically that of John Rawls and Robert Nozick, and the view of politics 
as applied ethics. By this he means an approach that is essentially idealist, in which we ‘start 
thinking about the human social world by trying to get what is sometimes called an “ideal 
theory” of ethics’ derived from general principles and historically invariant.  In such an 
approach the empirical and historical enter only afterwards when they are then judged against 
this ideal.  He therefore sets against Rawls’s injunction that to think about politics is to think 
about our intuitions about justice, his own that, ‘if you want to think about politics, think first 
about power’ (Geuss 2010: 97).  
I follow this not to reject ethics or morality in politics but to note that an idealised ethical 
approach, which Trotsky helpfully labels ‘bourgeois evolutionism’, ‘halts impotently at the 
threshold of historical society because it does not wish to acknowledge the driving force in the 
evolution of social forms: the class struggle’, and that ‘[m]orality is one of the ideological 
functions in this struggle’ (Trotsky 2000 [1938]: 17).  The general ethical principles upon which 
the idealised approach relies are so broad as to be almost vacuous, a ‘shell without content’, 
the derivation of content for which lies in the concrete and thus in class struggle.  The ethics, 
morality or justice that will then be developed by such theory is therefore dependent on the 
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class affiliation, conscious or otherwise, of the theorist. Thinking first about power, in a class 
society, means that power and class are constitutive of ethics – and that, as one cannot 
generate a free-floating system of ethics, ‘the appeal to abstract norms is not a disinterested 
philosophic mistake but a necessary element in the mechanics of class deception’ (ibid).    
This then brings us to one last thought from Raymond Geuss: the necessity of respice finem – 
to consider the outcome; meaning ‘[d]on’t look just at what they say, think, believe, but at 
what they actually do, and what actually happens as a result’ (Geuss 2010: 10).  This as a 
central assessment of theory I complicate in the second theoretical chapter to give 
consideration to the relative autonomy of the academic field and agency to those within it, to 
avoid reductionism and also take seriously what ‘they’ say.  This is especially necessary for 
those who, as Trotsky suggests, approach the ‘threshold’, developing the bourgeois idealist 
conception of justice to its fullest extent in the figure of the ‘citizen’ which precedes ‘the 
guiding image of the comrade’ (Ernst Bloch in Rehman 1999: 11). A focus on outcomes 
otherwise risks flattening them into a single category with the most instrumental of organic 
intellectuals. 
This political realist approach focuses the analysis in the thesis, by stressing the relational 
nature of power and the realising of structure, and structural power, in agency: the central 
significance of social structures is to be found in agency, in what it enables who to do to whom 
(cf. Knafo 2010).  As I outlined in the introduction, comprehensive concepts of control are a 
way of grasping the agent structure dialectic in the process of class formation, as a class takes 
on political agency, and it this agency that I focus on.  The underlying binary of class interests 
allows assessment of theories and discourses in terms of interests, but comprehensive 
concepts of control are not generated automatically or functionally from structural interests 
but through a creative process drawing on the intellectual resources of society more generally, 
and in interaction with the specific problems confronted.  This gives the salience to the focus 
on European alternatives in the response amongst a shifting Western ruling class to the crisis 
of US hegemony; it is not simply a functional problem solving response, but the creative 
development of a new comprehensive concept of control.  All of which brings me to the 
relation between such an understanding of class grasped through its political agency and the 
states system. 
Capital and the states system 
The New Imperialism debate is the latest iteration of Marxist debate on the relationship 
between capital and the state.  Whilst characterised by its main protagonist as the Lenin-
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Kautsky debate redux, the debate marks a step forward in thought on this key issue.18   As 
Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher contend, the bounds of the original debate, must and are 
being broken to take account of the historical record of multiple forms of states and the 
‘immense co-variation in the nexus between capitalist states and projects of territiorialization’, 
as against a ‘structuralist view of an essentially invariant international order’ (Teschke and 
Lacher 2007: 577). The most significant change to the intervening British debates of the 1960s 
and 1970s, that surrounding the Nairn-Anderson thesis and the Miliband-Poulantzas debate 
(Clarke 1991: 18-20; cf. Martin 2008, Wickham Jones 2004, Wetherley 2008, Jessop 2008), is 
the focus on the significance of capital existing amongst a plurality of states – that is, the 
relationship cannot be understood in the singular, between capital and an individual state 
(Barker 1991).   
 
Thus, the argument that the international must be understood as internal to social science 
seems to be accepted, as it is the implications of this that form the crux of the debate.  I will 
briefly outline this debate, as salient to the relation between capital and the state that I will 
use. Its contours are clearest in the reaction to Alex Callinicos’ development of the schema 
outlined by David Harvey in The New Imperialism (2003).  Here Harvey seeks to understand the 
nature and forms of contemporary imperialism, positing as central to this ‘a dialectical relation 
between territorial and capitalistic logics of power’: dialectical as the ‘two logics’ are 
irreducible to one another and whilst ‘tightly interwoven’ have a problematic, often 
contradictory, relation. The difficulty in analysis then is ‘not to lapse into either a solely 
political or predominantly economic mode of argumentation’ (Harvey 2003: 183, 30).   In 
aligning themselves with this position19 Sam Ashman and Alex Callinicos note that this is very 
clearly an understanding based ‘in terms of the distinction between the economic and the 
political’ (Ashman and Callinicos 2006: 111).   
 
The problem with this reification of the formal separation between economic and political 
power in capitalism is made clear in Callinicos’ development of Harvey to argue the necessity 
                                                             
18 This usage by Alex Callinicos creates a false binary in positions in the debate between a homogenised 
‘global state’ category, including a diversity of work on transnational networks, as well as that by Hardt 
and Negri and William Robinson, and his own, state-centric view.  His own is then shown to be superior 
to the extreme ‘global’ position. 
19 ‘This formulation corresponds closely to our own view, according to which ‘[t]he Marxist theory of 
imperialism analyses the forms in which geopolitical and economic competition have become 
interwoven in modern capitalism’’. (Ashman and Callinicos 2006: 108, citing Callinicos 2003: 106; more 
generally see Callinicos 2007). 
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of a ‘realist moment’ in Marxist considerations of imperialism (Callinicos 2007).  Here, he takes 
seriously the sparse Waltzian framework – the ‘banal truisms’ - in a way that even avowed 
realists often do not (Kagan 1998: 4).  The danger of a lapse into ‘bourgeois theory’ this ‘neo-
Weberian’ move to multiple logics poses is clear, with the possibility of the overcoming of class 
conflict through another logic, here ‘the nation’.  More so, as realism and its irreducible 
territorial logic, and building on this, IR as a discipline of the strictly ‘high politics’ of state 
interaction, developed precisely as a counter to the power of Marxist theories of imperialism 
that integrated the political and economic - no matter how imperfectly at the time (Maclean 
1988, cf. Bedirhanoglu 2008 for this in relation to Cox’s work). 
 
We can see that its use has indeed had this effect, and thus the ideological power of realism, in 
Callinicos’ consideration of ‘failed states’.  These he sees as manifestations of the failure of a 
state class to follow its ‘rules of reproduction’, a view that exposes the disciplinary effect of the 
realist framework in the use of the state as a container to internalise the effects of capitalism 
in the periphery and integration into the global market to those states themselves (Callinicos 
2006: 113; cf. Morton 2007: 610).  It is in fact more or less this argument, the failure of the 
state class in the third world, that underpins Niall Ferguson’s neoconservative argument for 
the beneficial effects of US Empire in providing governance (Ferguson 2003).  
 
That in David Harvey’s hands this model does not degenerate in this way is in large part due to 
the very indeterminacy of the relationship between these ‘logics’: with both irreducible to and 
external from one another it remains impossible to specify which will predominate in any given 
case and their actual use is restricted to that of descriptive tools.  Thus whilst I took as my 
starting point his argument that the decline of US hegemony led to a strategy of dominance 
without hegemony it is hard to see how this fits with the model – hegemony in realist thought 
essentially a synonym for dominance, and alternative definitions of hegemony incompatible 
with realist assumptions (see below).  Nonetheless, as Adam Morton also notes in taking issue 
with the two logics approach, the actual analysis in The New Imperialism is compatible with 
other approaches (Morton 2007). 
 
Against the two logics John Hobson points to international relations having been characterised 
by an enduring hierarchy over the last two hundred years, with a clear division between the 
West and the rest (Hobson 2007).  Whilst (the quite spectacular) instances of  intra-Western 
conflict then remain to be explained this reveals the folly of accepting a realist view of 
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geopolitics, which can only ever obscure this history  – even within the more thoughtful 
neorealist quarters there is acknowledged a need to explain the contemporary lack of counter-
balancing against the US: the unsatisfactory, as logically incoherent, answer being the 
legitimacy or benign intent of the US, which can have no meaning within a Hobbesian 
framework. 
 
Hobson defines this primarily as a racialised and racist hierarchy.  He neglects that in order to 
effectively define the other as inferior, or certainly for such a move to have any real 
implication, one has to have the power to enforce such a definition: the dialectic referred to in 
discussing agency above.  Thus whilst he is correct in seeing imperial exploitation and Western 
racism as forming a developing self-validating complex (a comprehensive concept of control), 
at the critical juncture, the take-off, he provides a fudge: ‘I would argue that Western 
industrialisation and racism were born more or less simultaneously’ (Hobson 2007, my 
emphasis). By focusing his argument on those who see racism simply as epiphenomenal, 
merely as cover for exploitative capitalist interests, he avoids this critical question of the 
source of structural power which is realised through who does what to whom. In common with 
much constructivist thought there is an inability to explain which (or better, whose) ideas 
prevail – here whose definition of the other as inferior matters, as hierarchical racism is not 
confined to the West – and what drives change within ideology. Against his post-Marxist20 
idealism21 then must be an account that, whilst respecting the complexity of imperialist 
ideologies, in the sense Hobson demonstrates, conceives of them ‘as material social processes 
through which signs become part of the socially created world’ (Bieler and Morton 2008: 105), 
and grounds itself in the material dominance of the West, and the challenge this issues to the 
rest of the world. 
 
The starting point here must be the emergence of capitalism and the productivity thus 
unleashed.  The emergence into the proto-states system in Europe can be considered 
                                                             
20 In a typical move invoking the spirit, whilst rejecting the content, of Marx (Saccarelli 2008: 97): ‘For in 
the present context, perhaps the greatest irony lies in the point that I can think of few greater scholars 
who have allocated prime focus to the agency and resistance of subordinate groupings than Karl Marx’ 
(Hobson 2007: 594). 
21 He asserts that ‘neo-Marxists are speaking to a debate that has […] been superseded in IR theory by 
that between materialism and ideationalism (issued by post-structuralists and constructivists)’ which, 
given we have seen the Marxist argument against idealism (and crude materialism) is true only in the 
trivial temporal sense.  Indeed, he offers here too an exemplary apolitical, theory driven, view of change 
in the discipline: Following the ‘fading away’ of Marxist inspired debate, ‘a new debate has emerged at 
the behest of post-structuralism and constructivism’ (Hobson 2007: 582; 588 and passim). 
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contingent, but it is significant that capital in its significant form as ‘mobile wealth’ and 
‘extraterritorial social force’ emerged in the liberal West. It is this creation of an ‘organically 
unified group of states at the centre of the international political economy, of which the 
origins coincide with the primordial crystallisation of capital’ (van der Pijl 2007: 619) that is the 
basis of the enduring distinction between the West and the rest identified by Hobson. 
As the World Systems Theory work tracing ‘capitalism’ defined as trade for profit throughout 
recorded history attests, merchant capital and commercially-minded landowners have existed 
across time in many different societies.  However only in Britain ‘did they encounter the 
particular balance between centralised state power and local self-regulation and initiative in 
which alone capital can come of age’ as such a structure, and the flexible responsive legal 
system enshrined within it, allows a ‘civil society’, ‘a society of property-owning individuals 
free to arrange their mutual relations legally, and within certain limits, autonomously’ (van der 
Pijl 1998: 65). It was this state/society complex sanctioned by the Glorious Revolution that 
allowed the take-off into capitalism understood as relations of production in which workers 
find themselves ‘doubly free’: free from feudal exploitation, but also ‘free’ from ownership of 
their means of reproduction. 
This is because capitalism involves ‘both a particular organization of production and 
exploitation and a particular differentiation between the public and private – a differentiation 
that could not hold in pre-capitalist societies as the relations of domination were identical with 
the relations of exploitation’ (Teschke and Lacher 2007: 568).  It is this complex, with its 
conception of an ‘abstractly political’ state, that Kees van der Pijl terms ‘Lockean’. Use of this 
term, after John Locke’s 1689 Two Treatises of Government, indicates the significance of ideas 
as material processes. Here Locke’s ideas  exploring and developing the still contested and 
developing social structure found at the resolution of battles over surplus allocation,22 take on 
a material power and reality once championed, and internalised as a worldview, by those 
whose interests they further. 
This ‘abstractly political’ state-society complex was unique but rested on a transnational 
society from the beginning, enabled by settlement to the New World  and the pattern of local 
self-government that accompanied it that predated the Civil War in England. With the Lockean 
                                                             
22 ‘The ‘glorious Revolution’ brought into power, along with William of Orange, the landlord and 
capitalist appropriators of surplus-value.  They inaugurated the new era by practicing on a colossal scale 
theft of state lands, thefts that had hitherto been managed more modestly’ (Marx and Engels 2007: 
795). 
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pattern transmitted there emerged ‘on the foundations of industrial/commercial centrality 
and predominance, a heartland of the global political economy’ and a transnational society 
(van der Pijl 1998: 64 – 74). This unity of states under a society based upon this common 
state/society complex provides a further internal relation between capital and the state, 
geared to the international: ‘[Capital] profited historically from the structural free space and 
entry conditions prevailing in [this] Atlantic English speaking world; the West has all along 
pursued global liberalism and created the spaces for capital to expand transnationally’ (van der 
Pijl 2007: 619). 
Set against this heartland, that is resisting the pressure it generates, van der Pijl further 
identifies contenders to this originally Anglophone West of the US and UK: France, Germany, 
Japan, Italy and the USSR, now China – and thus incorporates intra-Western conflict into the 
theorising of the structure of the West in a way that, for example, a racialised hierarchy cannot.  
To compete, contender states are forced to restructure by this ‘whip of external necessity’23 - 
though rather than allowing this to become abstracted and banalised, the central importance 
is that the whip hand has so far enduringly, remained that of this heartland.24  As existing 
ruling classes attempt to maintain control and keep power this process is one of passive 
revolution, that is a synthetic revolution from above  - the process that Adam Morton similarly 
identifies as giving an internal relation between capital and the state and accordingly places at 
the centre of explaining international relations (Morton 2007).  The key distinction here is that 
this is a national complex, without the appearance of an ‘abstractly political’ state, containing 
rather a directive state fusing together incompatible social forces. 
With an internal relation between capital and the state-system established, any conception of 
two distinct and competing logics must be abandoned.  What remains is the inter-relation 
between the economic and the political and its management.  This then gives us more complex 
picture of class intra-relation, between state and capital managers; as far as they can in fact be 
distinguished, both roles often existing in the same individual either concurrently or 
sequentially.  Again behaviour cannot be derived from ‘logics’ or structures: ‘The question is 
never what state managers or capitalists  ought to do or ought to have done according to an 
ideal-typical logic, but what they actually did’ (Teschke and Lacher 2007: 570, their emphasis).  
Most significantly is the tension between capitalists competing against one another, and their 
                                                             
23 See below for the falsity of the view of incompatibility between Trotsky and Gramsci. 
24 cf. Teschke and Lacher 2007, for this danger in work built upon the theory of uneven and combined 
development. 
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common interest against the working class – the image of the ‘warring brothers’. Resolving this 
requires the identification of these common interests, and the negotiating of differences 
deriving from competition. 
This development of class-consciousness is central,  as though class is not an identity but an 
objective position in the relations of production, to act as a class, that is to overcome their 
plurality as ‘warring brothers’ and form a coherent common interest, capitalists must be not 
just the objectively given class in itself, but a subjectively developed class for itself.  This I have 
covered above, and it is this subjective development that defines actually existing capitalism 
and allows us to integrate, for example, racism not as epiphenomenal but as constitutive to 
class rule in the sense Hobson suggests.  Capitalists are not capitalists in the abstract but as 
real human subjects occupying a structural position and defining the nature of existing 
capitalism through their agency. 
Within this planning groups, explicitly dedicated to the formation of common understandings 
of interests and their strategic pursuit, are key – but formative too are broader social 
conditions and more diffuse networks within which those actively involved in the networks of 
planning groups also sit.  Even more significant for us is this interest as it is turned beyond 
simply operating against a domestic working class, towards more regional or global interests, 
and the stronger intersection with foreign policy this entails, which intersects itself with 
broader cultural conceptions, here of the ‘West and the rest’. 
This understanding underpins the focus on conceptions of European alternatives as a 
reconfiguring of Western hegemony.  As Gonzalo Pozo-Martin notes ‘it is crucial not to confuse 
foreign policy ideology with realism.  Examining the doctrines that articulate state managers’ 
views is an essential task’ giving information on and reflecting the ‘fundamental tensions or 
harmonies between the actions of state-managers and the class conscious influence of 
sections of national capital’, thus the ‘study of ideology is a necessary element in any 
examination of the state-capital link’ (Pozo-Martin 2007: 557-8), to which I simply add that the 
plurality of state forms, and the forms of the EU, along with their internal relation to capital 
must be borne in mind.  
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Hegemony 
 
… the greatest modern theoretician of the philosophy of praxis [Lenin] 
has—on the terrain of political organisation and struggle and with 
political terminology—in opposition to the various tendencies of 
‘economism’, reappraised the front of cultural struggle and constructed 
the doctrine of hegemony as a complement to the theory of the State-as-
force.     
Gramsci 1971: 56 
 
Hegemony offers the ‘how’ to the ‘who/whom’ framing my approach as outlined above.   As 
such it is centrally concerned with the means of power.   Accordingly, hegemony is also an 
essentially contested concept, by which I mean its definition is methodologically dependent, as 
it lies at the politically significant intersection of structure(s) and agency: the use and 
construction of the former in the latter. Its definition having significant political import it is 
therefore not amenable to agreement across methodologies (cf. Cerny 2006: 67).   
In his consideration of American empire, Niall Ferguson notes that ‘by far the most popular 
term among writers on international relations [for the US] remains hegemon’ (Ferguson 2005: 
8).  As so popularly used within the discipline, and summarised succinctly by Ferguson, 
hegemony is accordingly used in a state-centric way to characterise the American situation as 
one of politico-military dominance, or in hegemonic stability theory as leadership underwriting 
world order.25  The ‘great lie’ can permit little else within theory, and as we have seen such 
theory was an effective part of Cold War Western supremacy.  
Ferguson himself instead subsumes hegemony under empire – distinction between the two is 
not ‘legitimate’ (ibid: 10) – to demonstrate overall continuity in American foreign policy and 
thereby the legitimacy and necessity of the Bush administration turn to coercion, in the 
process implicating earlier IR discussion of the ‘hegemon’ within informal American Empire. 
The shift in policy is a shift in means: ‘American empire has up until now, with a few exceptions, 
preferred indirect rule to direct rule and informal empire to formal empire’, the question 
provoked by the ‘conspicuously uninvited invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq’ is whether this 
marks a transition to more direct and formal imperial structures (Ferguson 2005: 12-13). 
                                                             
25 Both derive from a reading of the term’s ancient Greek heritage, in the realist reading the stress on 
Athenian dominance, the liberal on Athenian leadership – in common with most IR accounts of this 
supposed classical root for the discipline, relying on a dichotomisation of internal/external that does not 
hold up well to more considered historical study (Monoson and Loriaux 2006).  
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The unorthodox use by Niall Ferguson, a highly effective organic intellectual for Western 
power most prominently in the neocon moment - homo atlanticus redux as Pankaj Mishra put 
it (Mishra 2011) – is therefore revealing about the crisis of US hegemony and relation to 
mainstream US IR.  It brings out the disjuncture between the two, revealing the difficulties and 
confusion of mainstream IR discourse on the taboo, and disciplinarily structurally difficult issue 
of US empire;  Robbie Shilliam noted contemporarily that whilst the ‘recent unilateral turn in 
US foreign policy has yet to unsettle established theoretical traditions in the discipline […] it 
has nevertheless thrown into sharp relief the limits of existing concepts of power, leadership 
and world order’ (Shilliam 2004: 59-60).   
John Ikenberry represents the other ‘liberal’ side of the US foreign policy debate, arguing that 
analyses such as Ferguson’s overestimate US coercive power, and if they are to retain their 
pre-eminence the US should focus on leadership (Ikenberry 2005).  Again however, both realist 
and liberal concepts of hegemony are explicitly intertwined in the analysis; their intellectual 
incompatibility noted but discounted.  He argues that a beneficial global order of ‘democracy 
and capital flows’ requires US power to back it, which in turn legitimates the use of US power – 
albeit here in dialogue with other responsible states.  The desired effect is the same: limited 
polyarchic democracy and (and as) safety for capital.  With the aims agreed this is a strategic 
discussion as to whether the US alone underwrite this project, or must it draw in other 
coercive forces and bolster its legitimacy by broadening its base.   
The limits of such discussion, that these shifts can be contained within an ongoing US 
exceptionalism and largely unchanged overall concept of global governance I covered in the 
introductory chapter. Nonetheless here consideration of hegemony within competing 
hegemonic projects post-Iraq demonstrates not only the limits of US IR as it relates to the crisis 
of US hegemony and the formulation of responses, but also how in practice the relation 
between coercion and consent within hegemony are implicitly understood.  Whilst collapsing 
the ‘great lie’, Kagan and Ikenberry stop at the ‘threshold’ of declaring their class allegiance – 
analysis remains couched in terms of ‘the US’ and provision of universal benefit – a theory of 
hegemony we can use requires its foregrounding. 
The ‘Moment of Coercion’ 
Deriving from Gramsci’s realisation that the ruling class rarely had to resort to force to 
maintain its position, his concept of hegemony is a theory of social leadership, in which power 
is seen as a combination of coercion and consent, with, in the quotidian run of Western 
societies, consent of primary significance. To gain such consent, rather than mere 
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acquiescence, the interests of the ruling social class must be universalised; that is either 
naturalised by being written in to the very nature of things, or presented as being in the 
interests of society(ies) as a whole, or at least a majority within it.  
This definition of hegemony draws on Russian socialist, rather than Greek, roots and 
developed as a practical revolutionary strategy for winning power, referring to the formation 
of an alliance between the proletariat and peasantry against the oppression of the ruling class. 
It is the development of this concept within the Comintern, subsequent to the success of the 
October revolution, that Gramsci draws upon (Anderson 1976: 15-16).  In drawing upon it, 
Gramsci stressed the need for concessions and sacrifices from the proletariat to secure its 
leading position, adding a cultural or ethico-political element to the more mechanical Russian 
conception of alliance – the metaphor of ‘yoking’ - to give a conception of a more organic 
whole, intellectually and morally unified, a ‘new historic bloc’ (ibid: 19). 
The true novelty of Gramsci’s work however lay in taking this strategy, generalising its 
conceptions and applying them to the analysis of bourgeois rule in the West; taking up Lenin 
and Trotsky’s notion that the ‘dense organization of civil society in the West would require a 
different road to socialism than that taken by the Russian Bolsheviks’ to ‘vastly enrich and 
expand the implications of what was still a rather crude formulation in the early 1920s’ 
(Rosengarten 1984: 66-67).  Here then we have the use of concessions to the working class by 
the bourgeoisie, as well as the role of ideological structures in generating a unified society 
under their rule.  In generalising the concept of hegemony in this way, he drew upon 
Machiavelli’s conception of the dual nature of power – the centaur, half-human, half-animal – 
incorporating force and consent. In thus analysing bourgeois rule as hegemonic, the concept 
becomes a theoretical informing of counter-hegemonic strategy. 
This second use to a degree negates the first, Russian one, for a Western context: it is this 
understanding of bourgeois class-rule in hegemonic terms that underpins the analysis of why a 
war of movement, from which this first definition stems, cannot succeed.  That is, capture of 
the state in the West would be insufficient, as behind the rule of the state stands civil society – 
the whole apparatus of hegemonic rule generating consent. What is necessary then is a war of 
position – that is the building of a counter-hegemonic apparatus.   
Focusing upon this need for counter-hegemony in ideology and culture (often in reaction to, 
and in preference to, economistic understandings of Marx) leads to a third ‘Gramscian’ reading 
of hegemony, one in which hegemony is abstracted away from this constitutive revolutionary 
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development to focus overwhelmingly on this ideational element  and absorption into the 
reformism  of social democracy through this.  Much of the criticism of Gramsci from the left, 
from Perry Anderson’s 1976 Antimonies of Antonio Gramsci onwards, has been in fact 
concerned primarily with this use of  his thought – Anderson targeting Euro communism and  
the influence of Foucault and Deleuze on the ‘politico-intellectual landscape’ of the left 
(Thomas 2009: 81), Robbie Shilliam more recently criticising neo-Gramscianism as a project 
restricted to ‘building alternative ideologies and political subjectivities to those constituting 
and upholding dominant structures’ (Shilliam 2004: 61). 
What both are reacting to is, in Emanuele Saccarelli’s term for the great mass of Gramscian 
work in this ‘cultural’ vein within academia, ‘Gramsciology’: the residue of cultural politics and 
hegemony as discourse left once Gramsci’s work is traduced through its academicisation - that 
is its separating from its constitutive relation to a revolutionary socialist politics based upon a 
Marxist understanding of class (Saccarelli 2008).   This is enabled by the fragmentary and 
highly abstracted form of writing forced upon Gramsci by his imprisonment and accompanying 
censorship. The forced shift from direct political engagement to a euphemised engagement, 
along with the posthumous work done in presenting these notebooks as the work of a ‘writer 
and thinker’, gives the appearance of a very academic form of abstraction to generalities. 
Academics, Saccarelli argues, can relate to him as ‘a familiar sort of intellectual—specifically, as 
a fellow academic’, and ‘as a result, moreover, Gramsci is turned into a figure he would have 
recognized and derided — a ‘critical critic’ confident in, or at least resigned to, the corrosive 
power of cultural criticism alone’ (Saccarelli 2008: 25).   
The fragmentary form also, and here we travel with Perry Anderson’s concerns, ‘allows’ 
selective readings that fit with the academic habitus – containing an over-valorisation of the 
ideational, the field in which the professional academic expends their energies.   The crux is 
Gramsci’s use of Machiavelli’s centaur, which Anderson asserts allows an opposition of 
coercion and consent, through which ‘he allowed the conclusion that bourgeois class power 
was primarily consensual. In this form, the idea of hegemony tends to accredit the notion that 
the dominant mode of bourgeois power in the West -‘culture’- is also the determinant mode, 
either by suppressing the latter or fusing the two together. It thereby omits the unappealable 
role in the last instance of force’ (Anderson 1976: 44). 
However, it is precisely the relation between the dominant and determinant mode, as put by 
Anderson, that is the key development made in Gramsci’s work on hegemony.  After asserting 
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the need to develop a ‘’dual perspective’ in political action and in the life of the State’ with 
‘two fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli’s Centaur — half-
animal and half-human. They are the levels of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, 
violence and civilisation’, he explains the dialectical nature of this dual perspective:  
Some have reduced the theory of the ‘dual perspective’ to something 
petty and banal, to nothing but two forms of ‘immediacy’ which 
succeed each other mechanically in time, with greater or less 
‘proximity’. In actual fact, it often happens that the more the first 
‘perspective’ is ‘immediate’ and elementary, the more the second has 
to be ‘distant’ (not in time, but as a dialectical relation), complex and 
elevated.  
    Gramsci Q 13, §14, SPN: 169-70 
 
The relation of coercion and consent is not then one of opposites, of one or the other, but of 
simultaneity, their ‘dialectical inclusion and implication’. Nor is this, or its relations to forms of 
state or forms of revolutionary strategy an abstracted one, their relation is determined by the 
concrete conjuncture the ‘immediacy’ of one or the other ‘depending upon the specific 
conditions of the conjuncture, as a form of appearance of the other (that is, as its essential 
conjunctural form)’. As Peter Thomas summarises, ‘[c]onsent and coercion now figure as 
moments within each other, theoretically distinct but really united as moments of a political 
hegemonic project (Thomas 2009:179). It is such an understanding of hegemony that 
underpins the relation between ideology and force in this thesis. 
All of this will be developed further in the second theoretical chapter, where the need for 
elaboration of this conception of hegemony as it pertains to the contemporary academic field 
develops from this distinction from ‘Gramsciology’ – for example Owen Worth’s call to develop 
neo-Gramscianism through ‘[t]he work of Habermas, Hall, Laclau, Mouffe and even Foucault’ is 
rejected on these grounds (Worth 2008: 45).  
What we must take from this here are two things. Firstly, the seemingly facile point  that 
construction of a discourse on  the legitimate use of global  power implies the existence of 
such power, acknowledged or not: the shift from civilian power Europe to global power Europe 
I address in this first part of the thesis therefore reflecting the growth of European ability to 
project power. The argument here is then over how realistic assessments of capabilities, or 
near future generation of capabilities are; seen in Ikenberry’s questioning of the feasibility of 
Ferguson’s vision of empire for the US and the capabilities-expectations gap in EU literature 
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(Hill 1993; Toje 2008). Secondly, and giving this salience, it is just this relation between 
coercion and consent, the constitutive role of force in politics that the cosmopolitanism within 
Europe’s legitimating discourse seeks to deny, this disjuncture further  stressed in the shift to 
Arendtian cosmopolitanism covered in chapter five. 
Ideology - A Marxist Definition 
Ideology is also central to understanding hegemony and here I offer a Marxist definition; as 
Jorge Larrain notes, with the development of a variety of Marxist traditions, such a definition 
can only ever be a rather than the Marxist definition.  Nevertheless, whilst synthesis may be 
‘impossible’, Larrain offers an account of the complementarity between the broad division in 
Marxist thought, between negative and neutral definitions of ideology, according to the ‘task’ 
it is best suited to – the former to uncover the distortion of undesirable social situations at the 
level of their appearance, the latter to analyse ‘political discourses in search of hegemony’ 
(Larrain 1991).26  I follow this schema, with the distinction that this complementarity should be 
seen as structured by ‘depth’, related to Gramsci’s concept of historically organic ideologies, 
and cover them in that order here. 
Marx used the term negatively against bourgeois theory, defining ideas as ideological to the 
extent they obscure the inequalities in the determining context which creates them.  
Bourgeois theory obscures through being a partial view of society, based upon the individual, 
necessary for the legitimation of liberal capitalism and bourgeois sense of self, against which 
he offered a ‘scientific’ holistic view in which socio-economic determinants become visible.   
Ideology as used critically like this is not simply equated to falsehood, rather it relates to 
distortion in two ways: distortion in the naturalisation and eternalisation of current social 
relations, their presentation as an immutable ‘fact of life’ the distortion; and, one-sided 
presentation of the truth, a partial presentation that has the effect of concealing the real 
relations it describes 
At the deepest level of ideology is the presentation of the essence of capitalism as residing in 
the free-market. Thus a focus on the labour market gives an appearance of equality and 
freedom to a system of production based on exploitation and unfreedom.  The market is not a 
lie, but the effects of the transformations necessary to create it are obscured by a focus on its 
                                                             
26 Jorge Larrain is treating the incompleteness of Stuart Hall’s ‘Gramsciology’ (as Saccarelli defines it), asserting the 
need to move beyond discourse to the ‘reality of unfreedom and inequality’ as without this move all discourses are 
ideological, thus eliminating the critical edge of a focus on power and domination (Larrain 1991: 28, 5).   
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internal working. Uncovering this we ‘perceive a change in the physiognomy of our dramatis 
personae. He, who before was the money-owner, now strides in front as capitalist; the 
possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, 
intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to 
market and has nothing to expect but — a hiding’ (Marx and Engels 2007: 196).  
Marx’s insights here revolve around seeing ideas as arising from and reflecting material 
conditions, and as being ideological in so far as they conceal social contradictions. In this they 
are the mental compensation for a deficient social reality – there is therefore continuity in the 
use of the term for both religious and bourgeois ideology. Similarly, the hold such ideas have 
over all of society must be understood in this compensatory characteristic – fairness in ‘fair 
exchange’ and a ‘fair day’s pay for fair day’s work’ the sigh of the oppressed creature.   Against 
idealism therefore, ideology must be tackled at source, in acting not against ‘mistaken ideas 
but the misshapen nature of social reality which generated mistaken ideas’ (McLellan 1986: 
13).  
Accordingly for Jorge Lorrain the ‘task’ from this is therefore practical change, at the level of 
relations of production. Larrain is clear that the ideational is a dialectical part of this, but 
holding on to this definition ensures the reality of inequality and unfreedom is not diluted into 
the purely discursive.  This ideology is not merely a discursive trick on the part of the capitalist; 
it is only by perceiving the inner relationships of production that a competing view of possible 
social change can be constructed. 
Taking seriously this conception of ideology, here capitalism as the market being the 
perception of all involved, Lenin builds upon it with the insight that the working class requires 
socialist ideology to penetrate this appearance, and transcend a merely reactive response to 
the degradations of capitalism: that is, being restricted to the level of appearance there is an 
inherent limitation to trade-union consciousness, to fight for more favourable relations of 
exchange within the labour market, not the uncovering of the true nature of it and subsequent 
call for the destruction of social relations that maintain it. Hence ‘the spontaneous  
development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology’ 
(Lenin 1969). As Lenin labels the necessary intellectual and educative27 intervention for 
                                                             
27 This analysis of spontaneous working class thought is not intended to exclude workers from full involvement in a 
socialist movement but to highlight the need for all workers to become ‘socialist theoreticians’ – a natural tendency 
socially suppressed as Lenin sees it (ibid). In this we see the reality of Leninism’s relation to social democracy and 
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revolution ‘socialist ideology’, he is often seen as developing  a ‘neutral’ or ‘positive’ definition 
of ideology, that is one that relates systems of thought to class interests. It is from here, 
usually then via Gramsci, that we get the expansion of possible interests considered as 
generative of systems of thought or worldviews, until, whilst still at least nominally within the 
Marxist tradition, we get to the idea of all discourse as ideological, and a non-correspondence 
between ideology and class (e.g. Hall 1988, cf. Grossberg 1986, Larrain 1991). 
The problem stems from this idea of both Lenin and Gramsci’s definitions of ideology as in 
some sense general or ‘neutral’.  Lenin’s is unrelentingly binary: ‘the only choice is — either 
bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a “third” 
ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class 
or an above-class ideology)’ (Lenin 1969).   For Gramsci, similarly, ‘neutrality’ is merely 
definitional between opposing class forces.  Against the extension of ideology to all discourse 
he notes the concept loses its value when applied to both ‘the necessary superstructure of a 
particular structure and the arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals’, and he therefore 
distinguishes between historically organic ideologies necessary to a given structure that 
‘’organize’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness 
of their position, struggle, etc.’ and ‘arbitrary willed ideologies that produce ‘movements’ and 
‘polemics’’ (Gramsci Q7§19, SPN: 376-7).  The former, as historically organic, are therefore 
accurate expressions of material interests.  Thus for an historic bloc (a union of social forces) 
‘material forces are the content and ideologies the form’.  This though is a merely heuristic 
division as they are inconceivable without one another; ‘since the material forces would be 
inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without 
the material forces’ (Gramsci Q7§21, SPN: 377). At the deepest level we see this again in the 
market as the practical expression and force of the domination of capital and the bourgeoisie, 
and at the same time its ideology. 
Ideological struggle is again seen as critical, and extended from Lenin into a more sophisticated 
take on the role of institutions and thought in establishing particularly ‘common sense’.  By 
this Gramsci is referring to the nature of spontaneous thought within the mass of the people, 
like Lenin, seeing it as embedded in, and expressing the assumptions of ruling class attitudes 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
elite control –the inverse of the relationship more usually assumed:   ‘Leninism is conceived as a more democratic 
form of organisation than Social Democracy. It rests on activity, organisation and participation. In contrast, Social 
Democracy rests on a passive relationship to its base, organising it socially, but keeping it separate from the political 
leadership’ (Joseph 2002: 51). 
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and interests, as generalized so as to appear simply as the natural way things are, or as 
operating in the general interest. Against this is ‘good sense’ - the kernel of which is derived 
from the practical experience of the common people, over which is overlaid common sense -  
‘a conception of reality that has gone beyond common sense and become, if only within 
narrow limits, a critical conception’ (Gramsci Q11§12, SPN: 323-43).   
I take forward from this the binary underpinning ideology at the deepest level, and the idea of 
a depth complementarity, that is an organic link between this core binary and strategic 
political discourse.   This relationship of depth complementarity is captured by Gramsci’s 
concept of historically organic ideologies.  The parameters of successful ideological 
mobilisation are set by the fundamentals of the situation – here class in a capitalist society.  
Within this context hegemony is a shifting and unstable achievement and ideology within this 
is therefore shaped by conjuncture and the balance of forces and change therein.  Thus above 
the fundamental binary of bourgeois and socialist ideology there are more complex structures 
of thought: bourgeois nonetheless as they assert or naturalise this deep level of defence of 
property and the free market as the reality of capitalism, socialist as they focus on the 
unfreedom and inequality in the relations underpinning it.   
This higher level contains political strategies – comprehensive concepts of control, such as the 
discourse at all levels building to the imposition of neoliberalism in the West (e.g. Hayek and 
Friedman via Keith Josephs and the Centre for Policy Studies to Thatcherism) – but also those 
not necessarily conscious of ‘strategy’, but that serve the same ends in working within the 
common sense of the time.  It is to this kind of work, dealing with immediate problems within 
a given context that Robert Cox terms ‘problem solving theory’.  The problem with this is that 
in setting up his own binary between this kind of intellectual work and ‘critical theory’ Cox 
obscures the radical nature of neoliberalism, the most globally socially restructuring project in 
history.  It is the power of ideology at the deep level, the almost automatic expansion of the 
discipline of capital once the logic of the market and commodities is accepted, that gives the 
appearance of problem solving, or common sense, to a radical project extending this logic far 
beyond that contained within liberalism (cf. Cammack 2007).  Mental subordination then is 
both embedded in the naturalisation of socio-economic structures, and a product of politically 
strategic discourse and coercive activity. 
As a final consideration of ideology I briefly apply this model to US exceptionalism. Richard 
Hofstadter’s oft cited comment that for the US ‘[i]t has been our fate as a nation not to have 
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ideologies, but to be one’ (Hofstadter 1963: 43) brings out the central role of ‘Americanism’ in 
suppressing alternatives within the US to capitalist ideologies (a succession of comprehensive 
concepts of control), as they developed over time: the characteristics Hofstadter gives to this 
national ideology is centred on the protection of private property rights and (and 
acknowledged to be in tension with, if not against) democracy.28  
This Americanism monopolises ideological space as whilst it is ‘what socialism is to a socialist’, 
it is also a unique formulation in that ‘ideology and nationality are fused and the 
disappearance of the former would mean the end of the latter’ (Leon Samson cited in 
Huntington 1981: 25; Huntington 1981: 27).  Thus fused  this Americanism has been ‘uniquely 
effective in overpowering other systems of beliefs and values’(McKay 2009). It is also from this 
both inclusionary and exclusionary: to be part of the community one must ‘merely’ conform to 
set political values and ideals – one can retain ethnic identity and even hyphenated-national 
ties - whilst on the menacing reverse is the danger of being labelled un-American on political, 
rather than national grounds. 
Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative intellectual with bipartisan influence,29 captures 
the uniqueness, unique power, and global implications of this ideology when wedded to the 
globe’s most powerful political formation.  He notes that ‘[t]o be an American is to believe in 
and be committed to what Americans, and only Americans, like to call “our way of life”’, but 
that this way of life is however also in principle universal: the American cause is the ‘cause of 
all mankind’ (Kagan 2012: 12; Benjamin Franklin cited in ibid).  In its naturalisation 
Americanism becomes inherently universal so there is therefore a tendency from within this 
ideological frame to judge all people against their own society, seen as the universal standard. 
The idea of Americans as beneficent imperialists in denial is an effect of this ‘highly ideological 
                                                             
28
 Of course, such an Americanism did not just naturally occur, but is the result of long struggle, both 
coercively and ideologically.  Dorothy Ross, considering the ‘Origins of American Social Science’ and 
relationship between it and American exceptionalism (Ross 1992), traces the conflict between 
egalitarian and liberal world views within this exceptionalism, with the liberal version of Americanism 
winning out (cf. Lipset and Marks 2000, for this struggle in the labour movement, though, in a nice 
example of such American social science, repression and the ‘idea of America’ are treated as 
independent variables). 
29 Kagan was a co-founder of the Project for the New American Century and is a member the Council on 
Foreign Relations.  He is currently at the Brookings Institution and has advised both Mitt Romney during 
his presidential bid, and Hillary Clinton – Barack Obama was also seen toting his 2012 book cited here 
The World America Made (Landler 2012; Klein 2012). 
 
42 
 
 
view of the world’ which obscures the imperialist content of US actions to a domestic audience, 
and masks the interests furthered through it (ibid, cf. Ferguson 2004). 
The crisis of hegemony is in part that the export of ‘our way of life’ has lost its universal veneer, 
and the increased difficulty of legitimising the form of neoliberal interventions without this.  
The rebuilding of such a veneer takes place most explicitly in policy discourse on the US and 
the broader West (compare Brzezinski 2012; Kupchan 2012). Both Niall Ferguson and Robert 
Kagan through their uncovering of US imperialism seek to ‘de-Americanise’ and re-universalise 
the interests pursued through it with a more universal liberal ideology, through this giving US 
imperialism an heroic, almost self-sacrificial bent (cf. Drezner 2004).  Kagan reasserts the need 
for American leadership whilst distancing it from some of the more brutal and insensitive 
assertions of American universalism of the past. Identifying the core principles of Americanism 
as ideological allows a more sophisticated universalization of, and subsequent rallying to them, 
separable in principle from a rallying to America.  The US just happens to remain the 
indispensable nation for the safeguarding of this ideology of democracy, freedom, and free 
markets (the holy trinity, as ever, distinct but of one essence) in a dangerous world. 
As we saw espoused by Alvaro de Vasconcelos, at this level of reconstructing ideology we find 
an assertive EU. I argue that this contains an EU exceptionalism, with a (specific) neoliberal 
core, offering a more powerful universalisation of the interests of capital as shorn of 
attachment to a specific nation, and particularly as constructed against the preceding US 
model.  The focus here on organic intellectuals attached to think tanks and policy planning 
bodies suggests their central role in this, and that is my next concern. 
 
Think Tanks as ‘Ideological Apparatus’ 
Whilst mapping interlocking corporate directorates and boards can show that there is a 
corporate community, providing the necessary objective basis for the formation of a class for 
itself, to exist such a class must show conscious agency, and it is this dialectic that is grasped 
through comprehensive concepts of control.  It is thus  in the formation, interaction within, 
and activities of policy planning groups that we find evidence of the actual formation of such 
historic blocs, as actors seek to resolve disputes and co-ordinate interests to establish a 
consensus position, and formulate strategy to further this position hegemonically (Carroll 2010, 
Heemskerk 2013).  This applies at both the more immediate concrete problem-solving level, 
and in broader projects aiming to reshape societies in line with amenability to discipline by 
capital, with the two clearly inter-linked. 
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Think tanks in various forms – and I come to the role of definitional questions below – are 
therefore central to this process, in providing an enabling platform for the formation and 
pursuit of such strategies. Enabling in the bringing together of the individuals, or 
representatives of institutions both state and private, funding their activities and the 
interconnections thereby to the corporate community, with organic intellectuals able to work 
to legitimise and universalise funders interests.   
 
I focus here on think tanks, the informal discussion groups and conferences that form another 
part of this policy planning apparatus , such as the Trilateral Commission, or the Bilderberg 
Conferences, having been covered by others working in similar vein (e.g. Gill 1992, van der Pijl 
2007). Nonetheless these groups do bring out the second of the two dimensions to think tanks 
that I will cover. The first dimension is their role as think tanks qua think tanks, as policy 
institutes staffed by employees and producing research reports and the like. However, 
secondly, they also act as conveners of members of an existing or potential class for itself 
pursuing or formulating a hegemonic strategy, brought together through the governance 
boards which formulate strategy and policy direction for think tanks.  This second aspect tends 
to be neglected in the literature, though the World Economic Forum is an interesting example 
of the obverse focus, with the conference meetings attracting a great deal of media interest 
and coverage, whilst the year round work it carries out producing reports and convening policy 
panels and smaller regional meetings goes underreported. 
 
The central importance of think tanks stems from the relation between these roles: the second 
as a critical part of policy planning as an historic bloc forms; the first in translating these 
specific interests into expert knowledge – that is seemingly independent, disinterested 
technical knowledge and advice.   It is here that the role of organic intellectuals for capital is 
clearest, in the concealing of specific class interests in such legitimising and universalising garb. 
Such expert knowledge, as William Carroll rightly points out, is as central to hegemonic control 
as ‘common sense’ (Carroll 2010: 234).  
 
Indeed, it is the presentation of such expert knowledge as independent and disinterested 
technical knowledge that allows the breaking of established common sense, in favour of the 
creation of a new status quo.  The epochal shift from the prevailing status quo of Keynesianism 
and the welfare state to Thatcherism is the seminal neoliberal case in Europe, in which, 
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alongside considerable state coercion, reshaping common sense through politically selected 
‘expert knowledge’ was absolutely central.  Within this the Thatcherite think tank Centre for 
Policy Studies played a significant part. Established in 1974 by Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret 
Thatcher, it was explicitly tasked to ‘‘think the unthinkable’ with regard to public policy’, with 
the ‘unthinkable’ consisting largely of the application of neoliberal thought to the specific UK 
policy context30 (Stone 1996: 32-35, Stone and Garnett 1998: 13-14; Hall 1988: 271-282; Hall 
1993; Peck and Tickell 2007: 38-45).31 
 
The effectiveness of think tanks in this role, and their birth and predominant existence in the 
Anglo-American context, relates to the relation between this politics of expertise and state –
society structures.  For Lockean structures, where the freedom of civil society is constructed as 
against the state,  it is knowledge produced in civil society that is viewed as independent, as, 
regardless of the funding for its production, it is the state that is viewed as an interested 
political actor, and therefore illegitimate in this role.  This contrasts with contender state 
traditions, where a centrally directing, civil society confiscating state has shaped society 
through expert and technical knowledge produced within the state apparatus.  Such traditions 
vary, but offer a clear contrast to the Lockean model. 
 
To fully understand the working of this politics of expertise within this structure I will treat 
think tanks’ intellectual production with Bourdieu’s field theory, as this allows for the reality of 
the semi-autonomy central to their ideological role, and maintains a focus on strategic agency.  
This anticipates the use of the same in considering academics’ role, but the think tank field is 
significantly different to the academic field. It is the structural nature of these differences that 
account for the power of think tanks.   The central difference is that think tanks occupy an 
interstitial field – a field that exists between the fields of the media, academia, politics, and 
business (Medvetz 2012). As such it exists in a condition of ‘dependent independence’ from 
these fields, dependent upon resources and status from them, but also working to establish 
and maintain independence precisely in order to present itself as purveyor of independent 
policy relevant expertise. This character accounts for the seemingly antagonistic accounts of 
the two main traditions studying the field, as each contains one part of this unique character: 
                                                             
30
 http://www.cps.org.uk/about/history/ 
31
 This is ironically echoed in Diane Stone’s archetypally pluralist account, where she uses this anti-status quo 
activity as a defence against the charge that think tanks act in the interests of a ruling elite – confusing the status 
quo, an old class compromise, with the interests of capital.  There are echoes of the problematic distinction 
between critical and problem solving theory here too. 
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pluralist accounts asserting the independence of think tanks, whilst more critical approaches 
stress their dependence and incorporate them into a larger apparatus of hegemonic control 
used by a ruling class.   
 
Before developing this characterisation of the field as interstitial, I will outline these two 
established bodies of work on think tanks as it is precisely the tension between the two which 
gives the model such power. To give a first indication of the relationship between the two here, 
the contrast can be seen to be between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ viewpoints: for the former the 
field ‘appears highly competitive and pluralistic. No one organisation or individual controls the 
agenda or holds together a consensus’; whilst from outside it ‘may appear exclusive and 
structured through the interaction of elites’ (Stone 1991: 199).  This is of some significance 
sociologically, with the majority of scholars in the pluralist tradition also working in the field, 
whilst the critical tradition emanates from academic fields further from, and much less 
entwined with the policy field, such as sociology (Medvetz 2012: 10-13).32 
 
As part of its naturalisation of the Lockean state-society structure, mainstream political 
science’s pluralist considerations of think tanks fulfil an ideological role, establishing think 
tanks, or more formally and euphemistically in the literature, public policy institutes, as 
independent and scholarly.  They do so explicitly – for example defining them functionally as 
‘third party vetters of trust’ who ‘edit and credibly validate information’ (Stone 2000: 160) - 
but also through dis-embedding think tanks from their social relations of production. 
 
Think tanks are established as occupying a more or less hermetic field: that is as a competitive 
‘ideas market’, a market, as ever, divorced from the underpinning relations of production.  
Thus dissociated, competition can be seen as representative of a plurality of interests, as 
different organisations engage in ‘the daily battles, the fight for funding or the jostling for 
media attention’, that are so central a part of life within the field (Stone 1991: 199).   
 
                                                             
32 Thomas Medvetz extends this to argue that this distinction and disagreement further contains a 
‘euphemized battle between two sets of intellectuals over their own proper social role’ (Medvetz 2012: 
10). Examples of insider status from the mainstream pluralist scholars include both principal examples 
used here of  James McGann (president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute) and Diane Stone 
(consultant for the World Bank, and founder of the Public Policy Department at the Central European 
University, an academic-think tank nexus).  Other notable figures mentioned in this chapter include R. 
Kent Weaver (fellow at Brookings Institution) and Andrew Rich (ex-President and CEO of the Roosevelt 
Institute). 
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This characterisation of a ‘fight for funding’ is typical of how the funding of think tanks is given 
technical attention (how do we acquire and maintain funding), rather than any political 
importance; indeed as noted above an inversion takes place where ‘private funding’ is a mark 
of independence, as it is presumed to be government that they will be advising. Where the 
motives of donors are considered, Diane Stone’s treatment is typical, suggesting support 
‘because they have a sense of social responsibility and believe a healthy democracy requires 
people thinking about public issues and offering alternative views. Similarly, think tanks may 
be supported because they contribute to the basic knowledge of and about society and the 
economy’ (Stone 1997: unnumbered33).   
 
To establish such a restricted discrete field consanguineous forms of organisation that are 
more obviously tied to donor interests, such as lobbying, PR or for-profit consultancies must be 
excluded – hence a focus on definitional concerns, and from this, taxonomies of the 
organisational forms and strategies of think tanks become a considerable part of the body of 
work. Such accounts then are wilfully naïve in the sense that they therefore ‘take the 
organisation’s role on the organisation’s own assessment’, and thus ‘conflate function with 
organizational form’ (Pautz 2011: 420).34 
 
Despite then consisting largely of rather dull compendia and taxonomies, or ‘narrow pluralistic 
recordation’, of ‘a large number of private, semi-public and public institutions of knowledge 
and ideology production’ (Pautz 2011: 420), the impact of mainstream scholarship on think 
tanks is significant in this ideological sense of establishing a separate think tank field from 
which ‘disinterested’ expert knowledge emanates. 
 
Opposed to this is a heterodox tradition, actively marginalised by this mainstream, building on 
the power elite theory of C. Wright Mills. This approach, with its focus on the interlocking of 
directorates of the corporate, military and administrative elites, views think tanks as the 
                                                             
33 Indeed, having long been on George Soros’ payroll, his wealth coming from a ‘colourful career in 
finance’(!), Diane Stone’s 2010 article on his private philanthropy was explicitly oriented towards 
generating a theoretical framework on such a public interest role for intervention in civil society 
transnationally so that ‘[t]he role of private philanthropy thereby becomes legitimated’ (Stone 2012: 
unnumbered; Stone 2010: 270). 
34 See for example the listings of think tanks that take up such great chunks of Diane Stone and James 
McGann’s earlier works, in which the organisational descriptions are lightly modified versions of those 
found on the website of the organisation concerned. 
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intellectual adjuncts of such an elite. Although in the earlier work of the 1960s and 70s 
thinking on the role of think tanks was still inchoate and saw them as peripheral, forming just 
another set of linkages amongst the elite, by 2006 G. William Domhoff sees them as carrying 
out ‘the deepest and most critical thinking within the policy-planning network’ (Domhoff 2006: 
87).35  Think-tanks, being usually financed by corporate or personal wealth whether directly or 
via foundations, are therefore viewed as doing policy research and planning in the interests of 
their financiers and communicating it to decision makers. 
 
Within such a perspective think tanks are one part of a larger ideological apparatus, tying them 
into the longer tradition of societal and ideological reshaping through funding for academic 
and policy relevant social scientific research more generally, carried out through the 
philanthropy of the great American foundations (historically the largest being the Carnegie, 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, established in 1911, 1913, 1936 respectively) (Berman 
1983).   Hartwig Pautz usefully develops this strand to place think tanks alongside other such 
‘ideological apparatus’, such as management consultancies, which are taking over more and 
more of the public sphere on a prospectus of technical expertise (Pautz 2011). He points as 
example to the central role globally operating management consultancies such as McKinsey & 
Partners and Roland Berger Strategy Consultants played in the German government’s reform 
efforts, also identifying the role academically originated concepts such as ‘New Public 
Management’  played in increasing demand for just such services. 
 
This is useful in re-emphasising the central importance of the changing politics of expertise to 
think tanks’ role, with management consultancies achieving an even more depoliticised stance 
than policy institutes.  Nevertheless, the use of such an Althusserian derivation as ‘ideological 
apparatus’ points us to the structuralist weakness of this tradition,36 within which the effects 
of the field in which such expert knowledge is created, precisely the effect of apparent 
competition which gives claims to independence and expertise their great power, disappear as 
organisations tend to become presented as merely functional for capital. 
 
                                                             
35 Thomas Medvetz traces this evolution more fully (Medvetz 2012: 29 – 31). 
36 Hartwig Pautz aims to create a neo-Gramscian approach of Coxian derivation to think tanks.  The need 
for something like the Bourdieusian model I employ can be seen as in Pautz attempting to bridge the 
agent-structure problem through use of discourse theory he ends with a de facto structuralist account 
as indicated. 
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This second tradition is marginalised by the mainstream in two ways.  The first is simply to 
ignore it: almost all pluralist accounts assert a lack of previous scholarship on the field (Andrew 
Rich rather dubiously asserting this in 2005 - Rich 2005: 6), and identify the seminal work as R. 
Kent Weaver’s 1989 account. This account itself lays the foundation for such an exclusionary 
enterprise, containing very few citations of scholarly work, with sources predominantly 
journalistic or think tank produced materials such as annual reports.  The parameters of the 
field have barely changed from those established by Kent Weaver, with his typologies, 
definitions and focus on operational practices still the bedrock for most accounts - updated 
where necessary as US parochialism is slowly eroded (e.g. the addition of  ‘party affiliated think 
tanks’ to encompass the German field, cf. Kent Weaver and McGann 2000, Boucher 2004). 
 
The second, less frequent method, but useful for us to understand the nature and significance 
of the interstitial nature of the field is an attack on the structuralism of these alternative 
accounts.   Diane Stone, a central figure within the academic literature on think tanks, 
succinctly sets out the problems of:  ignorance, or suppression of the diversity of the field in 
these accounts; an a priori assumption of ‘real power holders’ operating behind ‘formal power 
holders’ which ‘presupposes prior knowledge of the real elite in advance of the empirical 
research’; and the simple ‘inference of a causal relationship between social and economic 
status and political power’ (Stone 1996: 30-31).   
 
Understanding think tanks as occupying an interstitial field allows us to see how marrying the 
two views together accounts for the power of think tanks as ideological apparatus creating 
expert knowledge.  It is precisely the existence of and competition within the field – the reality 
of semi-autonomy - that gives the appearance of independence, as those within it must locate 
themselves within and play by the rules of the field itself; thereby expression takes on a 
language and form divorced from specific interests it represents.  Similarly though, the nature 
of the field and its conditioning of possible expression within itself must also be understood 
through its dependent relation to the field of power, the field of economic and political 
struggle proper – more directly here than in the case of academia.  Within this, co-constitution 
between fields and the field of power becomes significant, placing think tanks as part of 
hegemonic projects through which a class, or contending groups, of ‘real power holders’ 
(including ‘formal power holders’) is formed, and can be identified.  Thus both established 
accounts capture elements of the field, which when brought together through this use of 
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Bourdieusian field theory account for the central significance of the field in establishing 
hegemony. 
 
The role of governing boards captures this relation, existing in fact at its nexus, with external 
representatives, often from funding foundations or companies, setting strategy and direction 
for the organisation, but not its expression within the field.   Diane Stone suggests a minimal 
role for such boards citing Hugh Heclo’s consideration that these are ‘self-important and 
vacuous big names that sit on their boards with little effect' (Heclo 1989, cited in Stone 1991: 
211)  and indeed interventions from board members in the quotidian activities of an institution 
are usually infrequent.  However, it is undeniable that such boards establish the direction of 
these organisations, and more active members often involve themselves in directing streams 
of work.  Again understanding the field makes sense of this: staff must understand the field 
and concomitant rules of the game (illusio for Bourdieu), and therefore there should be no 
need for direct involvement or correction once the direction and parameters are understood.37 
 
The central significance of this semi-autonomous relationship can be seen in the negative 
when it breaks down.  Andrew Rich,  ex-President and CEO of the Roosevelt Institute, traces 
the rise of the influence of policy expertise, but, from the vantage point of 2005, points to the 
declining power of US think tanks as they become more obviously ideological and interest 
based; the field effect destroyed by too direct a relation to the interests of sponsoring capital.  
David Frum’s comments after being forced out of the American Enterprise Institute in 2007 
reinforce this point, bringing out the political implications.  Fired for failing to toe the donor 
dictated line – ‘the message sent […] was clear: We don’t pay you to think, we pay you to 
repeat’ - he makes clear that establishing too clear a link to capital’s interests is disastrous as in 
doing so donors ‘are actually acting against their own longer-term interests, for it is the richest 
who have the most interest in political stability, which depends upon broad societal agreement 
that the existing distribution of rewards is fair and reasonable’ (Frum 2011).38 Frum’s account, 
whilst not couched in Gramscian terms, powerfully attests to both the importance of the field 
                                                             
37 The example trajectories of ECFR experts below demonstrate this point.  Heclo derived this view of 
boards from his work within think tanks – from my own experience of working in the sector, in both 
political lobbying and public policy, the need for any intervention from a board member would be seen 
as a significant failing in the work of any staff member. 
38 And bear in mind here that David Frum is a central neoconservative thinker coining ‘axis of evil’ in his 
role as George W. Bush’s speechwriter – from which role he moved straight to the AEI in 2000.  
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to universalising and legitimating specific interests and concomitantly the need for organic 
intellectuals to enjoy semi-autonomy. 
 
Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been firstly on grasping the dialectic between structure and 
agency through a political realist focus on power as relational and the development of 
comprehensive concepts of control as the salient form of political agency associated with class 
formation.  Such a focus on class as it forms in the concrete demonstrates the internal relation 
between the otherwise opposed ‘two logics’ of capital and (a hierarchical) geopolitics, and 
locates class formation as comprising the agency within Western hegemony. 
Developing the means of this class power through consideration of the concept of hegemony 
gave an understanding of the political as constituted by both coercion and consent – both 
‘moments’ within one another.   With this relationship understood I developed a definition of 
ideology that relates to both its deep role distorting and compensating for a deficient social 
reality, and its development in concrete formation of hegemonic blocs where various 
comprehensive concepts of control, all nonetheless organically related to the fundamental 
ideological core, compete.  This then gives significance to the agency of ‘organic intellectuals’, 
here represented by think tanks, as they develop such concepts of control. 
Concepts, as Leslie Sklair says, are where theory and the empirical meet.  This chapter has set 
the theoretical approach to be used, which the succeeding two chapters use to develop the 
conceptual understanding of Europe (chapter two) and analyse the significance of the Global 
Power Europe network of think tanks (chapter three). It will then be developed further in 
chapter four for use in considering the academic field. 
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2.  A Lockean Europe? 
 
This chapter establishes the existence of a Lockean Europe, as an entity separable but not 
separate from the broader West.  This sets the material conditions for Europe’s role in the 
renovation of Western hegemony, providing the basis for considering the policy and academic 
formations considered as, in Gramscian terms, organic, rather than willed or artificial 
movements.  I take the title from Kees van der Pijl’s 2006 article ‘A Lockean Europe?‘ (2006a), 
which I use to frame an engagement with the Amsterdam School’s consideration of Europe 
more generally.  As already introduced the Amsterdam project was constructed against and 
forms a correction to the liberalism of the bulk of  theorising on Europe, most notably in 
European Studies (Anderson 2011: 131-2). My task in this chapter is to continue the great 
dynamism it has brought to the study of European integration during the immediate post-
World War 2 and Cold War periods, to the post-Cold War world where it is on less sure footing 
with a tendency not to take Europe’s distinct role seriously enough as it is folded too 
completely into the US led West as a whole.  The chapter proceeds through four sections, each 
both setting part of the context I am establishing and working to retool the work of the 
Amsterdam School for the post-Cold War world. 
First, I establish the argument for considering the EU as a Lockean entity in its own right.  Here 
I interrogate van der Pijl’s equivocation over the nature of the EU in theoretical terms, 
agreeing with him that different developmental dynamics formed the Atlantic heartland and 
the EU. Whilst for van der Pijl this inserts some caveats to seeing the EU as Lockean Europe, I 
suggest that these provide an entry into considering the development of Lockean spaces 
politically.  In doing so I seek to maintain the geo-political dynamism of his approach, that sees 
the expansion of the original heartland as the central drama of international relations in the 
modern period, extending it to allow the formation of Europe as its own distinct  Lockean 
space, bound into, but also a central constitutive part of the broader West. 
In the second section, this develops into a discussion of neoliberalism that discounts the model 
of political change that sees neoliberalism as external to Europe, and therefore places 
European neoliberalism in a reactive, backward, position to the US, as a continuing 
‘Americanisation’ of Europe. This model, central to van der Pijl’s account of Europe continuing 
as a subordinate extension of the heartland and prevalent throughout the Amsterdam School’s 
work, tends to equate neoliberalism with the US-UK model, neglecting both the strong history 
of neoliberal thought in Europe, and Europe’s own agency, again central and essential, in 
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constructing neoliberal globalisation. Thus, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn constructs European 
neoliberalism as ‘embedded neoliberalism’, ‘inherently contradictory’ in its concessions to 
social democratic traditions, contrasted with a ‘pure laissez-faire perspective’ (van Apeldoorn 
2009: 24-25).  However, neoliberalism must be understood as more than simply the laissez 
faire model of Anglo-American neoliberalism, with, for example, founding ordoliberal concerns 
for social stability and market compatible protections seen as integral to neoliberalism, not 
antithetical to it.  In this light, ‘embedded neoliberalism’, which van Apeldoorn agrees has a 
greater sustainability and stability, is a development within neoliberalism - which was always 
an attempt to move beyond liberalism, not, as the Amsterdam School parses it, an 
intensification of liberalism - and therefore, whilst distinctions between neoliberal forms is 
necessary qualifiers such as ‘embedded’ should not be seen as ‘contradictory’.  The more 
general importance of this distinction lies in the merging of neoliberalism with ‘Atlanticism’ 
operating as a key conceptual error, leading to the omission of real European agency 
throughout much of the school’s work. 
The third section then studies the economic field, looking at the formation of a European 
transnational capitalist class.  Much of the work I draw on here is a development, and updating 
of the work of van der Pijl.  What is striking in this development is the centrality of the 
Europeanisation of capital to the formation of a broader Western transnational capitalist class.  
Here again the need is for a conceptual shift to accommodate the realities of the post-Cold 
War world, against van der Pijl’s tendency to both retain a belief in the centrality of  national 
capital formations and an overall subservience to US capital. 
The fourth section focuses on the changing role of the EU within Western military structures, 
and its post-Cold War achievement of coherence and capability for independent projection of 
power globally – albeit with more limited intensity and duration than the US.  Here the 
preceding reconsiderations of the Amsterdam School’s work come together as, with a 
conception of neoliberalism as a US capitalist class interest, the EU pursuing its own interests is 
interpreted as evidence of ‘Atlanticism’ and US power over the EU.  Where acknowledged, 
European military capability and action then becomes simply symptomatic of the US ‘shadow 
over Europe’, with the focus then turned to potential conflict between a declining US and a 
rising China – a power still militarily far weaker than the EU – rather than the changing 
dynamic within a bi-polar West reconfiguring its hegemonic control globally.  
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Overall I establish, as a basis for the study of policy and academic work, that there is a 
consolidating European transnational capitalist class, and an increasingly independent and 
Europeanised military force, pursuing a neoliberal agenda, but one in which market 
compatible attempts to achieve social, and even environmental, sustainability are integral. This 
gives both the base for, and coercive moment within, hegemony – which the articulators of 
Western legitimacy naturalise.  It is this legitimating function that is so important in renovating 
Western hegemony in the light of the US’s hegemonic crisis. 
This chapter then achieves two things: Firstly, setting the context to understand assertions of 
European difference as neither ‘Kant or Cant’ (Layne 1994), but as implicated in an objectively 
based hegemonic project. Secondly, it also seeks to make a contribution to further developing 
the transnational historical materialist approach to European integration from which the 
understanding of such a hegemonic project is derived.  As such, when considering the 
Amsterdam School the focus is on vacillations, lacunae and inconsistencies, somewhat taking 
for granted its great strengths.  It should be clear however that I am seeking to build on this 
work.  
A Lockean Europe? 
There are two inter-related reasons why Kees van der Pijl equivocates over establishing a 
‘Lockean Europe’ in his 2006 article on the subject: one theoretical-structural, relating to the 
configuration of EU institutions; one cultural-historical, highlighting the ongoing salience of the 
contender state experience of continental European powers in the construction and actions of 
these institutions (van der Pijl 2006a).  This section deals with the first of these, the next 
section covers the second, primarily through a consideration of the understanding of 
neoliberalism it contains. Whilst significant for any analysis, both arguments, I argue, are 
subordinate to class development: that is both the structure enabling class formation and the 
intellectual resources drawn upon in constructing comprehensive concepts of control are not 
best understood as abstracted entities based on their preceding Atlantic formations.   In doing 
so I am positing a more reflexive relation between structures and class formation, 
reintroducing dynamism to the idea of a ‘heartland/ contender state structure of modern 
international relations, through which class formation and democratisation are thenceforth 
refracted’ (2006b: 158).   It is the value of this dynamic model I turn to first, to establish the 
analytical utility of resolving this question of ‘Lockean Europe?’ 
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A dynamic model of geopolitics 
One of the great contributions of van der Pijl’s heartland/contender model is its integration of 
a spatio-temporal element as integral to political analysis. In essence this reflects the structural 
position of contender states to the heartland overdetermining their political complexion, 
whether left or right (seen in the structural similarity of Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia).  The dynamism of this can be seen by contrast to the anti-totalitarian thought 
developed during the Cold War which sees far-left and far-right political thought as inherently 
totalitarian, necessitating the aggressive defence of the ‘vital centre’ of liberalism: in such a 
static model the structurally determined behaviour of a confiscatory state is ascribed to its 
political ideology, whereas in the heartland/contender model ‘totalitarianism’ is not a static 
attribute of political thought, left or right, but a response to the dynamism and threat of the 
heartland.39    
 
This model is reflexive, in that the achievements of the leading contender states in turn 
pressure the heartland.   As we have seen in the previous chapter, through this capital as an 
extra-territorial force is therefore able to ‘impos[e] its discipline in both directions through 
geopolitical competition’ (van der Pijl 2006b: 21).40  Central to the model then is change in 
response to challenge and the contingent forms of class rule that this generates.    I highlight 
the need to reintroduce, or maintain, the dynamism at the heart of the model – to understand 
the expansion of the heartland in a way that also allows for change in its spatial configuration, 
to accommodate a Lockean Europe, which is necessary if we are to make sense of Europe’s 
role in a West now containing a declining US.  
Failure to do so, and a tendency towards implicit conflation of the US and the West, means 
that US decline and the failure of Bush’s ‘War on Terror’, as a ‘global state of emergency’, to 
generate support either within or outside the West is seen as the ‘demise of the liberal project 
itself’ (2006b: 406-7; cf. Amin 2000, Kagan 2012) as examples of the prevalence of this view of 
European irrelevance across the political spectrum).     The only non-negligible role for Europe 
                                                             
39 Which is not to disavow a relation between such ideologies and structural position, but to uncover the 
primacy of this dynamic model of geopolitics.  The development of such ideologies in such contexts 
speaks to the constitutive role of social structure in political thought, as outlined in the previous 
chapter.  Separating out Marxist thought from its development through the contender experience then 
becomes a vital task. 
40 ‘The heartland enjoys the initial advantage, forcing the society it confronts into the contender 
posture. The actions and achievements of the contender state in turn affect developments in the 
heartland; in the process, capital becomes an autonomous force, imposing its discipline in both 
directions through geopolitical competition’  (van der Pijl 2006b: 21). 
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then is as a new, non-liberal power, ‘emancipated’ by the decline of the US, and able to 
flourish through both a more appropriate (corporatist) mode of relations of production and 
alliances with rising powers in Russia and China41 – a vision drawing heavily on Emmanuel 
Todd’s projection in After the Empire (Todd 2004).    However, as both the current conjecture 
(and unfair advantage of hindsight), and the thread of European rivalry with the US within a US 
led and dominated West throughout van der Pijl’s historical account suggests, this captures 
neither the endurance of the ‘liberal project’, or Europe’s role within this satisfactorily.  
 
Thus whilst I go a long way along with van der Pijl’s account of European integration into a post 
WW2 Atlantic unified West, the differences that I elaborate below, principally concerning the 
implications of the European contender experience and the nature of neoliberalism, ultimately 
give a view of post-Cold War Europe as separable but not separate from the US within a 
bipolar West, as the best description of both where we are and the direction of travel.  The 
reintroduction of  dynamism and reflexivity to the idea of a ‘heartland/ contender state 
structure of modern international relations, through which class formation and 
democratisation are thenceforth refracted’ (2006b: 158), therefore means that formation of a 
European transnational capitalist class is of vital significance as it relates to the construction of 
a Lockean European space.  
 
From this, we see the importance of outlining the development of a class project, creating and 
developing a European Lockean space, and its impact globally.  In this then it is significant that 
van der Pijl’s overarching, over-determining, geopolitical structuring device of an expanding 
Atlantic heartland set against a succession of contender, and secondary contender, states, 
developed from his work tracing the historical development of an Atlantic Ruling Class (2006b, 
1984).  The establishment of a transnational Lockean space acts as an enabling condition for 
the formation of a transnational class for itself, as in the original transnational Anglophone 
heartland. 
The EU as transnational juridical space 
To return then, to the first of the two reservations: The theoretical-structural argument relates 
to van der Pijl’s conception of a transnational Lockean space – that is a space unified in the 
                                                             
41 These two positions compatible on the assumption an emancipated Europe would not pursue a liberal 
project – this externalisation of neoliberal globalisation a central point of disagreement with van der 
Pijl’s account, developed below. 
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legal enforcement of private property rights, whilst remaining split into separate territorial 
jurisdictions.  As we saw earlier, it was this construction in the original Anglo-American 
Lockean heartland that is responsible for the take-off of capitalism, understood as a force that 
must be able to discipline societies from the ‘outside’, that is extraterritorially42.  The 
subsequent geopolitical competition with contender states then further entrenches this 
discipline, from the outside, in both directions. 
At first blush the EU as an overarching political body does not seem to fit this model well – 
indeed the supposed normative superiority of the EU  over those still  mired within  the states 
system rests upon a conception of it transcending territorial jurisdictions.  However the key to 
understanding the power of the Lockean model is in its enabling capital’s disciplining from 
outside, and the inability for the representation of the popular will at the same scope, thus 
capital escapes national and democratic control.  This lies at the core of Friedrich Hayek’s 
vision for Europe of a single European market coupled with an interstate federation where 
transnational competition within such a regime would discipline states’ ability to intervene in 
or protect their economies, with the social solidarity required to implement interventionary 
policies at the level of the single market assumed to be impossible to achieve.  The 
fundamental problem such a model sets out to overcome is that of national control over 
capital, through redistribution and taxation, seen as linked to national solidarity (Hayek 1948 
[1939]). In this context then the EU is a Lockean entity to extent that it represents such a 
disciplinary competition regime, and not Lockean to the extent that the popular will is 
represented at the same geographical level. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is in this light, seen as a centrally Lockean institution, 
creating ‘a legal space in the Lockean sense – where the discipline of capital can be enforced 
by court actions… rather than by a political institution’ (2006b: 17).    However, this ‘structural 
similarity [to the original Anglo-heartland] at the end of the road has been achieved by 
different, often incompatible, strategies’ (2006b : 15), thus set against this legal space is 
precisely the danger of a state-like political institution over the space, here especially in the 
form of the European Parliament.   
Giving this some initial contemporary credence perhaps is the current example of the 
European bankers’ bonus cap (capped at 1x salary) developed by the European Parliament and 
                                                             
42 As noted earlier, this creates an internal relation between capital and state forms. 
57 
 
 
agreed by EU finance ministers on 5 March 2013. There is however potential for this too to be 
taken to court as ‘the EU’s Lisbon Treaty forbids interference on pay by the European 
Parliament or European Council’, such action stymied by public opinion, not by any power of 
the European Parliament (The Economist, 9 March 2013).  Pay is not an isolated element, in 
continuance of the core EU project of the construction of a single market and competition 
regime for all such matters related to competition the initiative and enforcement lies with the 
executive body of the EU the European Commission, as indeed it does for legislation.  But, 
whilst for the latter the process of ‘co-decision’ means the European Commission proposes 
new laws, and the European  Parliament and Council of the European Union adopt them for 
the former the Commission  ‘effectively serves as a prosecutor, judge and jury in antitrust 
investigations’ (Kanter 2012: u.n.).43  The final arbiter as court of appeal, for both member 
governments and companies is the ECJ.44  
Beyond the schematic of ECJ as Lockean structure and the democratic potential of the 
European Parliament, analysis of this most complex and opaque of structures tends to give an 
image not of a comprehensibly structured ‘Fortress Europe’ but of a ‘Maze Europe’ of 
transnational governance both above and below the state (Christiansen and Jørgensen 2000).  
Such governance is organised along functionally differentiated lines, to create different social, 
political and identity spaces that map onto neither states or the EU, focusing on regions within 
or across states or through specific non-state territorial funding streams creating ‘coastal 
Europe’, ‘trans-border transport linkage Europe’, etc..  This brings out the technocratic 
governance of the EU as a project of functional integration and control around the core of 
single market and competition regime, with state borders increasingly seen ‘as the reason for 
governance’, with cross-border regions each becoming a ‘space bounded by policy-making and 
politics (Christiansen and Jørgensen 2000: 68-9).  As identified above the danger of  the state 
which an overarching Lockean structure disciplines is that of solidarity, ‘Maze Europe’, in which 
instances of governance increasingly match neither state nor EU borders organised around 
functional spaces for coordination and control leave ‘most confused as to their precise 
whereabouts’ creating a political ‘fog of uncertainty over the role of European institutions, the 
                                                             
43 This is from an American perspective – and the difference in perspective signalled by labelling this 
‘antitrust’ has a significance I come to momentarily. 
44 Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 these cases are handled initially by the General 
Court (pre-2009 the Court of First Instance), with appeals progressing to the ECJ (the ECJ's official name 
was also changed by the treaty, from ‘Court of Justice of the European Communities’ to the ‘Court of 
Justice’, both generally referred to as ECJ). 
58 
 
 
location of final responsibility and the representation of political interests’.  This means that 
seeking a democratic solution to this problem through an enhanced role for the Parliament 
cannot address this ‘Maze Europe’ which ‘can only be understood by an inner circle of 
decision-makers’ (ibid: 74-75). 
This essential powerlessness of the European Parliament leads to the more significant general 
argument that the actual historical impact is its role in controlling far-left parties nationally, 
diluting the pressure of popular protest and organisation at national level into the European 
level (van der Pijl 2006a: 19-20, and 2006b: 143; Holman and van der Pijl 2003).   So, whilst van 
der Pijl keeps alive a social democratic belief in the parliamentary road to change at the 
hypothetical-theoretical level45, in practice, and in some contradiction, what is outlined is the 
European Parliament as a supra-national form of parliamentarism- even more deracinated of 
democratic content, reflecting the existence of a Lockean space.     
This, as indicated, is quite apart from, and again against, the common ‘democratic deficit’ 
argument that sees the problem as institutional, relating to the relations amongst EU 
institutions and Parliament’s lack of control thereof (one of the central strands of EU studies, 
see for example Journal of European Public Policy, special issue 20:2 2013; cf. van der Pijl 
2006b: 9, passim), as this latter sees any de facto parliamentarism of the European 
Parliament’s role as a rectifiable failure of implementation, not constitutive of the institution 
(cf. Christiansen and Jørgensen 2000). 
Overall then, the greatest effect of the EU is disciplining from the outside and embedding a 
juridical competition regime across Europe.  The recent  March 2013 European Commission 
consultation on ‘guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020’ gives a good example of this 
role (European Commission 2013).    State aid – that is any public intervention that potentially 
advantages one company over another within the EU – is prohibited.  The prohibition is 
tempered however by a minimal concern for the social sustainability of the model, with 
accordingly some leeway for a technocratic concern for amelioration of regional economic 
disparities46 - this idea of a more socially sustainable European neoliberalism I come back to 
                                                             
45
 ‘In the end, a parliament with real powers can legislate for emancipation and social equality too’ (van der Pijl 
2006a: 22). 
46
 State aid is defined as ‘an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by 
national public authorities…. A company which receives state aid obtains an advantage over its competitors. 
Therefore, article 107 of the TFEU generally prohibits state aid’. This is mitigated by, ‘in some circumstances, 
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momentarily.  Overall this militates against national activist economic policies as, taking the UK 
as an example, the guidelines would require EC blessing, even where interventions are 
deemed legal, for implementation of schemes such as the Regional Growth Fund (RGF) in 
England, Enterprise Zones (UK wide), Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) in Scotland, Selective 
Finance for Investment (SFI) in Wales, ‘and any similar successor schemes granting aid for 
inward investment or expansion’ (LGA 2013). 
In this, ECJ case law is of overriding significance, as ‘[i]rrespective of [current] Commission 
reform activities, European courts have recently taken a number of important decisions in the 
field of state aid rules’ (Brüggemann and Haak 2013). The UK’s Department of Communities 
and Local Government therefore provides guidance to public bodies on the implications for 
their activities of ECJ rulings (DCLG 2013). 
Thus whilst the space constructed is different in form from the original heartland, it performs 
in the same way as a juridical space.  The analysis of Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, delineating the 
EU as just such a Lockean space, shows it as more effective than the original space in imposing 
the discipline of capital extra-territorially, through this institutional difference - able to both 
enshrine competitive pressures more completely, and operate hegemonically in generating 
consent (van Apeldoorn 2009). Indeed, his earlier work showed precisely the how formation of 
a nascent EU transnational capitalist class developed in tandem with the forming of the EU as a 
Lockean space (rather than the earlier alternative direction of a protectionist neo-mercantilist 
entity) through this institutional structure (van Apeldoorn 2004a).  This brings to the fore 
again, the significance of delineating the EU in this way: the Lockean space, here created 
through political action, is an enabling factor in the formation of a European transnational 
capitalist class in itself, and this space is here able to be further developed in their interests by 
a class for itself.  
Neoliberal Europe: laissez faire and Ordoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is best thought of, and defined by its constitutive class projects: accordingly here 
I seek to identify both a core common to, and an understanding of divergences between 
comprehensive concepts of control which constitute neoliberalism in relation to Europe. David 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
government intervention is necessary for a well-functioning and equitable economy. Consequently, the Treaty 
leaves room for a number of policy objectives for which state aid can be considered compatible’ (European 
Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/state_aids/state_aids_en.htm ). 
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Harvey refers to it as a restoration of class power, and of a continuation of class warfare in the 
post-Cold War world – but only by one side, by capital.  It is best thought of in this way, as 
when the theoretical strictures of what is most often identified as neoliberal theory – that is 
neoclassical economics – run counter to the interests of the ruling class, it is the former that 
give way.  Similarly, whilst the neoliberal justification for the social restructuring of the last few 
decades has been the promotion of economic growth, its record in this area has been mixed to 
poor, succeeding however in a huge redistribution of wealth upwards (Harvey 2007).  Whilst I 
will argue that neoliberal theory is rather more complex than that, and that the common 
aligning of neoliberalism and neoclassical economic theory serve to cloud the waters, I return 
to confirm this contention that it is only truly possible to understand as practice, as developed 
by hegemonic blocs.  
The most common presentation of neoliberalism is as a theory politically activated in the 
1970s and progressively enacted thereafter.  In this way the theory was incubated by the Mont 
Pelerin Society (and a few other academic departments, and marginal think tanks) before 
being taken up when the economic crisis of the 1970s presented the opportunity to impose 
capitalist discipline more absolutely – thus the first wave is associated with the names of 
Pinochet, Thatcher and Reagan (as well as incorporating the less often noted Antipodean 
experiences of the time).  It becomes in this reading a fundamentally Anglo-American ideology, 
the seminal Chilean experience driven by the US and managed by trainees of the ‘Chicago 
School’.  In this reading neoliberalism is associated with laissez faire, and limitation of 
government, especially in its ability to intervene in the market and control entrepreneurial 
activity. Thus this interpretation sees neoliberalism as a development of liberal principles in its 
supposed setting of civil society against the state. This is both the starting point of David 
Harvey’s history of neoliberalism, and the underlying understanding of the Amsterdam School 
(Harvey 2007; e.g. Cafruny and Ryner eds. 2003; van der Pijl 2006b; for a review of such 
understandings in social sciences more generally Jessop 2013). 
Yet, as close study of the history of the Mont Pelerin Society, and of the variety of ‘neoliberal 
constellations’ developed since then show, this is a simplistic reading (Mirowski and Plehwe 
2009; Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer 2006).  Historically tracing neoliberalism and US 
hegemony, back to the 1950s and 60s, rather than starting at the US moment of the late 
1970s, and their non-correspondence, gives a more complex relation – one where the way 
challenges are reinterpreted by neoliberalism as a practice, is central to its comprehension.  
Neoliberalism has historically consisted of a family of theories, often in conflict with one 
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another, unified to varying degrees through strategizing to solve problems and mobilising for 
political action (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009).  Such a form of mobilisation and ‘improvisation in 
specific spatio-temporal contexts and conjunctures in all their messiness produces immense 
variations in neoliberalisms’, each, including the US model, as sui generis as another (Jessop 
2013: 73).  Purity, on the lines of neoclassical economics, is therefore less characteristic of 
neoliberalism than its pragmatic orientation and recognition of the need to  incorporate 
‘important external alien elements, correct mistakes of the past, and transform doctrine in 
light of new insights and convictions’ in overcoming the limitations of traditional liberalism 
(Ptak 2009: 99).   Contrasts between, and attempts to align, this historical complexity with the 
common essentially fixed and geopolitically derived reading has led neoliberalism to come to 
seem a ‘chaotic concept’: clearest perhaps in the way it frames criticism and resistance than in 
its content (Jessop 2013: 65).          
Beneath the great diversity of neoliberal thought there is however coherent justification for 
the ‘neo’ prefix, in line with the depth ontology of ideology I developed in the preceding 
chapter: that is a common belief in markets aligned with a rejection of the laissez faire of 
classical liberalism.  Neoliberalism at its core sees the necessity of political action to establish 
and maintain the market, requiring the state to act beyond the confines of the liberal 
nightwatchman concept of the state. The market is then denaturalised in order to actively 
extend its scope, through reconfiguring the state as well as ever greater swathes of society, 
justified by theorising market mechanisms and competition as the most efficient way to 
allocate resources and drive productivity (Gane 2012).  Indeed, ordoliberalism, a fundamental 
strand in the development of neoliberalism (for Foucault the neoliberal avant garde), is based 
upon the strong state, with the free market a constantly renewed political intervention (Ptak 
2009). It sees the necessity ‘not only of a firm legal framework, but also of a robust social and 
ethical framework’ for a free economy, requiring not laissez faire but ‘vigilance, activity and 
intervention’ (Bonefeld 2013: 235; Gane 2012: 613). Born in the post-World War 2  crisis in 
Germany, it ‘demanded the strong state as the means of restoring and sustaining free 
economy’, but a state with the free market as its ‘organizing and regulating principle’ – a ‘state 
under the supervision of the market, rather than a market supervised by the state’, as in the 
liberal conception (Bonefeld 2013: 235-6; Gane 2012: 626). 
With this in mind we can see that the neoliberalism that took hold in the 1970s in the US and 
UK took on a more classically liberal character, extolling laissez faire, reflecting the Lockean 
experience; hence the common perception of neoliberal theory now being anchored in neo-
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classical economics.  This made sense for the class project of the time – with the crisis of 
profitability the need was primarily to return laissez faire to the labour market in a unionised 
corporate society, alongside the extension of the scope of exploitation through expanding the 
areas of society covered by the market in privatisation drives. The great danger to social 
stability presented by the proletarianisation of the masses, central to ordoliberal thought, 
could however be handled by creating social division through buying off selected groups of 
society and coercively crushing the resistance of others; this neoliberal hegemony having a 
more strongly accented coercive moment. 
However, more contemporary neoliberal practice, and especially that in Europe, is better 
understood drawing on this fuller history, to see it not as a ‘contradictory synthesis’ or ‘hybrid’ 
form with this specific Anglo-American neoliberalism (van Apeldoorn 2009; van der Pijl 2006b), 
but as a characteristic development within neoliberalism.  Such an understanding makes sense 
of the neoliberal character of the restructuring of the role of European states and 
development of the EU, not in their withdrawal, but in their enforcing of a ‘comprehensive 
concept of competitiveness’, with accompanying focus on audit and benchmarking across all 
organisations, public and private (Holman and van der Pijl 2003: 84).  These newer forms of 
governance draw on a more ordoliberal influenced neoliberal trajectory, with the shift from a 
focus on exchange in the market to competition within the market –and extension of such 
forms into the public sector through pseudo markets and competitive benchmarking 
characteristic (Gane 2012).   
David Gerber’s seminal article47 on the significance of the Freiburg School’s ordoliberalism and 
a developed ‘German tradition’ makes this clear, identifying how the EU’s competition regime 
is best understood from this vantage (Gerber 1994; Gerber 1998; cf. Wigger and Nölke 2007; 
Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2010).48  As indicated above the comprehensive structuring of social 
                                                             
47 For example, in their very brief consideration of the role of ordoliberalism in the ‘Making of Global 
Capitalism’, Gerber’s 1994 article is Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin’s only citation.  Misrepresenting his 
argument they render ordoliberalism as simply the contemporaneous term for ‘neoliberal monetarist 
policies’.  By this means ordoliberalism is integrated into the ‘Political Economy of American Empire’ 
without regard for the European tradition of thought itself (Gindin and Panitch 2012: 97). 
48 These last two offer a very useful tracing of the development of the EU as predominantly a 
competition regime, especially in convergence from a more ordoliberal/Rhenish model toward the 
US/Chicago School/Anglo-American antitrust model.  Nonetheless within a conception that sees only the 
latter as neoliberal, as laissez faire, the social model of Europe in which the construction of markets for 
the common good plays a part – the ongoing ordoliberal conception – appears as merely hypocrisy.  As I 
return to in the conclusion to this chapter, this renders those building this European model as merely 
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stability flows from the construction of the competitive market – and here the shift from the 
liberal conception of the market as natural to its central role in creating a good society is 
significant, removing any charge of cant from Europe’s social model. The ordoliberal 
conception that ‘ the economy was the primary means for integrating society around 
democratic and humane principles’ remains, as does intervention to ensure sufficient social 
support for it (Gerber 1994: 38-9). 
The construction of this competition regime stems not from the ‘traditional liberal bastion’ of 
England, and is thus not a simple extension of, or absorption into the Lockean heartland. As 
van der Pijl notes, ‘specific characteristics of the continent are not just relics of the past, 
doomed to be swept away by ‘reform’’, nor should the historical contender experience be 
fixed in aspic, giving a path inherently standing opposed to the discipline of capital, once states 
are absorbed into the heartland (van der Pijl 2006b: 290).  This should not be understood 
unidirectionally though, in maintaining the political dynamism of comprehensive concepts of 
control, considering shifts within the mode of social control within the ‘liberal bastion’ itself 
from this European direction become significant and demonstrates the usefulness of 
conceiving of neoliberalism not as a reified image of laissez faire, but as developing strategies 
of a (shifting) ruling class, organised however around this conception of the state not as ‘night-
watchman’ but as  market maker, enforcer and social guarantor. 
The Third Way, and its development in the Big Society are characteristic of this form, with both 
the restructuring of the public sector and associated shifting of responsibility for handling 
competitive pressures to the individual enforced by and enabled by the state, through 
restructuring of welfare systems and associated pressures for ‘lifelong learning’. Often seen as 
a synthesis of neoliberal and communitarian thought, such moves rather show the salience of 
this understanding of neoliberalism for the British experience also (Sage 2012a, 2012b), and 
the use of particularly German experience in forging this ‘synthesis’ (Gane 2012 and Bonefeld 
2013 for the specific ordoliberal elements).  The political media characterisation of 
convergence on this model form both left and right of the British political spectrum, 
exemplified by Philip Blond’s ‘Red Tory’ism, and Maurice Glassman’s ’Blue Labour’, as ‘post-
liberalism’49, whilst the socialist left characterises it as neoliberalism confirms this, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
instrumental for capitalist interests and, whilst these scholars talk of convergence, they delineate a 
process of conversion to and dominance by the Anglo-American model.  
49 For example, New Statesman, 27 March 2013, 
(http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2013/03/leader-liberalism-now-feels-inadequate-
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need to overcome the use of neoliberalism as a ‘chaotic concept’ referring to both an 
intensified liberalism and its transcendence. 
Indeed, in supporting his classification of the EU as ‘embedded neoliberalism’, van Apeldoorn 
draws on this shift to the ‘Third Way’ in Europe.  The argument then is not over the potentially 
far greater social sustainability of this move, but over its contrast with a supposedly purer 
laissez faire neoliberalism.  This comes to the fore in van Apeldoorn’s understanding of the role 
of the state as tempering (in van der Pijl’s phrasing ‘compensating’) national societies within 
an overall neoliberal drive by the EU.  As seen above, this simplifies the relationship between 
the state and market in neoliberalism.  Overall, the understanding of the shift in form from a 
laissez faire to a juridical competitive state, concerned with social stability within the 
parameters of the market is strong in the Amsterdam School’s work on the EU, the problem is 
its mischaracterisation due to the conceptualisation of neoliberalism. With a less schematic 
understanding of neoliberalism, the full neoliberal agency of Europe, separate from 
‘Atlanticism’ can be understood.   
Against the Amsterdam School model I therefore work with a conception of neoliberalism 
which sees the Anglo-American model as at least as sui generis as any other – rather than as a 
purer neoliberalism.  Such a conception, particularly in its pragmatic incorporation of alien 
elements, reveals its character as class power practice: that is as a shift in core ideology to 
transcend liberalism expressed in a variety of competing ways, grasped by the idea of 
competing comprehensive concepts of control. The ideology is then at core in tune with the 
base of a capitalist class’s power, that is in privileging the market and competition, but more 
heterogeneous at a higher level.  Such a conception allows European agency, where its 
exercise furthers a neoliberal agenda, to be understood in its own terms – not necessarily as 
part and parcel of a sweeping ‘Atlanticism’. 
A European Transnational Capitalist Class 
In offering a synopsis of the work to date on the transnational capitalist class hypothesis in 
2005, Michael Nollert found it lacking in empirical rigour, tending towards hypotheses derived 
from ascribed logics to capital, rather than sociological work.  In particular he found the work 
on ‘global capital’ and a related global transnational capitalist class (for example that of Sklair 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
new-age-insecurity); David Goodhart, May 11, 2012, Financial Times, ‘Welcome to the Post-Liberal 
Majority’ – launching Demos’ ‘post-liberal’ ‘citizens programme’ (http://www.demos.co.uk/citizens)  . 
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2001; Robinson and Harris 2000; Robinson 2004), characterised by a ‘new geographically 
undefined division of the world into a global bourgeoisie and a global proletariat’, was based 
on a ‘lack of empirical evidence’ (Nollert 2005: 293-4). 
William Carroll, testing the propositions of this more abstract ‘global capital’ work, and 
building especially on the territorially embedded work of both Kees van der Pijl’s delineating of 
an Atlantic ruling class, and Bastian van Apeldoorn’s account of the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT) role in the formation of a nascent European capitalist class (acting ‘for 
itself’ in shaping the formation of the EU through the European Commission), regrounds the 
study of the transnational capitalist class in just such a sociological way, with powerful results.  
Noting that ‘globalization transforms but does not transcend territorial division’ (Carroll 2010: 
5) he finds that ‘most of the corporate interlocking that has been taken as evidence of the 
formation of a transnational capitalist class has occurred within Europe’ (ibid: 176)50.   Thus 
much of the evidence given for the development and existence of a transnational capitalist 
class qua transnational capitalist class, that is almost as an abstracted a priori, relates in fact to 
specific geographically located activity, and increasingly a dominantly European agency. 
The European corporate community, upon which this class for itself is formed, emerged in the 
latter half of the 20th century, and consolidates itself until the crisis of 2007-8.  At this point 
‘Europe’s corporate community had achieved unprecedented unity as a key component of a 
transnational capitalist class in the making’ (ibid).  Whilst the financial crisis has strained the 
political coherence of the EU, the network of corporate interlocks has grown ever denser, with 
the bulk of this increase new European interlocks. The ‘shift to Europe’ then has continued, 
despite the crisis (Heemskerk 2013).  
Such a shift cannot be  seen as national capital reasserting itself within a European framework, 
as speculated by Kees van der Pijl, Otto Holman, and Or Raviv (2011).51  This is a Europeanised 
European network of corporate interlocks: ‘Europe is the reality for big business in the twenty-
                                                             
50 These interlocks being where the same individual serves on the boards of two or more organisations.  
Such interlocks create a social fabric that serves both a communicative and community formation 
function.  
51 Van der Pijl et al’s conclusions here do seem to be based more upon the theoretical premises they 
bring to the data, than the (somewhat sketchy) data they use. Eelke Heemskerk’s more thorough 
findings contradict them both on the significance of national versus European interlocks, and in the 
significance of German capital: ‘[T]he relatively modest role of German firms in this European network 
seems to counter the conclusion of van der Pijl et al. (2011) that Germany will be the cornerstone of the 
emerging European network. Rather, French firms continue to be the most dominant’ with the most 
significant finding the overall Europeanisation of these firms (Heemskerk 2013). 
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first century’ and a ‘European’ mindset exists amongst the CEO’s of these large European firms 
(Heemskerk 2013: 94). Most notable in this context is the changing geographical distances 
between interlocking directors home and ‘away’ boards, shifting from a domestic and 
neighbouring country radius, to a more fully European radius: ‘most of the increase in number 
of interlocks takes place in the 300- to 600-kilometre range’ (Heemskerk 2013: 89). 
This European network remains anchored in North West continental Europe, whilst also 
increasingly including UK based firms.  The core then consists of companies based in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and increasingly the UK and Sweden (Carroll 2010: 
162-3).  Nevertheless, despite the persistence of historic unevenness, the trend is towards 
pan-European equity in participation (ibid). Whilst this trend is in the early stages of 
development, the more recent increase in European interlocks is ‘concentrated in the firms 
that were sparsely connected in the European network in 2005’ with the ‘fringes’ becoming 
more integrated with an already well-connected core (Heemskerk 2013: 95). 
Nevertheless, Eastern Europe hosts a paucity of large stock listed firms, and therefore remains 
minimally linked into this community.  This means that within this kind of interlock mapping, 
the integration between  Western and Eastern European corporate elites ‘remains clouded’ 
(ibid). 52 Overall however we can note here that their ‘semi-peripheral position […] has made 
Eastern Europe strongly dependent on foreign investment’ (Bohle 2009: 83), a situation 
reflected in the members of European Council on Foreign Relations, which I analyse in the next 
chapter, where representatives from Eastern Europe are largely linked either to venture 
capital opportunities in the region or developmental projects.53   
Overall Europe reflects the general global trend of decreasing national interlocks (again 
mitigating against interpretations that privilege national capital formations), but bucks the 
trend in its increasing transnational, mostly European interlocks.  This European community 
remains set within a broader Euro-Atlantic network, but since the turn of the century 
especially, these European interlocks are at the expense trans-Atlantic interconnectivity (and 
again here Europe includes the UK). The shift away from ‘Atlanticism’ is notable as 
                                                             
52 I return to the methodological limitations to this network mapping approach in the next chapter, but 
here note that both Carroll and Heemskerk acknowledge the need to supplement this outlining of the 
objective condition of a class in itself, with its activity, principally in policy planning groups, as a class for 
itself, to get any real picture of its salience. 
53 Though cf. Yurchenko 2012 who in the case of Ukraine finds much of this FDI is local capital, 
accumulated by dispossession, recirculated via off-shore tax havens. 
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‘significantly, most of the European firms with multiple interlocks outside Europe are well-
ensconced in the European corporate community’ (Carroll 2010), and the relative ‘sparseness 
of ties spanning the North Atlantic, underscore[s] both the robustness of corporate Europe and 
the comparative lack of integrative capacity between North America and Europe’ (Carroll et al 
2010:  836).  
This shift in the global network’s centre of gravity, and increased differentiation from the 
trans-Atlantic network is mirrored in the fact that ‘the most central corporations globally are 
based in Europe’ (Carroll 2010: 173). Beyond this ‘what also stands out is the rarity of ties 
beyond the Euro-Atlantic’ (ibid: 174).  This is then a development within the West, to a West in 
which a distinct European corporate community becomes visible within the broader Euro-
Atlantic network. 
To speak of this community as a class however is premature. Whilst the evidence so far 
suggests the existence of a community with a common set of interests – a foundational social 
fabric - a class for itself forms in seeking to actively further those interests and overcome 
common problems it is faced with. In talking of transnational class then, within both this 
European formation, and the broader Euro- Atlantic, policy planning groups play a central role.   
It is these planning boards that signal that a cohesive class of itself – that is an integrated 
European corporate community – is becoming a class in the strategic sense I use, that is, a 
class for itself.   It is these policy groups that speak to structural consolidation, and the 
formation of a transnational historic bloc, working to consolidate a hegemonic project of 
neoliberal globalisation.  It is they that give the capacity to speak as a class for itself, and to 
formulate and present corporate interests as in the general interest; and as noted in the 
previous section, the role of Europe in the global hegemony of neoliberalism has been central. 
In Europe, the ERT, having acted as a driver of the formation of this community, remains 
central.  The increasing involvement of UK companies has seen a shift from an organisation 
dominated by French and German capital, to one reflecting French, German and UK capital 
(van Apeldoorn, 2002: 134, Carroll 2010: 163).  With the overall shift to Europe, the ERT plays 
an increasingly central interlinking role in the broader network also, Carroll seeing it as 
increasingly the core organisation (Carroll 2010: 201-2). Carroll identifies the wider community 
as centralised around four other boards also, the identity of which is in keeping with other, 
more anecdotal accounts of the formation of a transnational capitalist class (e.g. Gill 1995). 
These organisations are the ICC, Bilderberg, Trilateral Commission, and the World Economic 
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Forum. In addition, and in keeping with the move to ‘sustainability’ the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development is increasingly significant (Carroll 2010: 179-202).    
The makeup of the boards of these organisations also speaks of the shift to Europe, as whilst a 
Euro-North American ruling class remains at the centre, they are weighted increasingly 
towards Europe - increasingly constituted of ‘pan-European transnationalists’, and most 
densely tied to corporate Europe (ibid). 
We have then a sketch here of the class base upon which the subsequent chapters build – of a 
European corporate community, active on policy planning boards, increasingly central to what 
remains an overwhelmingly Western network of capital and corporate power.  This then 
speaks of a particular base for hegemonic activity that I argue reflects this changing position of 
Europe within a broader West.   
To establish that this European formation is important in the reformulating of Western 
hegemony we then must focus on the cultural and political spheres.   In particular, noting that 
‘the ideological trump card is representing not just common sense but also ‘expert sense’’ 
(ibid: 234).   Before I do so however, I turn to one of the neglected or taken for granted 
elements in much of this work on transnational capitalist classes and its putative hegemony – 
that of the coercive moment in hegemony.  This is integrated into the following chapters as the 
condition for the intellectual work studied, and the integration of military structures into policy 
planning groups. 
The Bi-polar West 
The changing make-up, and role of both successful and failed initiatives in the field of 
European security must be understood as set within and constituting a European field of 
power, and this itself within a broader transatlantic field of power (Cohen 2011).  Focus on 
developments in isolation, or just within Europe as though discrete from this broader field, 
render understanding more difficult, rather than offering any simplification (Toje 2008).  I 
therefore trace here the development of European military capacity as developing through a 
‘separable but not separate’ capacity to form a bipolar West, primarily through the 
relationship between the EU and NATO, adapting Asle Toje’s conception of a focus on change 
within a ‘transatlantic bargain’: this bargain having both an EU-US, and an intra-European 
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element.54  Such an approach has the great benefit of avoiding both the inter-governmental 
rationalism common to much EU security analysis, and the de facto stripping of European 
agency common to many critical political economy approaches, as identified earlier.  I first 
outline the need to overcome these limitations, before tracing the most salient elements of 
the post-Cold War history of the relationship between EU and NATO. 
The weakness of intergovernmental approaches, and their rejection of class analysis, can most 
easily be seen in their ignoring, and thereby obscuring, the implications of the central, 
dramatic, post- Cold War shift in Western security institutions focus from territorial defence to 
expeditionary force. The central drive of their analysis retains a focus on the need for defence 
under new conditions of insecurity following the collapse of the bipolar system – this then 
giving European states rational cause to drive forward military cooperation (Muftuler-Bac 
2007). However, the need for territorial defence is minimal – seen for example in the decision 
not to bolster the new ‘frontlines’ of NATO after expansion – and for European states remains 
within the function of NATO.  The development of EU expeditionary force must then be seen 
alongside the shift in NATO focus from Article 5, covering territorial defence, to Article 2, 
‘promoting conditions of stability and well-being’.  It should therefore be seen in the context of 
the  post-Kosovo war shift to conceptualising the role of the West, in the guise of the 
international community, as ‘defending’ human security, and therefore the expansion of 
capitalist liberal social structures, by actions ‘illegal but legitimate’ if necessary (Hehir 2008).  
This relates also to modifying Asle Toje’s understanding of the intra-European bargain.  Despite 
basing his analysis on the overlapping and relation between the two ‘fields’ of Europe and US-
EU he retains a state centric high-political focus, beyond its usefulness.  Whilst the post -World 
War 2 and Cold War periods can be somewhat understood within this frame, as capital 
formations remained primarily national, transnationalisation and Europeanisation become 
ever more important in the post-Cold War world, including for the UK.  Thus whilst 
characterising Cold War security arrangements as designed, in the words of Lord Ismay, the 
                                                             
54
 It is worth noting here that Toje is that relatively rare beast, a European neo-realist scholar, and I take 
only the central argument, that post-Cold War EU and NATO must be understood together, with 
European agency given due respect.  I use it here, as I have used (neo-)realist work earlier, to identify 
the surface appearance of the change that needs to be explained.  His subsequent, more explicitly neo-
realist account of EU power sees it as a ‘small power’ (Toje 2010). However as Hanns Maull notes of 
Toje’s argument ‘[b]ecause the EU lacks strategy and purpose in world politics, it usually punches below 
its weight. But this does not mean it is a small power’,  particularly as when it does act it is ‘effective far 
beyond what small powers could achieve’ (Maull 2011: 185) 
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first NATO Secretary General, ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans 
down’ may be accurate, Toje’s adaptation to characterise the ESDP’s role as ‘keeping the 
Americans out, the British in, and the French down’ is outmoded, as can be seen most clearly 
in Franco-British military cooperation.  This cooperation has been intensifying since the 
Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, and is best seen as a ‘new engine for European defence’– 
albeit taking place outside of the Lisbon Treaty’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (Jones 
2011).  After all, combined Britain and France account for some 40% of Europe’s defence 
budget, 50% of its military capacity and are the only remaining European full-spectrum 
militaries with independent expeditionary capabilities (Gordon et al. 2012). 
Dispute between these two post 1945 military powers of Europe has historically been the 
central stumbling block in European defence cooperation – the great danger in this context of 
European disagreement over the invasion of Iraq lying in Franco-British alienation, coming so 
soon after St Malo and the formation of ESDP (Howorth 2003).  Overcoming such 
disagreement, to create the unprecedented European military cooperation of the Lancaster 
House Treaties, and the survival of such cooperation beyond the tenure of the ‘Atlanticist’ 
Sarkozy government, also suggests that ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ conceptions of the roots 
of divergence in perceptions of European security institutions’ nature and purpose – assigned 
to Britain and France respectively - are no longer the most useful tools. 
This last point is significant in its differentiating of my assessment from that of the ‘Amsterdam 
School’. It is this differentiation that lends the conception of ‘separable, but not separate’ its 
weight.  Alan Cafruny, of the Amsterdam School’s New York chapter (Anderson 2011: 131), 
asserts that ‘the common foreign and defence policy has merged into Atlanticism’, and that 
‘[t]he increasingly fragile US imperium is casting a widening shadow across Europe’ (Cafruny 
2009: 82-83). As his argument here builds upon and draws together those of the school as a 
whole, briefly outlining its problems is here worthwhile (Anderson 2011: 131-2). 
The principal difficulty, as before, is the negation of European power and agency. This occurs 
across three areas: neoliberalism as a political project; European military force; and US 
influence over the EU, and its expansion.  The first I have already covered, and the importance 
of doing so can be seen in Cafruny’s assertion that ‘Atlanticism and neoliberalism are 
indivisible’ (Cafruny 2009: 82, see also van der Pijl 2013), with all the implications of such a 
conflation for negating European agency that is not either directly anti-American or anti-
‘neoliberal’.  
71 
 
 
Alan Cafruny’s assertions that a European demographic decline and its military weakness mark 
its increasing irrelevance, are the ‘conventional wisdom’; as too is his belief in the eclipsing of 
Europe by China (Cafruny 2009: 72-3, Moravcsik 2009).  Yet as he concedes, by 2005 the EU 
was ‘the second largest military force in the world, was conducting seven separate operations 
in Africa, Iraq, the Caucasus and South-eastern Europe’ and ‘[h]aving formed a 60,000 troop 
rapid reaction force the EU was deploying 7000 troops in Bosnia and had conducted more 
modest interventions in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (Cafruny 2009: 73).  
As Andrew Moravcsik notes, it is also the only force other than the US capable of global force 
projection; for all the talk of US competition with China, Chinese military capabilities ‘[a]t best, 
[…] might compete with a single European country’ (Moravsik 2009: 409). 
Cafruny then is only able to assert that there has been no ‘development of genuine European 
global military capabilities or autonomy from the USA’ because the EU has not ‘develop[ed] 
military capacities that would enable it to approach the USA on a remotely equal terrain’ – but 
equivalence with the US is only a definitional requirement for global military capabilities if 
there is an assumption of conflict with the US and thus that there can be only one such power 
possessing such capabilities (Cafruny 2009: 73).  In fact, real concerns over declining European 
hard power under the impact of governmental austerity relate to a reduction in the number of 
missions with global reach that can be undertaken simultaneously, and the duration of such 
interventions that can be sustained (Gordon et al. 2012). 
The final area is the alleged continuity of overweening US influence in post-Cold War Europe, 
exemplified by NATO and EU expansion – the dual track enlargement designed by and 
entrenching a conflated US power/neoliberalism (Cafruny 2009: 69-70, 75-76). Certainly, NATO 
expansion was driven by and shaped primarily by the US.  However, the relation between the 
dual enlargements was not simply hierarchical, as presented, and in fact EU enlargement, 
driven by the EU, took the lead in the early nineties, before the delays of EU decision making 
allowed NATO to recapture the initiative, to some degree then setting the agenda.   
Nevertheless, both sequencing and inclusion of new members in the EU and NATO reflected as 
much European as US interests - ‘Visegrád first’ as much a German as US interest (cf. van der 
Pijl 2013 for the US interests seen as derived from heredity and diaspora lobbying) – and, as 
Asle Toje argues, given the level of shared US and European interests and values it is hard to 
see how the process would have been different without US pressure.  Most tellingly, ‘when 
Washington encouraged the EU to do something that went beyond the established consensus, 
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this failed’ (Toje 2008:  96).  Only by first (correctly) characterising the EU expansion as a 
neoliberal project, and then subsuming all such neoliberal projects under ‘Atlanticism’ can EU 
expansion be seen as a product of US power rather than a process driven by European 
interests, operating in partnership with the US through NATO.  
Overall accounts such as Cafruny’s that minimise European agency, fail to capture post-Cold 
War shifts adequately.  We can see this most clearly in Cafruny’s reliance, in 2009, on Zbigniew 
Brzezinski to elucidate US foreign policy strategy, thereby missing the critical element of 
generational change in  foreign policy advisers that has marked the more recent US foreign 
policy shift under Obama to an accommodation with at least relative decline (Mann 2013).55   
Given that relations between a changing NATO and a developing European security 
infrastructure have been marked by a common and fundamental assumption of a compatibility 
of interests, and complementarity in roles, we can see that framing an argument around ‘US 
Power and the Limits of European Autonomy’ (as Cafruny’s is entitled) is to miss the point – 
what we must assess is rather Western power and its organisation.56   
Development Towards a Bipolar West 
The desire for an autonomous integrated European military force has been a consistent post 
WW2 European aspiration.  Nevertheless, the exigencies of the immediate post-war period, 
combined with an insular French focus on the ‘German question’, ensured that the over-riding 
European pre-occupation was to keep the US in Europe.  Thus 1947’s Dunkirk Treaty, and 
1948’s Treaty of Brussels, which perhaps had potential for forming Europe as a ‘third force’, 
especially as it drew the UK in, fell victim to anti-German concerns, preventing them being a 
precursor for common European security.  As consolidation of Soviet power across Eastern 
Europe progressed, alongside a French realisation that cooperation with the US would be 
needed to contain Germany, there was a shift to Trizonia as the political and economic means 
                                                             
55 This generational element missed also from Naná De Graaff and Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn’s otherwise 
excellent account of the continuity within change of post-Cold War US foreign policy.  They do however 
capture Obama’s foreign policy as a response to the ‘passing of the unipolar moment’ whilst still 
expecting a renewed hegemonic project within the US state-society complex, rather than generated by 
and incorporating the broader West (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012).  Alan Cafruny seems also to 
miss the change in tone from US primacy, to ‘marriage’ with Europe, between the earlier and later 
works of Brzezinski he cites (Cafruny  2009: 75, vs. 83 n4.).  The latter, 2004 work, is in particular 
incompatible with the supportive role towards George W. Bush’s foreign policy that Cafruny assigns it 
(Brzezinski 2004).   
56 Again, the earlier discussion of neoliberalism is central here – Cafruny sees ‘core Europe’ as resisting 
US neoliberalism, rather than pursuing its own, currently neoliberal project. 
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of controlling and rehabilitating Germany, and NATO as a stronger military guarantee against 
potential German or Soviet aggression.57   
Once created NATO was then necessarily the context in which European goals were pursued; 
despite chafing for autonomy, even René Pleven’s European Defence Community Plan 
proposed the force be commanded by the American commander of NATO forces in Europe, 
and be ‘destined to cooperate with the American and Canadian Forces’ (Pleven 1950). 
NATO’s force goals as outlined in Lisbon in 1952 were never realized, nevertheless the initial 
plan for NATO was always of an essentially ‘two pillar’ structure, and the division of labour laid 
out at Lisbon had the US providing only strategic air force and nuclear deterrence, alongside 
naval force in concert with the countries that later formed the Western European Union.  This 
view of NATO was made explicit in President John F. Kennedy's vision of a two-pillar NATO 
formulated in 1962. 
Thus the various attempts to form an integrated European military force must be understood 
in terms of what they were – genuine aspirations – as well as in their effects as precursors to 
increased US involvement to fill the voids of successive failures, but must also be set within the 
context of an assumption of shared goals and cooperation. US military dominance in Europe 
therefore progressed, most notably under President Jimmy Carter’s defence build-up of the 
late 1970s and Ronald Reagan’s Conventional Defence Improvements (CDI) programme of the 
1980s, through European unwillingness to spend at the same rate, as well as European reliance 
on conscription based force structures that pushed up personnel costs, at the expense of 
research and development and procurement.  It is no coincidence that it is during this period, 
and the concurrent strategic transatlantic divergence over détente, that the concept of ‘civilian 
power Europe’ was formulated and gained ground. 
Despite this history of partnership unfulfilled due to European reluctance to actually form a 
coherent European military structure and capability, the idea of a ‘Europeanist’ force as a 
potential challenger to NATO or as an alternative global pole persists. Tension between this 
development of EU security identity as a second pillar of NATO, or as a counterbalancing pole, 
supposedly remains a central issue, with the end of Cold War an enabling condition.  However, 
                                                             
57 Though see Creswell and Trachtenberg (2003) for the greater compatibility of US, British and French 
positions throughout than is usually accorded, and for the mutual recognition all along that the Soviet 
threat was a far greater concern than a resurgent Germany. 
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as the EU has developed an independent military capability the best characterisation is the one 
the historical outline above would suggest - as the development of a bipolar West.   
The table I have constructed compiling the institutional development of independent 
European military capability in Appendix A traces this development, starting with 1992’s 
Maastricht Treaty (TEU) establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy  as the second 
pillar of the EU and extending until 2003, marking the point at which European military 
capacity and determined cohesion, tested by disagreement over the invasion of Iraq, can be 
said to truly have the makings of a bi-polar West.  This can be seen in the Anglo-French 
‘Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence’ and publication 
of the European Security Strategy, the agreement of Berlin Plus, and Operation Artemis – the 
first independent ESDP mission: the immediately preceding and succeeding ESDP military 
operations, EUFOR Concordia (2003) and EUFOR Althea (2004) both reliant on NATO assets 
and undertaken under Berlin Plus arrangements.58    
EUFOR Concordia as the first ESDP military operation, and a Berlin Plus operation, helped to 
prove that a partnership between the EU and NATO was possible, whilst despite its limited 
scope and duration Operation Artemis shows, as it was intended to, European capacity for 
independent out of area action.  In this way Artemis marks the culmination of the move from 
ESDI in NATO, allowing European states to borrow NATO assets, to the ESDP as a new political 
project of the EU ’with its own internal dynamics and self-fuelling logic’  (Howorth 2010).  The 
Le Touquet declaration, made in the shadow of disagreement over the Iraq War between the 
‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ military powers in Europe, and the drafting and agreement of 
the European Security Strategy after the invasion demonstrate the determination and political 
will to form a coherent military force. 
                                                             
58 Berlin Plus refers to the 2002 agreement between NATO and the EU, coming into force in 2003, 
allowing the EU to draw on NATO assets in its own operations.  EUFOR Concordia was the first ESDP 
operation under this agreement, with this EU peacekeeping mission taking over NATO’s ‘Allied 
Harmony’ operation in the Republic of Macedonia.  EUFOR Althea is a military deployment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement, which replaced the 
preceding NATO operations there in 2004.  
Operation Artemis was the EU mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, spanning June to 
September 2003. This short term military intervention was to stabilise the Ituri region, before handing 
responsibility back to the UN’s MONUC mission. It was the first autonomous EU military mission outside 
Europe. 
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Since 2003 the UK – France connection as the driver of European security and defence 
cooperation has only strengthened, as seen in the Lancaster House treaties, and France’ s 
strategic defence review in 2013 (Livre Blanc 2013), suggesting, as this was an enabling 
condition here, that  current reduction of military budgets may well lead to greater 
cooperation still. Similarly the Lisbon Treaty, coming into force in 2009, has strengthened the 
institutions supporting coherent European action, through the merging of the posts of High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commissioner 
for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, to become High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the formation of the European External 
Action Service to serve as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU, and the enabling 
of Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence – this area being one of the least 
controversial elements of the treaty.   
The above suggests that against conceptions that ‘the common foreign and defence policy has 
merged into Atlanticism’ and that ‘the increasingly fragile US imperium is casting a widening 
shadow across Europe’, we must set the more nuanced view of Jolyon Howarth that whilst 
‘[t]here will undoubtedly be regular occasions in the future when NATO and ESDP will 
collaborate and will assume different functions reflecting their different natures’, there will 
also ‘be increasing occasions when they do not interact at all and when the very notion of a 
division of labo[u]r between them ceases to have any meaning’ (Howorth 2010).  As the 
outline above has shown, once one moves beyond a simple comparison of US – EU deployable 
force to contrast instead with the rest of the world, and accept the unlikeliness of military 
confrontation between the US and EU, the ‘developments all point in the direction of a bipolar 
transatlantic connection’ (Toje 2008). 
Conclusion 
As far as possible within this chapter I have used work that could be loosely grouped as part of 
the Amsterdam School as one of the central arguments is that such an approach is best placed 
to grasp the renovation of Western hegemony.  Indeed, with the recalibrating I have 
performed throughout this chapter it becomes clear that the work of the Amsterdam School 
contains all the evidence necessary to understand the post-Cold War development of Europe 
as a development to a bi-polar West, and a ‘separable but not separate’ Lockean entity in its 
own right. 
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As I have shown, this work characterises the EU as a transnational juridical space, as a 
neoliberal formation, as containing a developing transnational capitalist class, and as a major 
military actor with global power projection capabilities.  The conceptual retooling of the work I 
have engaged with in this chapter, and additional empirical evidence, allows Europe to come 
out from the US shadow and become more than merely an extension of the Lockean 
heartland, conflicted and contradictory in its neoliberal identity.  Instead it can be seen as a 
partner in the project of renovating Western hegemony, its different form of neoliberalism and 
its strong focus on human security in external interventions, which I focus on in the second 
part of the thesis, aiding in rebuilding the West’s legitimacy in the wake of the US’s unipolar 
moment.  Indeed in transcending the liberal reliance on the structuring of the state in favour of 
functional spatial differentiation that still maintains the same disjuncture between the 
discipline of capital and the expression of popular will democratically it could perhaps be 
characterised as a neo-Lockean formation.  
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3. Global Power Europe 
Introduction 
The idea of comprehensive concepts of control seeks to capture the dialectic of structure and 
agency in class formation, relating changes in the structural formation of capital to the 
ideologies through which its control is exercised hegemonically.  The preceding chapter gave 
an account of the development of a bi-polar West, pointing also to a competing 
comprehensive concept of control in a distinguishably different construction of neoliberalism.  
This chapter builds upon this by looking at the development of the externally facing element of 
this concept, captured in the idea of ‘global power Europe’. Doing so thus also solidifies what 
has come before, as it is in the construction of such a concept that we can discern class 
formation.  Central to this development is, again, its distinction to the model of the preceding 
US led West. There is no doubt that this concept seeks to open societies to the discipline of 
capital, but the social (re-)structuring through which this is to take place both transcends the 
preceding model of the construction of liberal state forms (polyarchic democracy promotion) 
and builds its legitimacy on the construction of Europe itself as an alternative to the preceding 
model – both in  the supposed transcendence of the nation states system within Europe and 
its non-laissez faire model of capitalism, Europe’s ‘social model’. The focus here is on the 
external facing element, but the integration with internal conceptions of Europe comes 
through clearly. 
I start with the discussion within European Studies on the changing nature of Europe’s self-
perception of itself as an actor in the world.  Here I focus on the relationship between the 
antecedent concept of civilian power and the concurrent development of contemporary 
visions of normative power and global power Europe.  Two scholars most concerned with the 
shift towards a more militarily interventionist concept of global power Europe, Ian Manners 
and James Rogers, identify a group of ‘eurostrategists’ driving this change based in a  
transnational policy network, and it is this opening I seek to build on. 
The second section maps the network of policy institutes involved in developing the global 
power Europe vision in preparation for the December 2013 European Council meeting – a focal 
point as defence was on the agenda.  I do this through analysing the interlocks between their 
governing boards and the resultant network mapping reveals the core institutes involved.  The 
limitations of this methodology are as suggested in the preceding chapter; this flat mapping 
needs both qualitative enrichment and vertical integration into the broader and multi-faceted 
process of class formation. 
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Accordingly the third section focuses on giving a more qualitative account of the institution 
lying at the core of the network; the George Soros founded European Council on Foreign 
Relations (ECFR).  Here I note the conditions surrounding its founding, explore the nature of its 
role as it operates in the interstitial field of think tanks through an analysis of its staff experts, 
and finally give more in depth profiles of three of its most prominent experts.  The final section 
then examines the interlocks of the ECFR’s governing Council outside of the think tank field to 
map how the institution is integrated into a wider hegemonic formation. 
In conclusion I draw out the ‘billionaire agency’ of founder George Soros as well as the need to 
integrate the process of this formation of a competing comprehensive concept of control – a 
clear long-term project of Soros – into a broader intellectual field; that is the dialectic as it 
relates to intellectual structures also. It is this broader set of resources as developed by a 
European IR that part two then examines. 
Global Power Europe 
I take the term global power Europe from James Rogers considerations of a post-Cold War shift 
in the EU’s ‘grand strategy’ from one focused around conceptions of civilian power Europe, to 
this global power Europe conception.  Rogers is, in turn, building on Ian Manners work 
excavating the ‘militarisation’ of the EU’s ‘normative power’ based on this civilian power 
Europe conception. Here I will outline these concepts and the transition, before indicating why 
the approach I take in the rest of this chapter is able to explain this shift better than either 
Rogers or Manners whose approaches are both based in the mainstream European studies 
against which the approach I have developed so far is set. Before I begin I note here then two 
things: firstly, that I use Rogers and Manners as representative of a far broader literature that 
both of them review and critique extensively in the articles of theirs I cite here, and I therefore 
do not undertake any wider literature review; secondly, that underlying this shift is the 
enabling condition of the end of the Cold War – civilian power Europe was necessarily an 
inward looking conception, whereas both normative power Europe and global power Europe 
are explicitly global views.  This then is about an argument set within a post-Cold War 
European studies. 
From Civilian to Global Power  
There are multiple conceptions of the EU as a novel kind of international actor, ranging 
through 'civilian', 'normative', 'ethical' and 'gentle' power. Alongside this constitutive common 
thread of the sui generis nature of the EU, there is a core commonality structured around an 
assumed reliance ‘on civilian rather than military means [used to] pursue the spread of 
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particular norms, rather than geographical expansion or military superiority’ (Diez 2005: 613).  
In this then Francois Duchene’s concept of ‘civilian power’ continues to dominate debate as it 
has for the last 40 years (cf. Orbie 2006).   
Duchêne coined ‘civilian power’ during his tenure as Director of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies in the early 1970s, the concept therefore borne of the Cold War context. The 
focus was accordingly primarily internal, with the overcoming of war within Western Europe 
making it the first region to achieve civilized politics.  This made it a ‘new type of power, which 
had a unique international role to play, not only as an exemplar, but also a catalyst, of 
superpower détente and complex interdependence’ (Rogers 2009: 840). Accordingly the 
European Community’s ‘grand strategy’ ‘should concentrate on ‘domesticating’ or 
‘civilianizing’ relations between its component Member States, as well as those on its 
immediate periphery, especially those under Soviet domination. This would continue to reduce 
the likelihood of European war, and produce a lasting peace ‘(ibid).  In a construction that 
underpins the EUs legitimacy to this day, this strategy was then cast against Europe’s war-torn 
past, making this internal peace project a ‘chronopolitical European grand strategy’  (ibid: 841). 
The success of this project – the construction of a ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘post-modern’ Europe 
internally - is the source from which the EU’s assumed normative superiority and thereby 
legitimacy derives.  Always within it was the underlying principle of how Europe was standing 
out as a third actor, an actor of a unique kind, which could be seen as a catalyst for a new kind 
of power in international relations – though hemmed in by the Cold War context of its 
development.  How this concept is developed and used in the post-Cold War context is the 
central question in debates over the EU’s sui generis identity as an international actor 
Most influential, certainly academically, has been Ian Manners normative power Europe.59 
This is principally an ‘updating’ of the civilian power concept with a focus on exporting 
‘sustainable peace’ through (dominantly) non-military means - the central shift is from an 
insular regional orientation to a global one (Manners and Diez 2007) - though Manners also 
draws on both Johan Galtung and E H Carr in delineating the diffusion of European norms as 
central to Europe’s power and role in the world.  In developing this role he points to the end of 
the Cold War as a central significant example of the role of norm diffusion, seeing this not as a 
‘heartland’ victory after a long drawn out struggle isolating and impoverishing of the Soviet 
                                                             
59 In 2007, his 2002 article developing the concept was voted one of the five most  influential works in 
the field over the preceding decade by the European Union Studies Association (Forsberg 2011). 
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Union, but due to a collapse in the legitimacy of elites in Central and Eastern Europe due to 
norm diffusion from Western Europe (Manners 2002: 238).60  This introduces ‘civil society, civil 
activism and collective action’ as a key actor in this process, particularly pointing to the role of 
the peace movement, and the influence on this movement (and on dissident movements in 
the East) of ‘[p]olitical philosophers such as Hannah Arendt’ (Manners 2006: 185).   
 
The normative power of the EU, as for the civilian power of the EC, stems thus from ‘what it is’ 
rather than principally from ‘what it does or what it says’ (Manners 2002: 252). So the EU is a 
normative power as it represents this vision of Arendtian cosmopolitanism, of political 
expression through collective political action.61  As Manners highlights, this is a continuity with 
the civilian power concept of Europe based on there being ‘a built-in sense of collective action, 
which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance 
[and] the international open society’ (Duchêne 1972: 47, cited in Manners 2006: 185).  
Arendtian political ethics therefore ‘have, and should, inform the public political philosophy of 
the EU’ and from this stems its normative power (Manners 2006: 185; cf. Guisan-Dickinson 
2003 providing empirical support for this contention). 
 
To the degree this is operationalized for external action it translates this conception of 
‘sustainable peace’ built on this political ethic to the broad human security concept, of 
ensuring both freedom from want and freedom from fear.   Such intervention then is socially 
restructuring at a deep level not necessarily focused on the construction of a liberal state but 
on such a political ethics: ‘In contrast to humanitarian assistance and intervention’, 
‘[s]ustainable peace is not simply about the conjunction of short- and long-term methods but, 
in line with Arendt and Duchêne, is informed by the need to build indigenous capacity for 
resolving internal tensions before they lead to violent conflict’ (Manners 2006: 185). 
It is this vision he sees as being ‘militarised’ in an attempt by the EU to ‘have-its-cake-and-eat-
it-too’ in using this normative power conception to legitimatise direct military interventions. 
Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy amongst 
other things, and a significant figure in the global power Europe network I identify below, links 
it together for us: ‘Where did we start? As a peace project among adversaries. What is our 
                                                             
60 In chapter six I develop the significance of the centrality of this view of the end of the Cold War being 
brought about by pressure from below to cosmopolitan constructions of Europe. 
61 Chapter five below discusses Arendtian cosmopolitanism further in the context of the relation of 
cosmopolitanism to liberal imperialism. 
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greatest accomplishment? The spread of stability and democracy across the continent. And 
what is our task for the future? To make Europe a global power; a force for good in the world’ 
(Solana 2006). 
Through this process of militarisation, beginning in the 1990s and picking up pace from 2003 
on, in this way the EU will ‘turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a 
full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention’ (Manners 2006: 186). This identifies the 
central rift in the debate on Europe’s role: not the global order to be pursued – all agree this 
should reflect the EU as they see it - but on the role of force within constructing this order.  
Manners links this process within Europe to the broader shift within global governance as this 
move contains ‘the diverting of the human security agenda both in Brussels and at the UN’ a 
‘misdirection of the normative concerns of the human security agenda away from sustainable 
peace’ (Manners 2006: 192).  Central to this latter process he identifies Mary Kaldor in her 
work for Javier Solana constructing a ‘Human Security Doctrine for Europe (Albrecht et al. 
2004; Glasius and Kaldor 2006).  These questions and Kaldor’s role I cover in the second part of 
the thesis, so here I offer a summary of the transition to the global power vision, but note here 
the shift is achieved through a narrowing of the human security concept to a focus on 
immediate physical threat – a narrowing even of the freedom from fear component. 
 
This marks a shift away from Europe’s power stemming from what the EU is, to what it is – its 
cosmopolitanism - legitimating action ‘out there’. Europe’s past is used to legitimate the EU as 
normatively superior, but a return to the past  is no longer the threat; the danger shifts from 
the potential for intra-European war to external threats menacing this successful construction 
of a zone of ‘civilised politics’.  The EU’s legitimacy stemming from this ‘civilised’ politics is 
integral to its success in intervening externally as there is a clear understanding of the need for 
legitimacy to achieve the lasting social structural change externally which is seen as the way to 
neutralise the variety of threats – from terrorism to irresponsible climate polices – identified.  
 
James Rogers highlights this constitutive element of the ‘need for legitimacy when the Union 
operates abroad’ within this global power discourse, which means that in developing a 
militarily interventionist stance this global power ‘European approach to foreign affairs should 
be founded on a delicate strategic and tactical operation to turn forms of violence and 
authority into a legitimate and lasting order’.  For the ‘eurostrategists’ developing global 
power Europe the ‘Union should enhance its ability to commit violence, while not undermining 
82 
 
 
its ‘civilian’ forms of power; it should then attempt to synthesize both into lasting legitimacy, 
by co-opting others into the strategy’ (Rogers 2009: 850). This he sees as the heart of both 
Robert Cooper’s ‘liberal imperialism’(Cooper 2002, 2003), and  Mark Leonard’s ‘European 
power’ (Leonard 2005), in which‘[f]rom this perspective, the Union attempts to underpin a 
world order’ (Rogers 2009: 850).  
 
Robert Cooper’s has been the most enduringly influential vision within this global power 
Europe discourse, an influence I indicate below in considering figures such as Mark Leonard 
within the network, but that is also evident from the positions he has held as adviser to Tony 
Blair, and currently to the current High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Baroness Ashton.  Cooper classifies the EU as a ‘post-modern world’ having 
transcended the ‘modern’ inter-state structured world.  He notably does not include the US in 
this post-modern world, but does include fellow human security proponents, Canada and 
Japan, in this setting the EU centrally within a wider Western renovation away from a US led 
West.  The dangers to this civilised realm emanate from this modern world of states and the 
‘pre-modern’ world of failed and failing states, operating outside the post-modern realm of 
community and law.  In dealing with this the ‘challenge to the postmodern world is to get used 
to the idea of double standards’ that ‘among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are 
operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle’.  To deal with the dangers the 
jungle presents these operations must seek to create a ‘world in which the efficient and well 
governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth’.  ‘What is 
needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and 
cosmopolitan values’ (Cooper 2002: u.n., cf. Cooper 2003).  This then is the core of the global 
power Europe vision. 
Mary Kaldor and Robert Cooper are two of the group of ‘eurostrategists’ that Manners sees as 
driving this shift to global power Europe – members of a ‘transnational policy network’ centred 
on ‘transnational policy institutes based in Brussels’ (Manners 2006: 191-2).  It is this policy 
network, that Manners does not develop beyond a few illustrative examples, and that James 
Rogers only sketches out, that I map in the next section, updated to cover the network 
involved in preparing a global power Europe vision for the December 2013 European Council 
meeting (the individuals and institutions in Manners’ and Rogers’ treatments can be found in 
appendix B).  This mapping, based on interlocks among the institutions governing boards, 
allows us to get beyond what can seem a free-floating stratum of ‘eurostrategists’ in these 
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earlier accounts.  In locating the centrally placed organisations and studying one of them in 
more depth it therefore also allows us to locate this network within the process of class 
formation identified in the preceding chapter. 
The Global Power Europe Network   
The think tank community agitating for a more strategic and interventionary Europe has grown 
‘tired of waiting for Brussels to initiate the necessary debate, [and] have decided to do it 
themselves’, December 2013’s European Council meeting, where defence is on the agenda, 
has intensified the level of activity by those ‘by those anxious to ‘prepare’ the Council’s 
discussion’ (Witney and de France 2013: 3). This has given a new drive to the global power 
Europe discourse coalition. 
 
This contemporary work falls into two and a half groupings.  The two primary groupings are: 
Think Global Act European convened by Notre Europe62; and the European Global Strategy 
project convened  jointly by Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI),Polish Institute of International 
Affairs (PISM), Real Instituto Elcano (RIE), and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs 
(UI), on behalf of their respective national ministries.63  The half is the Riga Process - now 
explicitly developed to ‘dovetail’ with the European Global Strategy project.64   
The final reports of the two groupings in the run up to the meeting show clearly their global 
power nature. The Notre Europe project published ‘Think Global – Act European: Thinking 
Strategically About The EU’s External Action’ (Notre Europe 2013).  The intention is to create 
the ‘impetus for new strategic reflection on the EU’s role as a global power’ arguing ‘strategic 
cooperation between the EU and the US is required to create a global level-playing field 
promoting Western values in global economic governance and address the ever more 
recurrent abuses of state capitalism.’  To do so European states must ‘maintain and develop 
military capabilities that give them the agility and autonomy they need to respond to future 
                                                             
62 http://www.eng.notre-europe.eu/011015-103-Think-Global-Act-European.html 
63 http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/ 
64 The Riga Process is a series of workshops, held on the margins of the Riga Conference (‘Northern 
Europe’s leading foreign and security policy forum’) organised jointly by the Latvian Transatlantic 
Organisation, the Latvian Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Latvia. As the Riga Process does not form part of the analysis below, I only note here that George Soros 
and the ECFR are well connected here also. The 2013 workshop was part funded by The Soros 
Foundation-Latvia, had several ECFR attendees, as well as those from PROVIDUS: Centre for Public 
Policy, an organisation itself established by the Soros Foundation-Latvia.  This last point a reminder that 
Soros funding is deeply imbricated with civil society organisations throughout especially the former 
Eastern bloc and FSU.  
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crises and challenges [… and] look beyond their current ‘pooling and sharing’ efforts towards 
integrating military capabilities’.  All of which is part of a global order project as the ‘emerging 
powers challenge the liberal order based on Western values and institutions (open markets, 
social bargains, democracy, multilateral institutions and cooperative security) and what until 
the crisis was expected to be a progressive Westernisation of the world through globalisation. 
Europeans have to prepare to engage in an ever more intense competition over values’ (Notre 
Europe 2013: 7, 14, 17). 
The European Global Strategy group published ‘Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing 
European influence in a changing world’ (EGS 2013).  This interlinked external action and the 
nature of the EU creating an ‘obligation to base its external action on the principles that 
inspired its own creation and to promote its values abroad’. This external action aimed 
primarily at the EU’s strategic neighbourhood, extending as far as ‘the Sahel, the Horn of 
Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Arctic and adjacent sea-lanes’; a neighbourhood that 
presents ‘a challenge that will seriously test its capacity for concerted external action’.  In 
meeting the challenge the ‘EU should also be prepared to undertake autonomously the full 
spectrum of civilian and military missions in the strategic neighbourhood' which ‘implies the 
ability to project both civilian and military capabilities, and the capacity to link timely crisis 
management and humanitarian assistance to longer-term development efforts as part of the 
EU’s comprehensive approach’ (EGS 2013: 1, 5-6). 
To construct the network of organisations involved in this contemporary global power Europe 
discourse coalition I tabulated the core and affiliated organisations in these projects, alongside 
both James Rogers and Ian Manners earlier identifications of the components of a Global 
Power Europe discourse to give a longitudinal dimension (2009 and 2006 respectively), this 
table reproduced in Appendix B. 
From this table I developed a core group of think tanks involved in this discourse. In doing so I 
focused on the core convening organisations, and those central to Rogers and Manners 
analyses, with the addition of those from the broader groupings that appear twice across the 
groups. This removed the semi-defunct and more marketing oriented groups found in the 
larger Notre Europe project, as well as the minnows such as the Kosovo Group. It also had the 
effect of removing the university departmental centres.  Whilst this direct involvement is 
useful to note in illustrating the continuum between academia and policy institutions it is not a 
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primary conduit for private values expressed as expert knowledge, operating according to 
other logics - supported by their peripheral position in this discourse coalition. 
Similarly, whilst both the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and Polish Institute of 
International Affairs (PISM) are core institutions and were included in the analysis undertaken 
below there were no linkages to the rest of the network, so they have been removed from this 
core post-hoc.  This isolation is unsurprising as both are governmental advisory spin offs, with 
governance boards made up of purely domestic politicians and academics accordingly. Whilst 
these, and other similar quasi autonomous governmental bodies demonstrate continuity 
through state and private policy bodies, as the overall argument on the interpellation of state 
and capital mangers in a ruling class suggests, the focus here is on the construction of a vision 
for Europe in the think tank sector proper and thus the capital- policy nexus.  
This left a core network of thirteen institutions: the Bertelsmann Foundation; Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS); Centre for European Reform (CER); Demos; Egmont Institute; 
Elcano Royal Institute (RIE); European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); European Policy 
Centre (EPC); Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP); International 
Affairs Institute (IAI); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); Notre Europe; and, SWP 
- German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 
I analysed the relationships between the component organisations through looking at their 
board interlocks – that is where the same person sits on the governing boards of two or more 
institutions.  This method of analysing interlocks is often used in establishing the existence and 
nature of a corporate community (as in seen in the preceding chapter). Its suitability here rests 
on the same premises, that it is through such interlocks that organisations communicate and 
coordinate to establish a social fabric.  As noted, the next stage for a corporate community is 
actively pursuing hegemonic projects, with policy planning institutions central to this (Carroll 
2010, Heemskerk 2013).   This method then gives an overview of a community, and the 
position of organisations within it – here as these organisations are of a policy 
planning/strategic nature we have an overview of a strategic community. 
 
A number of the think tanks concerned had more than one governance board, most usually 
one concerned with executive governance, and one with policy governance.  As is standard 
practice, in these instances I combined the boards (Carroll 2010).  In most of these cases the 
executive governance board was preponderantly domestic politicians, business people, and 
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academics who were not linked into broader networks, whilst it was in the policy governance 
board that the interconnections with the network tended to be found.  
 
The shortcoming of this method is that it likely underestimates the density of linkages between 
the organisations as staff were not included (cf. Carroll 2010: 189).  Overall whilst staff experts 
certainly collaborate amongst these institutions, and thus fulfil the communication part of a 
community’s social fabric they do not decide direction of overall work, or sit on strategy across 
organisations.   However there are also interlinkers between the staff and governance level, 
with board members for one organisation working as outside experts for another, and also 
links through career trajectory, for example the trajectory of Mark Leonard which I outline 
below.  Whilst these links were excluded from analysis, my sense from having carried out this 
research is that these linkages conform with the findings below – the linkages are amongst the 
core group of organisations. 
To establish the nature of the network between the governing boards of these institutions 
they were analysed using UCINET (Borgatti et al 2002) and NetDraw (Borgatti 2005), an 
established set of software packages for this purpose (Carroll 2010, van Apeldoorn and de 
Graaf 2012).  The results are seen in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 makes clear that the ECFR is the central node of the network, with CER, EPC and 
Notre Europe forming the core of the network with it.  Of the various boards the CER contains 
the densest collection of network links having a board of only 34 people.  It is heavily linked 
into ECFR with 11 interlinks, whilst EPC has 13 and Notre Europe 8 links to the ECFR. Most of 
the linkages between non-ECFR boards are carried by only one or two individuals, with only 
the links between Notre Europe and Egmont, and Notre Europe and EPC carried by as many as 
three individuals. This is perhaps unsurprising as the ECFR’s council is three to four times the 
size of nearest largest two groupings consisting of 205 members (EPC with 75 members, Notre 
Europe with 58: mean grouping size was 47.6; mode 31; median 34, making clear the ECFR as 
an outlier). 
 
From the 619 board positions analysed, there emerges a group of 55 ‘linkers’ – people acting 
as interlinks through having more than one affiliation – the list is reproduced in Appendix C.  
Within this most carried only one interlock amongst this core group of thirteen think tanks, 
though 13 of them carried two interlocks, and one, Antonio Vitorino, the former Portuguese 
defence minister and deputy prime minister and ex- European Commissioner, who is now 
President of Notre Europe, carried three.   Of this group of linkers, only 14 were not on the 
ECFR council – significant amongst these are the two within this group with multiple interlocks: 
Etienne Davignon linking Notre Europe, Egmont and CEPS) and Francois Heisbourg (CER, 
ELIAMEP and IISS).  Etienne Davignon has however previously served on the ECFR Council in 
201165.  
 
Overall then the ECFR’s Council places it at the centre of the Global Power Europe discourse 
coalition.  It’s greater size suggesting a deliberate move to establish such a position, especially 
in the increase in members from 141 members in September 2011, to 205 in September 2013.  
 
 
                                                             
65 François Heisbourg also indicating the difficulties in fixing the idea of a Europeanist/Atlanticist rift, having served 
in French governmental positions (member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the 
Minister of Defence), in the defence industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF (antecedent to Thales),and senior vice 
president for strategy at Matra Défense Espace (now EADS)) and in academia (professor of world politics at 
Sciences-Po Paris), whilst also serving as Chairman, and previously Director, of that most Altlanticist of 
organisations, the IISS (van der Pijl 2012 [1984]: 220). He is a special advisor of to the Fondation pour la Recherche 
Strategique, Paris.  
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The European Council on Foreign Relations 
This section looks in more depth at this centrally placed think tank, adding the necessary 
qualitative dimension to the analysis. I briefly outline the organisation’s founding before using 
its staff of experts to establish its location in an interstitial field, supporting the earlier 
theoretical contention and helping situate the production of expert knowledge in this field.  I 
then finally focus on three of the more prominent experts within the ECFR to give more insight 
into the global power Europe vision it develops. 
The circumstances of the ECFR’s founding support the idea of its creation being a strategic 
move to strengthen and develop the global power Europe network. Billing itself as the first 
‘pan-European’ think tank as it has offices in  Berlin, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw as 
well as its base London office, the ECFR was founded by George Soros in the pursuit of his 
vision of a values based foreign policy, aiming to recalibrate Western intervention in wake of 
US hegemonic crisis.  As Soros sets out in the Age of Fallibility this hegemonic failure requires 
Europe to play a more important role in the West, setting an example for America to follow, 
and thereby creating a ‘legitimate international community capable of exercising the 
responsibility to protect’ (Soros 2006: xxiv).  His role in bringing this about he moots, one year 
before launching the ECFR, lies in ‘launching a European open society foundation’ (ibid: xix).  
James Rogers identifies its first ‘statement’, taking the form of a letter to various press, as 
crystallising the global power Europe discourse he has been charting (Rogers 2009: 849). 
Entitled The EU Cannot Afford to Become a Symbol of Weakness or Decline, it’s a pugnacious 
encapsulation, for example: ‘The threat of a nuclear Iran, the risk of war in the Middle East, the 
fight against extremism in Afghanistan, the challenge of climate change and the plight of Africa 
all require a stronger Europe better able to promote peace and prosperity. The new 
administration in Washington will need a strong European partner to reaffirm the Atlantic 
Alliance and restore its moral prestige. Europe's place in the world will be challenged if the 
Union indulges in self-doubt and paralysis’ (ECFR 2008).  The letter is signed by 44 prominent 
figures from across Europe, a microcosm of the ECFR’s governing council, which I analyse 
below, that contains ‘serving ministers, members of parliament, EU senior officials, former 
NATO secretary generals, intellectuals, journalists and business leaders - from the EU’s 
member states and candidate countries’ (ECFR u.d.).   
In my earlier discussion of think tanks, I developed Thomas Medvetz’s idea of think tanks 
occupying an interstitial field – that is occupying a space between academia, business, media 
and politics.  We saw that the simultaneous relations of dependence and independence of 
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these fields is what gives think tanks their power, as developed through generating 
independent but relevant and usable expert knowledge.   To understand this position I have 
applied this to the ECFR’s ‘Experts’, those who produce their primary reports (comprising their 
fellows and senior fellows, as well as their CEO, Director, and even communications manager – 
who also works as a consultant to other think tanks; they also host guest reports/papers).  To 
do so I have coded the career backgrounds and current concurrent roles of the 34 experts 
according to the field they occupy: academia, business, media and politics, with the addition of 
think tanks to cover the interlinking of the organisation with the field itself via its experts.  
Business here refers to work in business consulting on strategy, rather than corporate 
management roles, as it is this policy entrepreneurialism that is salient to working within the 
field. Figure 3.2 below visualises the results. 
As is clear, whilst no-one occupies the ‘perfect’ middle spot, there are very few whose 
background lies in purely one area.  The experts of the ECFR can be said to reflect the 
existence of a think tank field that has developed the characteristics of a Lockean interstitial 
field.  
Even those occupying only one area by career background also demonstrate this inter-mixing 
of fields in other activities.  The ‘pure’ academic is Jan Zielonka Senior Policy Fellow working on 
ECFR's Reinvention of Europe project. He is a Professor of European Politics at the University of 
Oxford and Ralf Dahrendorf Fellow at St Antony’s College, and also directs a large international 
project funded by the European Research Council on the Media and Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  One can see the relevance of this Polish political theorist’s academic work: his 
book Europe as Empire exults at a European enlargement whose ‘design was truly imperialist’, 
demonstrating ‘power politics at its best, even though the term ‘power’ was never mentioned 
in the official enlargement discourse’, an example of a ‘benign empire in action’ (Zielonka 
2006, cf. Anderson 2007).  More significantly he also sits on the research council of the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), central to the West’s shift to democracy 
promotion as means of hegemonic control (Robinson 1996).66 
 
                                                             
66 http://www.ned.org/research/research-council/forum-research-council-members 
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Figure 3.2. Career backgrounds of ECFR Experts67 
 
 
 
The pure media career background is Hans Kundnani, a former journalist still published in The 
Guardian, The Observer, Financial Times, Prospect and the Times Literary Supplement.  Whilst 
not an academic he does however also have several papers published in academic journals 
(e.g. Kundnani 2013; Kundnani 2012), as well as contributing policy papers to the German 
Marshall Fund. 
                                                             
67 List of ECFR experts available at http://www.ecfr.eu/content/experts/ , last accessed 1 September 
2013. 
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The five with a purely political career background are generated by my coding, in which in the 
interests of a usable visualisation I have amalgamated civil service and lobbying NGOs as 
similar in providing experience of influencing political action. It does however obscure the 
variety of roles covered.  To take one of the five in this segment, Susi Dennison’s career 
background includes roles in advocacy for Amnesty International, civil society representation 
in the Human Rights and Good Governance partnership of the EU Africa strategy, and policy 
work within the British civil service (HM Treasury and Home Office). 
Rotation through the think tank sector is also quite high; of significance for us are the officer 
level links to other think tanks in the Global Power Europe network including: Notre Europe, 
DGAP, SWP, Foreign Policy Centre, German Marshall Fund, Centre for European Reform, 
Elcano Royal Institute for International Affairs, RIIA /Chatham House. 
I restrict the media group to those who have worked directly for media organisations – for 
example Thomas Klau, Head of their Paris Office, who participated in the conception and 
launch of the Financial Times Deutschland - as almost all the experts regularly contribute to 
high profile news outlets, such as the Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, Economist, 
Le Monde, New York Times etc., as well as many appearing in Foreign Policy and Foreign 
Affairs.  Overall this media visibility and the really rather glittering collection of CVs this expert 
cohort possesses, give the organisation great credibility, weight and reach.  
 
Three examples from this panel of experts will serve to illustrate this, as well as how their 
intellectual trajectory suggests that as an autonomous research fellow they will produce 
expertise in line with Soros’ mission for a rebalanced West embodying and promoting a more 
developed sustainable neoliberalism.  It should also be noted however the frequency with 
which ECFR papers acknowledge the input and guidance of members from the ECFR Council, 
the organisation’s guiding body – which I come to below. I focus on founding director Mark 
Leonard, ‘Davos Man’ Parag Khanna, and Nick Witney, founding chief executive of the 
European Defence Agency, and through them also give some of the development of the Global 
Power Europe discourse within the ECFR. 
Mark Leonard – A European ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ 
Mark Leonard is the founding, and current Director of the European Council on Foreign 
Relations, having previously been the New Labour ‘foreign policy Wunderkind’ (Anderson 
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200768) in roles as director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform, and founding 
director of Tony Blair’s Foreign Policy Centre.69  Both of these organisations were prominent in 
the earlier generation of a ‘global power Europe’ discourse that seeks precisely to renovate 
Western hegemony, with Tony Blair’s ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ expounded in 
1999 a touchstone for the conception of an alternative European approach to intervention – at 
least before the invasion of Iraq (Leonard 200270; contrast Kaldor 2001, 2003 with Kaldor 2007, 
2011 for example).   
 
Accordingly Leonard himself is a prominent figure in this discourse, Ian Manners noting his 
vision of European power is of an imperial liberalism, as expounded by his fellow foreign policy 
guru to Tony Blair, Robert Cooper. Three examples from before the founding of the ECFR show 
the development of this thinking.  As part of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Global Europe project, 
Leonard co-wrote ‘Global Europe: Implementing the European Security Strategy’. Notable are 
firstly the call to ‘[p]romot[e] doctrines within the United Nations to provide Chapter VII 
support for ‘the responsibility to protect’’, that is to allow preventative military intervention 
under Chapter VII ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace’ (Leonard and Gowan 2004: 28-
9). Secondly that Europe ‘has developed a new type of power that starts not with geopolitics 
but domestic politics’ focusing on ‘what values underpin the state? What are its constitutional 
and regulatory frameworks?’. Thus as ‘democracy and human rights are too important to be 
left to Neo-conservatives’ he develops an approach to foreign policy that promotes political 
reform in other target countries as a good in itself, rather than as one means to international 
stability, and considers this a distinctly European contribution to global security (ibid: 11-12). 
 
2005 saw Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century. This ‘New European Century’ will be ‘a world 
of peace, prosperity and democracy’. Much of this change will be achieved through the 
                                                             
68
 Perry Anderson here links Mark Leonard’s view to that of Jürgen Habermas, sharing an ‘apparently 
illimitable narcissism, in which the reflection in the water transfigures the future of the planet into the 
image of the beholder [here the EU]’, a flattering European self-image constructed through a contrast 
with the US.  (Amusingly the letters in response largely ignore the content of this piece, indulging in 
pedantry focused on his use of ‘referenda’ as plural for referendum. The price you pay for publishing in 
LRB.) 
69 Prior to this he also worked for Demos and was a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of 
the United States. 
70 Mark Leonard writing in the Observer to bolster the humanitarian case for the Iraq War, likens it to 
the case for intervention in Kosovo (Could the left back an Iraq war? Mark Leonard, Observer, 11 August 
2002). 
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seductive power of European values and way of life, as ‘Europe represents a synthesis of the 
energy and freedom that come from liberalism with the stability and welfare that come from 
social democracy’; an established discourse in establishing the superiority and therefore right 
to intervene of European civilisation.  Nonetheless for recalcitrants unswayed by this vision of 
Europe ‘pre-emptive intervention’ from Europe is valid; pre-emptive as non-liberal democratic 
states have been established as illegitimate and a likely source of threat.  In Leonard’s 
distinguishing of this from the Bush Doctrine, the comprehensiveness, and dangerousness of 
the ‘new type of power’ he outlines become clear: 
The contrast between the two doctrines is stark. The Bush doctrine attempts 
to justify action to remove a threat before it has a chance of being employed 
against the United States. It is consequently focused very closely on physical 
assets and capabilities, necessarily swift in execution and therefore short-
term in conception and unavoidably military in kind. The European doctrine of 
pre-emption, in contrast, is predicated on long-term involvement, with the 
military just one strand of activity, along with pre-emptive economic and legal 
intervention, and is aimed at building the political and institutional bases of 
stability, rather than simply removing the immediate source of threat. 
Leonard 2005 
 
Finally, written immediately prior to the founding of ECFR in 2007, is ‘Divided world: The 
struggle for primacy in 2020’ (Leonard 2007: i).   Here he identifies four emerging poles of 
ideological competition: the US, ‘which will seek a balance of power that favours democracy’; 
China and Russia, ‘which will use international law to protect autocracies from external 
interference’; the EU, ‘which will favour a world of democratic states bound by the laws of 
multilateral institutions’; and the Middle East, ‘which will become a faith zone, governed 
neither by democracy nor the rule of law’ (Leonard 2007: 2). Not all countries will fit neatly 
into one sphere or another so a ‘global battle to co-opt ‘swing countries’’ will ensue’ (ibid: 47).  
This thus established a clear source justifying an active interventionary policy spreading 
‘European values’ hegemonically (as well as anticipating the argument in Parag Khanna’s The 
Second World (Khanna 2009)). 
Whilst ‘the EU shares so many values with the US that it should be able to forge a common 
agenda with Washington on many issues’ (Leonard 2007: 53), the grave danger for the EU is 
‘paradoxically’ its respect for the law – hence whilst within Europe democracy and the rule of 
law are mutually reinforcing, ‘outside the cosy warmth of the European continent, the EU 
often has to choose between these two values’ (ibid: 37). Rather than remain thus in thrall to 
UN mandates, and thereby the veto power of Russia and China ‘the EU should openly 
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recognise its [UNSC] limitations and explore other mechanisms for giving legitimacy to 
international interventions for example through regional organisations like NATO and the 
African Union’ (ibid: 51-52). 
 
We have a recipe for unifying Western intervention and a seeking for legitimacy. A search that 
concludes that the EU’s character in itself serves as sufficient legitimation – again a strong 
echo of the ‘hypocrisy’ advocated by Robert Cooper in dealing with the non-European world.  
As such, Leonard has been central in aligning the myth of Europe as an alternative within 
international relations and Global Power Europe conceptions – the former feeding the latter.71 
Parag Khanna –Davos Man 
Parag Khanna ties this back into the broader Western configuration and the use of Western 
power, having served on the foreign policy advisory group to Barack Obama during his 
Presidential campaign and as senior geopolitical advisor to United States Special Operations 
Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007.  Which is not to imply a US nationalist viewpoint; 
Khanna is the archetypal ‘Davos Man’ (Reid 2011)– Samuel Huntington’s term for the global 
elite whose interests transcend the national – having not only worked for the World Economic 
Forum, but also  been anointed a ‘Young Global Leader’ by them (in 2009, a distinction he 
shares with Mark Leonard), and regularly attending their annual conference.  He readily 
acknowledges it as one of the real centres of global governance, calling for the establishment 
of more such fora for informal governance (Khanna 2011b). He has also worked in both the 
Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations.72 
 
His views then are influential.73  They fit quite neatly into George Soros’ world view also, seeing 
the end of US hegemony (notably Khanna 2008), generating  the need for a more consolidated 
West to follow the ‘new’ European ‘style’ of foreign policy – embarrassingly labelling the EU 
the ‘Metrosexual Superpower’, this boils down to hegemonic power; the ability to pursue 
interests through generating consent and maintaining legitimacy whilst using or threatening 
force  (Khanna 2004). 
                                                             
71 Ian Manners, in setting this Global Power Discourse against his own conception of normative power 
Europe sees the latter as co-opting the former, whereas Leonard demonstrates further the internal 
relation between the two (Manners 2006). 
72 See the acknowledgements of How To Run The World (Khanna 2011a) for some of his more informal 
network – immediately notable for our purposes are the Bertelsmann Foundation, Demos and SWP. 
73 In a nice demonstration of the contemporary field of power, this is despite all his works 
simultaneously being near universally panned in academic reviews.  
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Consent is critical as in the Post-American world the nature of world order will be decided by 
second tier states, deciding the balance between the great powers of the US, the EU and 
China.  The US then must follow the European example and work to persuade these ‘tipping 
point’ states to follow Western norms (Khanna 2009).  In this, it is very much a call for 
renovating the preceding US based hegemony on an broader basis, whilst also seeking to re-
legitimise the concept of empire for the West (again cf. Cooper 2003).  
 
Perhaps most interestingly, and in considerable tension with the latent realism of this earlier 
work – unwittingly illustrative of the instrumental fluctuation between the use of realist and 
universal frameworks in IR (Khanna’s PhD is in IR from LSE) - his humbly titled  2011 work How 
To Run The World74 is a paean to private political philanthropy of the Soros kind (Khanna 
2011a).  Framed as a ‘new colonialism’ this intervention by private sphere ‘megadiplomats’ 
(George Soros, Bill Gates – Žižek’s Davos ‘liberal communists’), overcomes the failings of 
traditional development efforts by combining entrepreneurialism with dedication to public 
service.  As Slavoj Žižek identifies, and Khanna lauds, this entails a move to seeing problems as 
discrete practical challenges – not politically or as containing ideological elements (Žižek 
2006b; Žižek 2006a). For example: ‘rather than even talk about poverty, we should focus on 
need. Poverty is amorphous and sounds incurable, but needs are specific: food, water, shelter, 
medical care and education’ – solvable in civil society through ‘cosmopolitan, or cause-
mopolitan’ participation (ibid: Chpt. 9 (u.n. epub)).  All of which operates within the framework 
of an interventionary West, whose interventions can legitimately include targeted 
assassinations. 
Nick Witney – Maintaining a  bi-polar West 
Nick Witney gives concrete content to the vision as outlined above. Having seen senior service 
in the UK’s Ministry of Defence, lastly as Director-General of International Security Policy 
where he was responsible for NATO and EU policy as well as missile defence, Witney was also 
the first Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), serving from 2004 – 2007.  As 
such he is extremely well placed to judge both Europe’s military capabilities and strategy, as a 
whole and disaggregated – to whit he carried out a review of all EU member states’ security 
                                                             
74 Hard not to draw the titular comparison to Hobsbawm’s How to Change the World (Hobsbawm 2012) 
and its implications for the author’s relationship to power. 
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strategies on behalf of the French ministry of defence in 2012 (findings from which are 
developed in Witney and de France 2013).  
 
The creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) was a great success for European arms 
firms lobbying75 – for Ian Manners the EDA is the embodiment of the European ‘military-
industrial simplex’’s militarisation of EU foreign policy: termed a ‘simplex’ ‘ to capture the way 
in which both the military-armaments lobby and the technology-industrial lobby have worked 
at the EU level to create a simple but compelling relationship between the need for forces 
capable of ‘robust intervention’, and the technological and industrial benefits of defence and 
aerospace research’ (Manners 2006; 193).  As such ‘a carrier and shaper of the political order 
of EU defence, the Agency may serve as a litmus test of the emerging nature of that order’ 
(Bátora 2009: 1092). With that in mind, in an overview of literature on the agency Jolyon 
Howorth notes the ‘remarkable successes of the EDA in pushing forward defence industrial 
integration’.  That is whilst complaints about fragmentation and duplication remain, voiced not 
least by Nick Witney himself, given the intergovernmental terms of reference of the EDA (its 
Board consists of the 27 Ministers of Defence) the reasonable successes of breaking out of 
such a framework towards a cohesive European capability are notable – more so for us as 
abetted by ‘the direct input of industry and the common mindset linking industrial lobbyists to 
the EDA officials’ (Howorth 2012: 440). 
 
At the ECFR Witney has continued in this vein, of the need for cohesive European military 
capacity, most recently through call for a European defence capability assessment linking 
strategic vision to the materiel needed to achieve it (Witney and de France 2013).  In doing so 
however the justificatory emphasis has shifted from the industrial and economic arguments of 
the ‘military-industrial simplex’ towards arguments based on the unique contribution Europe 
makes to world order and the need for force to continue to realise it –armed forces are 
‘necessary instruments of power and influence’ (Witney 2011: 1).  Thus 2009’s Towards a Post-
American Europe: a power audit of EU-US Relations, starts from the position of a post-US 
hegemonic world and argues that the West needs the emergence of a more assertive ‘post-
American Europe’ – not as a counterweight to the US but to strengthen the relationship 
between these two poles of the West and ‘handle […] and influence the ongoing 
                                                             
75
 See for example the joint letter from the chief executives of Thales, EADS and BAE, ‘The New European Defence 
Agency: Getting Above the Clouds’, FT 24 June, 2004. 
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transformation of the international order in directions they find congenial’ (Witney and 
Shapiro 2009: 14-15).  
 
Notably he goes against the ‘Atlanticism’ vs. ‘Europeanism’ paradigm, arguing from interviews 
with foreign ministries of all member states that all states believe they have a ‘special 
relationship’ with the US and that they are more committed than average to both this 
relationship and Europe.  This is hardly a contradiction as a stronger Europe makes for a 
stronger West.  Demilitarisation must therefore be resisted: whilst Europe is far from 
demilitarising, spending far more than China and Russia combined, the lack of direct territorial 
threat has led to concerns other than security  driving this spending (inter alia regional 
/national industrial policy and employment, prestige).  Both the effectiveness of Europe’s soft 
power, and Europe’s freedom and security, require the ability to mount ‘early and robust 
intervention’. More even than just such self-interest, for Europe the ‘readiness to undertake 
“expeditionary operations’’ is a ‘moral imperative’ (Witney 2011: 4). 
 
Establishing that progress towards a truly bi-polar interventionary West has clearly been made, 
he notes that European ‘fatigue for liberal interventionism’ has become a problem, leading to 
a noticeably less interventionist EU after the promising start of ‘more than 20 European crisis-
management operations launched in the period from 2003 to 2008, in conflict areas as far-
flung as Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Witney 2011: 2).  
Hopes for a rejuvenation of such liberal interventionary political will now lie with December 
2013’s European Council meeting, where defence is on the agenda (Witney 2013). 
 
ECFR and a hegemonic formation 
Having located the ECFR at the centre of the Global Power Europe think tank network, and 
given some consideration to the organisation itself, I now turn to locating it within a European 
hegemonic formation set within the West. 
A hegemonic formation requires a variety of disparate elements if it is to succeed: it must 
establish a consensus over interests to overcome capital’s concrete character in capitalists as 
‘a band of warring brothers’, agree therefore on the shape of a favourable future operating 
environment, and form strategies to further and universalise these interests and visions, and, 
finally, it must be capable of taking political action to realise them.  It must therefore integrate 
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dominant capital formations and business interests, organic intellectuals of all kinds, as well as 
politicians and other controllers of governance and coercive apparatus, into a hegemonic bloc. 
To demonstrate the position of the ECFR in relation to just such a hegemonic formation for 
Europe within a bipolar West, I have developed the method used by Kees van der Pijl, in 
analysing the 2007 Istanbul Bilderberg conference as another instance of the gathering of such 
a potential hegemonic formation76 (van der Pijl 2007).  There he categorised attendees into: 
representatives of the liberal West as a political formation; transnational capital; and the 
instances of hegemonic order on which the two converge (intellectuals, the media and 
international economic organisations).  Dividing attendees up amongst these groupings 
suggests how through such meetings and organisations a transnational ruling class coordinate 
themselves to ‘utilize the levers of power available’ to master the challenges they face (ibid: 
636).77 
A similar approach to the members of the ECFR Council produces a similar grouped listing with 
all of the elements well covered.   I have taken this breakdown and translated it into a ‘map’ of 
the components of such a hegemonic formation, as interlocked into the ECFR Council, along 
geographical and class formation axes, in figure 3.3 below. 
Missing from this map however are two elements central to the universalising of interests – 
the creation of expert knowledge to reshape common sense, and the dissemination of such 
knowledge and universalised worldviews through media of various kinds.   
The first is covered in the Global Power Europe network illustrated above.  The latter is 
touched on in the identifying of the interstitial position of the ECFR as a think tank through the 
analysis of its staff’s career backgrounds.  There we saw the bulk of the ECFR’s experts 
regularly publish and appear in media with a high international profile.  The same is true for 
many of the council members, especially of course those there specifically for that reason, 
such as public and academic intellectuals, or journalists and writers, such as Timothy Garton 
Ash, Mary Kaldor, Maria Kuffaro, Teresa de Sousa, Diana Pinto, Ian Buruma, or Goran 
                                                             
76 The disparate nature of the elements makes the social network analysis used in the preceding section 
inappropriate. Where such methods have been used in relation to similar conceptions of hegemony they 
have sought to link only internally within one, or at the most two of these elements – for example 
William Carroll integrates the organisations within my global policy planning box into his corporate 
network, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graaff analyse the interlocks between recent US 
administrations and, separately, their commercial interests, and the (US delimited) policy planning field. 
77 As noted earlier, he does so in order to demonstrate through a transnational class analysis the 
internal relation between capital and the state system manifested in class formation. 
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Stefanovski.  Whilst the various media fields operate according to their own rules, and are 
semi-autonomous in that sense, the ‘crudest’ basis of the censorship and control of the field is 
still economic ownership (Bourdieu 1998: 15-16). With that in mind, the Council also contains 
numerous board members and owners of media outlets and conglomerates,  themselves 
further entrenched in networks of media ownership external to this study, including, Corelio, 
Die Welt, Dogan Gazetecilik, El Pais, Le Monde, and RAI.  
The focus of the map is on the translation of the formation of a corporate community through 
to strategic political action, on an axis of class formation.  This focus on formation and 
development is central to arguments on the existence and hegemony of a transnational class, 
(as seen in my arguments earlier), both developing the work of the Amsterdam School to 
accommodate the development of such a formation within Europe, and against the pluralist 
critique of the structuralism of power elite theory – a focus on class formation is central to 
both.  The ECFR through linking all of these elements presents a forum for the formation of a 
class for itself,  above and beyond merely a corporate community and against, through its 
regional geographical specificity, its absorption into a diffuse un(der)specified ‘global’ class and 
policy planning apparatus. 
From this can be seen this further interstitial nature of think tanks I identified above, in their 
role in class formation through bringing together components of a potential hegemonic 
formation on advisory boards.  The boards of most of the other global power Europe think 
tanks examined above perform similar functions, uniting think tank directors, academics, 
media interests, with other  business interests and, though less often, military organisations.  
Overall however, they tend to a national core of board members with some cosmopolitan 
linkers, and are limited in size. The combination found on the ECFR Council is uniquely 
comprehensive. 
This extends to another significant aspect that falls outside of this study, the societal 
restructuring within the newer EU members and the membership on the council of 
appropriate representatives.  Thus it is notable that for example Marek Belka, Governor of the 
National Bank of Poland and  former Polish Prime Minister and Finance Minister, who was also 
both a consultant to the World Bank and Director of the IMF's European Department, sits on 
the council; exemplary in that numerous serving ministers from accession states sit on the 
Council, whereas for older EU states the members tend to be ex-ministers, backbenchers or 
advisers (e.g. Jo Johnson MP, Head of No 10 Policy Planning Unit in the UK).     
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Figure 3.3 - The ECFR and the formation of a hegemonic bloc 
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The hegemonic bloc 
Such a diagram, as is indeed the case for any such network analysis, struggles to convey the 
quality of the links visualised; here therefore I elaborate on the diagram above, focusing on the 
implications for global power Europe and the class formation driving it. 
Space precludes much analysis of links to individual businesses.  The diagram gives the three 
largest sectors linked into, by size from left to right –with banking and financial firms over-
represented in relation to this sector’s role in the European corporate community, though 
perhaps reflecting a new found interest in political projects incorporating the EU that the 
founding of the European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR), in the model of the ERT, 
suggests (Heemskerk 2013). Notable also is interlocks at the most senior possible level with 
both McKinsey and Company and Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, the significance of 
whom in the restructuring of European public services was mentioned above (Roland Berger 
himself, and Robert Reibestein, senior partner McKinsey and Company sit on the Council).   
Starting with the corporate community links, the ECFR is heavily interlinked with the European 
core of the transnational corporate community, as identified by William Carroll (2010).78 Most 
significantly of the seven European firms that have remained within the core of this 
community for the decade 1996-2006 – such continuity indicating politically active directors 
and boards – the ECFR is linked to four (Allianz, BP, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank). This measure 
also indicates the centrality of European firms to the political activism of the community as 
only one non-European firm, the  American AIG,  demonstrates the same continuity (Carroll 
2010: 193).  The same is true when we aggregate William Carroll and Eelke Heemskerk’s 
separate, consecutive, identifications of core temporal continuity, bringing it up to 2010: this 
gives a consistent core of three firms, two of which are interlocked with the ECFR Council: BP, 
BNP Paribas, and the non-ECFR linked Unilever (Heemskerk 2013: 90-91) 
Also notable is that most central to Heemskerk’s network in 2010, and ‘one of the organizing 
pillars of the European network, was Compagnie Nationale a Portefeuille SA/NV’ (ibid: 86).  In 
2011 the remaining independent shares in this Belgian holding company were bought by the 
                                                             
78 It is worth noting that the interlinking of ECFR to the core of the community must follow this shift to 
Europe as membership of the Council is restricted to European nationals (including Turkey).  Some 
members are also included as dual nationals –such as Soros, here listed as Hungarian/US, and Karin 
Forseke (Sweden/US), Steven Heinz (Austria/US), and Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US).  
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Frère family and BNP Paribas, who between them already held the rest of the company.  BNP 
Paribas now owns 47 per cent of the investment firm.79 
 
When the corporate community is aggregated with policy planning groups the ECFR is also 
linked to 9 of the top 10 most core organisations in William Carroll’s mapping of the network in 
2006, by virtue of interlocks with the five central policy planning groups (Global Policy Groups 
box, excluding the Club of Madrid which does not feature in the core of the network). 
We now move up a level to these policy planning boards, which in terms of the generation of a 
‘values based’ foreign policy for Europe and the consensual aspect of the hegemony of capital 
is the most significant level. The ECFR is interlinked into all of the five core policy planning 
groups identified by William Carroll (2010). For the Bilderberg grouping, the Council contains a 
recent member of the steering committee, as well as two attendees of 2013’s conference, six 
at 2012’s, and four at 2011’s meeting.80 For the Trilateral Commission there are 14 interlocks.81 
Javier Solana provides an interlock with the Global Advisory Board of the Council on Foreign 
Relations (one must be a US citizen to be a member of the CFR itself, the advisory board is 
made up of 24 non-US figures).  
The International Chamber of Commerce is linked through national chambers of commerce, as 
well as large firms within the European corporate community, but significantly also through 
Maria Livanos Cattaui, former Secretary-General of the ICC from 1996 to 2005.  During this 
tenure she dramatically increased its political activism and forged a ‘global partnership 
between businesses and the United Nations’, which has led to a greater role for businesses in 
the formation of UN economic policy (Corporate Europe Observer 1998).  
Cattui was also Managing Director for the World Economic Forum in Geneva, having worked 
there from 1977 to 1996, and was responsible for the organisation of their annual meeting.  In 
                                                             
79 The Frère family are a highly significant family node in the European network, only indirectly 
interlocked with ECFR. Compagnie Nationale a Portefeuille SA/NV was the holding company of Belgian 
multi-billionaire Albert Frere, who gained his fortune in the Wallonian steel industry. Indirect links 
include his history as a large shareholder in inter alia Bertelsmann, Total and  Suez.  
80 Jaakko Iloniemi for the steering committee; Carl Bildt and Thomas Leysen as 2013 attendees;  Luis 
Amado, Gunilla Carlsson, Wolfgang Ischinger, Bassma Kodmani, Pascal Lamy and Loukas Tsoukalis for 
2012; Carl Bildt, Pascal Lamy, Thomas Leysen and Loukas Tsoukalis for 2011. 
(http://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/meetings.html).  
81 Carried by Urban Ahlin, Marek Belka, Carl Bildt, John Bruton, Lykke Friis,Wolfgang Ischinger, Meglena 
Kuneva, Bruno Le Maire, Thomas Leysen, David Miliband, Dominique Moïsi, Andrzej Olechowski, Karel 
Schwarzenberg, Antonio Vitorino. 
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addition to the links to the World Economic Forum established earlier, and the ever-presence 
of George Soros within it, the nature of the Council members means large numbers have 
attended WEF meetings over recent years – including 15 in 2013.82 
I have also included the Club of Madrid in this grouping as whilst it doesn’t feature in the core 
of the transnational networks, in part due to its character as a limited group of ex-heads of 
state, so whilst certainly linked to business interests, its significance lies more ‘upwards’ in the 
direction of more directly influencing  political action. 
The second significant group at this level contains the transnational business councils.  Again 
the ECFR has interlocks with all the most significant organisations, linked into transatlantic 
organisations such as the Transatlantic Business Council/Dialogue, and the Turkish American 
Business Association. 
The most significant of these however are the European business councils, with an established 
influence on policy shaping within the EU.  All of the major policy planning and lobbying groups 
for business are interlocked with the ECFR. Thomas Leysen interlocks with the ERT, as well 
there being indirect links through ENI, Siemens and Telefónica Europe (the boards of these 
businesses linked into the ECFR and ERT by different individuals).  
BusinessEurope is linked through national industry and employer federations and their 
representatives, but also through Emma Marcegaglia, newly President of it and CEO 
of Marcegaglia S.p.A.  Whilst president of Confindustria, the Italian employers' federation, she 
succeeded in beating down Italian unions from sector based bargaining to negotiating 
contracts on a plant-by-plant level.  Whilst the ERT is an elite organisation, representing 45 of 
Europe’s largest transnational companies, BusinessEurope, as the European employers’ 
confederation, can be seen as the main voice of big business in Brussels.  In Marcegaglia they 
have a President clearly committed to political activism (Sanderson 2013). 
The Corporate Social Responsibility Alliance is a joint venture of the European Commission and 
Business Europe, with support from the ERT.  I include it here as whilst indirectly linked to the 
ECFR from all three sides it shows both the closeness of the working relationship between the 
                                                             
82 Being: Roland Berger, Gunilla Carlsson, Gerhard Cromme, Ahmet Davitoglu, Sylvie Kauffmann, Pascal 
Lamy, Pierre Moscovici, Mabel van Oranje, Cem Özdemir, Daniel Sachs, Ghasan Salame, Pasquale 
Salvano, Javier Solana, George Soros, Alexander Stubb 
(www3.weforum.org/docs/.../WEF_AM13_Participants_34ezx6jlxk.pdf).  
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three bodies, as well as the central ideological role of corporate social responsibility in the 
development of a sustainable neoliberalism – in the development of which Business Europe 
has taken a globally leading role (Sklair and Miller 2010). 
Finally in this group, the European Financial Service Roundtable is also well linked into the 
ECFR.  Membership is by company not individual, and as ECFR corporate interlocks are skewed 
towards the financial sector, the linkage here is unsurprising.  As indicated above the founding 
of the EFR in 2001, along the lines of the ERT, indicates a shift in consensus in this sector to 
include the EU as a significant focus for political projects (Heemskerk 2013). 
 
These three, the ERT Business Europe and EFS, are the most dominant organisations in terms 
of lobbying and shaping the EU in the interests of capital, as well as through this forming the 
basis for a European transnational class.  The final element of a hegemonic bloc I will cover 
here is that which contains the ability to realise the strategies generated in the formation of 
this class, that of political action. 
 
For political bodies such as national governments and the EU there are a multitude of 
interlocks.  There are 14 Members of the European Parliament, a head of state and 19 
ministers of state, including thirteen Ministers for Foreign Affairs, or Chairs of Foreign Affairs 
Committees – with a similar number of former ministers and numerous former presidents.  
The European Commission is linked in directly only at officer level, with seven ex-European 
Commissioners also sitting on the Council. 
 
Shifting to hard power, the links to NATO are multiple through the various foreign and defence 
ministers and the only serving head of state Toomas Ilves, President of Estonia.  The ECFR 
Council also contains three former NATO Secretaries General: Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, George 
Robertson, and Javier Solana.  These three sit on the boards of many organisations, including 
think tanks within the global power network analysed here, but the ECFR Council is the only 
one to contain more than one (George Robertson sits on the boards of CER and IISS, Javier 
Solana RIE and Notre Europe, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on CEPS). 
 
Similarly for the European External Action Service, there are numerous links through Foreign 
Ministers, who collectively ultimately set policy for the EEAS through the Foreign Affairs 
Council, as well as the Director General for Enlargement of the European Commission, Stefano 
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Sannino, with whom the EEAS cooperates within that area.  Nonetheless, it is significant that 
there is a head of division of the EEAS (Fernando Guimarães), as well as both an advisor and 
counsellor to Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (Steve Everts and Robert Cooper), as the High Representative is both head of 
the EEAS and  chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. 
I have intersected these instances of primarily hard power with a category of ‘Imperial 
Governance’ as both NATO and EEAS and its antecedent bodies have been involved in the 
most notable instances of Western imperial governance – where hard power meets economic 
governance in nation building.  Within this category there are direct links and a wealth of 
experiences for the Council to draw upon if needed, especially relating to Kosovo.  Most 
prominent amongst these in Iraq is Marek Belka, who in 2003 he was responsible for economic 
policy in the interim coalition administration of Iraq, ‘forcefully’ privatizing Iraq's economy and 
opening it up to foreign investment – for which he drew upon the experience of the reforms of 
Eastern Europe (Kurata 2003).  Experience of a justificatory build up to such intervention is also 
present with Rolf Ekeus, former head of the United Nations Special Commission on the Council 
(Ekeus 2003).  Much other expertise is available from the experience of NGOs in the 
reconstruction of Iraq, for example Martti Ahtisaari’s work with his Crisis Management 
Initiative organisation. 
 
Ahtisaari was also a United Nations Special Envoy for Kosovo, charged with organizing the 
Kosovo status process, part of a process of ‘normalizing intervention as an exercise in risk 
management’ by the West (Sahin 2013). We also find Samuel Žbogar, EU Representative to 
Kosovo, and Wolfgang Ischinger, the EU's representative in the troika mediating negotiations 
about the future status of Kosovo, on the Council; these links supplemented also by interlocks 
with the Economic Initiative for Kosovo and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. 
 
This brings us finally to economic governance more purely, and here we find a Senior Advisor 
within the World Bank alongside the former Vice President and General Counsel of the World 
Bank Group, the Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
and, at the time the Council list was frozen for the purpose of this study, the then Director-
General of WTO, Pascal Lamy.83  Taking advantage of such governance, there are also 
                                                             
83 This timing notable as prior to his fall from grace Dominique Strauss-Kahn was also a council member. 
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numerous regional initiatives for development and investment in peripheral European, and 
European peripheral states, as well as Melak Investments, focusing on foreign investment in 
Iraq. 
 
Even at this surface level of interlocks of direct links to the most significant bodies, the point is 
made – if the Bilderberg Conferences are part of a ‘process of establishing and renovating the 
hegemonic consensus of the West’ (van der Pijl 2007: 628), the ECFR Council exists as a similar 
forum but notable in the context of the shift of the transnational capitalist class towards 
Europe, in its focus on establishing Europe’s role in a bilateral West, and by this renovating the 
legitimacy of Western hegemony as a whole. 
Conclusion  
Having outlined the development of the global power Europe discourse and its relation to both 
a preceding civilian power and concurrently developing normative power conception of 
Europe, I then mapped the contemporary network of think tanks developing this global power 
vision. Within this I found that the ECFR sits at the centre of this network strengthening the 
links between the core organisations within it, and bringing in organisations that otherwise 
would not be linked into it.84  I also noted that the centrality is somewhat unsurprising given 
the size of the Council – that this is a deliberate strategy is suggested not only by Soros’ 
comments on the need for such an organisation in the pursuit of his political vision prior to its 
founding, but also by both the prevalence of central linkers on the ECFR council, and the 
increased size of the ECFR Council, from 141 members in September 2011, to 205 in 
September 2013. 
In this Soros is demonstrating what William Carroll found to be of surprising significance  to the 
transnational capitalist class overall – the linking role of individual billionaire networkers in 
pulling together more organically developing business community groupings that otherwise 
would not intersect (Carroll 2010: 132-5). The surprise comes from the tendency to overstate 
the ‘managerial revolution’, the ‘claim that the ownership of capital has been divorced from its 
control, leaving salaried managers in charge’; there has been a shift, but at ‘the heart of global 
corporate power, we find a combination of super-affluent owners, top managers and organic 
intellectuals, constituent elements of a transnational capitalist class that is irrevocably 
                                                             
84 This being quite apart from the broad array of other civil society and political lobbying organisations 
outside of this specific global power network that George Soros himself and the various executives of his 
Open Society Foundations organisations and offshoots would also interlink into this constellation. 
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grounded on the terra firma of property ownership’ (ibid: 152). The stratum of senior 
executives and directors make up the social fabric of corporate communities, with individual 
billionaire owners helping weave them together to form a class for itself. 
One important facet of this is that embodied in an individual, such interlinking will more 
readily have a clear strategic role – consciously bringing together otherwise organically formed 
groups of businesses, across sectors to make possible the formation of a class for itself.  Think 
tanks and policy planning groups in particular require just such strategic agency for their 
formation, and Soros’ own view is that the political edge of his organisations’ work will be 
dulled when continued through a board of directors after his demise (Soros 2011: passim).  
The collection of individuals on the ECFR Council then provides a good example of just such 
‘billionaire agency’. 
George Soros early diagnosed the crisis of hegemony in the US led West and set about doing 
his part to reconstruct Western hegemony around a bi-polar West; the establishment of the 
ECFR being his institutionalisation of the project.  The positioning of ECFR shows his success in 
cohering discursive constructions of Europe’s role within the European think tank field around 
this vision.  On the flip side of this, his success also demonstrates the organic link between 
contemporary conditions and such a vision – the wide compatibility of his vision with others 
contemporaneously developed, and their reliance on and development out of preceding 
conceptions of Europe, make clear that Soros is not a perspicacious haruspex, but well 
positioned within and sensitive to the changing context.  As we saw, the broader discourses 
around civilian power, normative power and global power Europe all rely upon a contrast of 
Europe with an assumed Hobbesian anarchic states system outside of it.  It is this idea of 
cosmopolitan Europe, transcending this anarchic system that I now turn to. 
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Part 2 – Cosmopolitan Power Europe 
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4. Theory II: Intellectuals and a methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter takes up the theoretical challenge identified in the conclusion of part one – 
understanding the dialectic of structure and agency as it relates to the ideational structures 
used in constructing comprehensive concepts of control.   The focus is on this dialectic as it 
relates to academic production. As such it is a development of the first theoretical chapter, 
allowing it to be brief, and providing the methodology for the subsequent chapters.  
These issues were introduced to some degree in considering think tanks as occupying an 
interstitial field – tied to capital but able to universalise its interest through its semi-autonomy; 
dependent yet independent of the fields of politics, media, business and academia amongst 
which it is set. The consideration of the academic field here sets it at a further remove from 
the direct determination of capital and so the task here is to develop a way to consider 
academic work beyond direct linkages into policy work which offer no such intellectual puzzle.  
More though, even where considering those directly linked into policy making circuits, I seek to 
avoid their reduction to representatives or ‘functionaries of bourgeois hegemony’ (Saccarelli 
2007: 771), returning to them a humanity as, in the example of Mary Kaldor in chapter six, a 
critical academic intellectual. 
The chapter progresses through four sections. First I consider the complementarity for this 
task of the theories of Gramsci and Bourdieu, seeing each as filling a lacuna in the other.  For 
Gramsci the missing element is the development of the tools to grasp a more complex and 
variegated intellectual realm than that of 1920s and 30s southern Italy.  This is a task 
acknowledged by much neo-Gramscian work, but undertaken through recourse to 
incompatible discourse theories, leading to the Gramsciology criticised in chapter one. 
Bourdieu’s work is shown to be compatible and, as its use in mapping think tanks shows, 
provides the tools needed. However, for Bourdieu the missing element is class-formation and 
even more so, transnational class formation.  Bourdieu’s theory, concerned primarily with 
intra-ruling class struggle in a national context, is unable to capture the shifts to neoliberalism 
of the late Cold War and post-Cold War world.  Here a neo-Gramscian approach provides a 
solution. 
The second section explores the principal difficulty of integrating their theories this way – 
seemingly antagonistic interpretations of the potential for contemporary university or 
‘traditional’ intellectuals.  Here I contrast two attempts to use Gramsci to get to grips with the 
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contemporary academic in this way which lead to the contention that this is a question of 
structure and agency.   Thus as my earlier theoretical consideration argued it is not resolvable 
in the abstract, but through the dialectic of intellectual production.   I then develop how I will 
analyse this dialectic, first through an overview of Bourdieusian field theory, and then through 
developing a methodology of ‘persons not paradigms’.  This latter I develop from Ole Wæver’s 
1997 consideration of using such a methodological approach to get a far firmer grasp on the 
nature of IR theory. 
Gramsci and Bourdieu  
Enmeshing Bourdieu’s theory within a Gramscian account of structure may seem 
counterintuitive or even anachronistic – certainly Bourdieu himself sets his position against, 
and temporally beyond a ‘Marxist vulgate’ that has ‘clouded the brains of more than one 
generation’ (Bourdieu 2000: 8).  Nonetheless it is only such a common economistic 
construction of Marxism that Bourdieu is in contention with, as his argument that ‘the 
scholastic disposition calls forth the illusion that knowledge is freely produced, and that it is 
not the product of specific material conditions’ is in accord with the sociology of knowledge of 
Marx (ibid: 12, Burawoy and Von Holdt 2012).85 
Gramsci, as the classical Marxist most focused on what Bourdieu would term symbolic 
domination within modern Western societies, is even more akin.  I follow Michael Burawoy in 
seeing the highly enriching potential of careful synthesis of their accounts (ibid). Here I focus 
on their complementarity, of their filling of respective lacunae, which helps position the two 
approaches in relation to one another.  The next section considers where they diverge and its 
overcoming. 
Gramsci was writing when the institutions of ideological production were far more 
rudimentary than today.  To take the most obvious change that was central to the first part of 
this thesis, the rise of think tanks in the late twentieth century has fundamentally altered the 
politics of knowledge production and the politics of expertise and its use across, at least, the 
West.   Whilst this needn’t, and doesn’t, invalidate the fundamentals of Gramsci’s thought on 
intellectuals, Bourdieu as our near contemporary does provide more attuned tools for 
understanding the current context – as seen in Thomas Medvetz’s powerful Bourdieusian 
analysis of think tanks used earlier (Medvetz 2012).  
                                                             
85 Michael Burawoy draws direct parallels with the Marx of The German Ideology , and indeed Bourdieu 
draws on this attack on the ‘German philosophers’ in an assault on Habermas (Bourdieu 2000: 66). 
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These are tools that have also not thus far been developed in neo-Gramscian work in 
International Relations, which accordingly do not always account well for the practice of 
generating consent within hegemony.  Whist the concept of comprehensive concepts of 
control covers this area, application remains methodologically underdeveloped.  Seen in its 
most general terms as the lack of a developed intermediation between structure and agency 
we can see this lacuna through noting the abrupt shifts in focus from structural imperatives to 
agential action in Kees van der Pijl’s work (see esp. van der Pijl 2006b), tending towards a 
mechanistic, almost conspiratorial, impression of the relation.86  Giles Scott-Smith, giving a 
‘neo-Gramscian’ account of the role of the Congress of Cultural Freedom in constructing US 
hegemony in post-War Europe, also notes this lack, grafting a Foucauldian approach onto van 
der Pijl’s work to bridge it (Scott-Smith 2002).  However as noted in the first theory chapter, 
such a move is characteristic of a post-Marxist ‘Gramsciology’ in which the material, and the 
‘moment of coercion’ are stripped from conceptions of hegemony (Saccarelli 2007).   
This discursive focus is one that Bourdieu attacks as one of the central ‘scholastic fallacies’, 
giving an indication of the compatibility of his methodology for use here.  As this fallacy also 
underlies the problematic political ethics found in the cosmopolitanism covered in the next 
chapter I elaborate on it here.  Bourdieu identifies three inter-related and mutually reinforcing 
scholastic fallacies, in epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, deriving from the conditions of the 
exercise of ‘pure thought’ – that is detachment and separation from necessity (especially 
economic necessity), and a related gratuitousness. These are: ‘scholastic epistemocentrism’  – 
the divorce from practical experience and the embodied and embedded logic of practice, 
which leads to the suppression of the practical viewpoint by the theoretical viewpoint; 
‘intellectual universalism’- in which the view that reason is given in the structure of mind or 
language suppresses its historical invention within fields of cultural production and their 
conditions of existence; and, an ‘aesthetic universalism’ in which the judgement of taste is 
divorced from its ‘impure conditions of possibility’, the social conditions allowing the creation 
and class monopolisation of a cultured habitus. 
I focus here on how this relates to the conception of politics; certain conceptions of politics 
themselves being a product of skhole87 – the conditions of leisure necessary to the ‘serious 
                                                             
86 Van der Pijl acknowledges this himself: ‘intentionality is my personal weakest link – the danger of 
conspiratorial approaches always lurks and looms’ (van der Pijl 2008). 
87 A play on the etymology of the term ‘scholastic’ from the Greek skhole which means ‘leisure’(Lane 
2000, 90) 
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play’ of academic work, that underlies these fallacies, and the repression of this distance from 
necessity, so that its influence is not reflected upon.  Bourdieu attacks Habermas on these 
grounds, significant for us as the role of the conception of politics of Habermas and Arendt, 
and the distinction between them, is central to the next chapter. I note also though that  in 
these terms of scholastic fallacy there is commonality between them: Habermas having 
‘claimed that he had learned from Hannah Arendt how to approach a theory of communicative 
action’ (Brand 1986) and referring to Arendt’s The Human Condition as ‘an anthropology of 
communicative action’ (Habermas 1977). Indeed, when even Habermas finds Arendt guilty of 
‘a politics that is cleansed of social and economic issues’  it is clear that the criticisms Bourdieu 
levels at Habermas apply to Arendt a fortiori (Habermas 1977: 15). 
Criticism of Habermas’ conception of politics from Bourdieu is recurrent in his work, and 
translates for me to the destruction of Marxism through its expression through a scholastic 
habitus, homo scholasticus (Bourdieu 1991, cf. Bookchin 1982).  His position Bourdieu 
summarises neatly as ‘moralism as egoistic universalism’, which transferred to Habermas’ 
political pronouncements is captured in Perry Anderson’s critique of the  ‘illimitable 
narcissism’ of both his thought and of the homologous current liberal imperialist directions in 
EU foreign policy discourse (Anderson 2011; again, I treat this assessment of Habermas in the 
next chapter). The claim here is that it is an effect of skhole. Habermas’ representation of 
political life, based upon the public sphere is accordingly divorced from reality, based upon a 
particular abstract vision of rational action and language, in turn deriving from the specific 
scholastic position which is thus universalised. The contrast is relating politics to the actual use 
of language, and its limits: ‘that the force of arguments counts for little against the arguments 
of force’ (Bourdieu 2000: 65).  The political failure is thus the way in which such universalism 
‘obscures and represses the question of the economic and social conditions that would have to 
be fulfilled in order to allow the public deliberation capable of leading to a rational consensus’ 
(ibid: 65). 
This repression of the conditions of access to the public political sphere is what this 
construction of the political is ultimately founded on: this is well captured  in for example 
feminist critiques of Habermas (Fraser 1985), but best captured in its totality by Bourdieu’s 
phrase of an ‘invisible property qualification’ (Bourdieu 2000: 67).  Overcoming these 
limitations of access to open the public political sphere to all is not possible because to do so 
would fundamentally change the nature of the sphere being admitted to. As Arendt’s historical 
focus on especially classical and American republican political conceptions demonstrates, this 
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conception of politics is theoretically constructed precisely on the divisions of the 
discrimination of access to the public political sphere; in this sense The Human Condition is a 
critical contribution in that  it is indeed a damning ‘anthropology of communicative action’  
(Habermas 1977; Arendt 1998). 
What we see then is that embedded within Bourdieu’s idea of the intellectual is a relation to 
both economic and social conditions, and a constitutive relationship also to ‘the arguments of 
force’.  Nonetheless this does not include either inter-class conflict, or a macro picture of class 
formation. The gaps become most apparent with his later political activism, with a simplistic 
and journalistic account of neoliberalism (Callinicos 1999, Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer 
2006). As his work is predominately on intra-class conflict within a national context this gives 
him little material for theorising change within the structure itself; particularly if one sees an 
internal relation between national state-society structures and the inter- and trans national 
level (Leander 2001), and thus structure, especially as manifested in a ruling class is  rather 
taken for granted within his generative structuralism.   
The need for such an account of class formation can be seen in recent applications of his work 
within International Relations where a central question is over the  existence of trans-national 
or global fields of power (Adler-Nissen 2011; Bigo 2011).  The field of power is the overarching 
field of political and economic intra-(ruling) class conflict, which within the approach 
developed earlier we would see as the transnational site for contestation between 
comprehensive concepts of control (I elaborate further on Bourdieu’s field theory below).  A 
neo-Gramscian approach with its focus on the changing geographical coordinates of class 
formation and its implications for global structures provides a base for answering such 
questions, if we see the field of power and struggle within it also containing Gramsci’s 
contribution of the ‘elucidation of culture as a complex set of norms in the domain of ideas, 
and how such norms are solidified through the influence of specific elite networks operating in 
the interests of a ruling group in the economy’ (Scott-Smith 2002, 3).  Overall then I here set 
Bourdieu’s work as a meso-level theory offering accordingly the tools for grasping the dialectic 
between structure and agency as it is manifested in comprehensive concepts of control, and 
more so, as this struggle within the field of power relates to fields – such as academia – that 
are semi-autonomous from this field of struggle. 
The Traditional Intellectual  
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The central claim for using Bourdieu is the need to ‘update’ Gramsci for a contemporary 
academic context.  Ernesto Saccarelli attempts to understand this changed intellectual terrain 
from within a purely Gramscian frame, structured around the concepts of traditional and 
organic intellectuals.  For Gramsci everyone is an intellectual, but only some have the social 
role of intellectuals; of these, there are two archetypes the organic and the traditional 
intellectual.  The former emerges with class formation and with this ‘the social affiliation and 
origin of the intellectual becomes in an objective sense direct and unmediated: capital 
demands, gives life, puts to use, and discards a broad array of specialists’, contemporarily we 
may think of bankers, brokers, management consultants and the like (Saccarelli 2011: 761).   
The traditional intellectual here was the already existing established intellectual ‘those who 
existed in historical or geographical conditions largely undisturbed by the development of 
capitalism’ – thus whilst in some ways outmoded, reflecting a previous social formation, 
through their appearance of being divorced from class interest they serve to universalise the 
interests of a ruling class of which they are a part. It is this ideology of a class apart, a timeless 
tradition of thought carried by generation after generation of thinkers that is central to the 
legitimacy of intellectuals as a whole.   
 
Of the huge growth of academic intellectuals and the university in the last half century, which 
is his central concern, Saccarelli notes ‘this was not a purely quantitative, demographic 
expansion, but rather the standardization of hitherto diverse forms of intellectual labor and 
engagement [in] the post-World War II period. […] the bohemians, the freelance writers, the 
eclectic critics and the party intellectuals were replaced by a more prosaic and dependable 
figure: the university professor’ (ibid: 758).  That these structures are now under significant 
attack and a rapid rate of transformation only reinforces the point that the academic 
intellectual must be located within history.  
 
To understand the contemporary academic intellectual then we must look below the myth of 
the traditional intellectual that sustains their position, belied as it is by the clear historical rise 
and (beginning of the) fall of the academic intellectual.  Doing so means that as ‘the 
intellectual comes into being by default within the political orbit of the ruling class, exactly 
because on the social plane he or she is born with manifold attachments to it [then] in the case 
of the contemporary academic intellectual, he or she is quite literally produced - trained, 
regulated, employed - by capital. Severing these manifold links, according to Gramsci, is no 
mere matter of adopting a generic ‘leftist’ disposition, or even activism’, it is in essence 
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inescapable from within the position (ibid: 768). Even ‘earnest political intentions’ opposing 
contemporary power relations ‘perform a useful and organic political role for the bourgeoisie 
exactly when they were not so directly implicated with its interests and operations’(ibid). From 
here Michel Foucault is rendered an exemplary ‘functionary of bourgeois hegemony’, and any 
independence found in the ‘pure domain of abstract intellect’ is ‘illusory’ (ibid: 771). We may 
as well pack up and go home. 
 
Edward Said develops Gramsci rather differently to argue that  ‘the Western university, 
certainly in America, still can offer the intellectual a quasi-utopian space’, in which with a set of 
values ‘fuelled by care and affection rather than by profit, and selfish, narrow specialization, 
collectively ‘amateurism’, true [critical intellectual] work can go on’ (Said 1994: 49, 50-62).88  
To do so Said uses Gramsci to set up the distinction between the traditional and organic 
intellectual: the former he understands as a permanent static class of intellectuals, ‘teachers 
priests and administrators who continue to do the same thing from generation to generation’; 
the latter, directly ‘connected to classes or enterprises that used intellectuals to organize 
interests, gain more power, get more control’ (Said 1994: 3-4).   This he does not to critique 
the claimed detachment from worldly interest that organic intellectuals adopt from the 
concept of the traditional intellectual (which presents itself, though cannot be, a class apart 
from society), but to reverse Gramsci and argue precisely for the concept of the intellectual as 
a class in itself against the organic, professional intellectual.89   
That power interacts with intellectual production he acknowledges, but this is an external 
interaction, a set of pressures acting upon the intellectual, not constitutive of them.  Thus Said 
further distinguishes between the professional and amateur intellectual: the distinction not in 
the fact, but the attitude towards being paid to think. Here he cites many of the external 
pressures on academics, such as specialisation and US governmental influence on universities.  
Yet these remain external – the academy a somewhat insulated utopia.  Resisting these 
pressures then is a class of true intellectuals. This is a class of individuals though: he is 
contemptuous of the ‘faceless’ professional intellectual,  ‘anonymous functionary or careful 
bureaucrat’, setting against them the intellectual as (heroic) individual separate from social 
                                                             
88 The views of the role of the intellectual he laid out in his 1993 Reith Lectures, published as 
Representations of the Intellectual (Said 1994). 
89 In a further reverse claiming that ‘Gramsci’s pioneering suggestions’ are that ‘intellectuals and not 
social classes [are] pivotal to the workings of modern society’ (ibid: 8). 
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class and representing society’s conscience, acting as leader for emancipatory causes s/he 
himself has brought into being (Said 1994: 3-19, 49-63).  
By the time he has finished this is hardly a recognisably Gramscian account; Saccarelli noting 
that it contains only ‘carefully calibrated ‘Gramscian’ features’ (Saccarelli 2011: 777 n.8). 
Epifanio San Juan  Jr. is more scathing: ‘Said conceives of the intellectual outside of the 
hegemonic struggles of the major social classes, aggrandizing its function in a way that is 
completely idealist and antithetical to Gramsci’s vision’ (San Juan, Jr 2006: 48). Though the 
problem San Juan is attacking is that Said’s approach ‘arrogates all agency’ from subaltern 
groups to these intellectuals - Said identified as the seminal figure of, and his conception of the 
intellectual central to the problem with, post-colonialism for San Juan.  Regardless of the 
accuracy of San Juan’s assessment of the effect of Said on such movements, surely this then is 
precisely the point – that he does have such agency, and the question is of its use.  There is no 
doubting that Said in fact lived his conception of the committed intellectual, becoming for 
many the most faithful representative of the Palestinian cause and their most powerful voice, 
and in the process seemingly becoming a model for being engaged in political activities outside 
the university (Barghouti 2003; Fisk 2005).  His notion of the ‘secular critic’ was embodied and 
proven in his life.  Said’s conception may not be Gramscian but these Gramscian attacks point 
to the need now for a more sophisticated understanding of the potential within the academic 
field.  In fact what Said is giving is an account far more in tune with Bourdieu and his 
confidence in the potential for scholastic truth generated in the academy – though as we’ve 
seen Bourdieu introduces considerable qualifiers that Said omits tied precisely to trying to 
grasp the complex position of the academic field in relation to its socio-economic context, as 
we saw in his attack on scholastic fallacies. 
I have focused on these two accounts here as they bring out the tension between Bourdieu 
and Gramsci well.  Perhaps the most salient point from this consideration is support for the 
claim that their fundamental divergences here are closely tied to the very different historical 
contexts within which they theorised the intellectual.  A broad determinism that captured the 
historic role of traditional intellectuals before the great merging and supposed 
homogenisation that Saccarelli points to cannot capture this much larger, socially broader and 
more variegated sphere now.  Thus whilst universities may still be dominated by those born 
into socially advantaged social strata this is by no means always the case – and of course here 
Bourdieu himself stands as exemplar.  It is not so true then that the contemporary academic is 
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‘quite literally produced’ by capital, even though – and qualified by a significant remove – they 
may, ultimately be ‘trained, regulated, employed’ by capital. 
As can be seen then this is about the relation of structure to agency - and one in which being 
‘born with manifold attachments to’ capital is seen as significant: background too counts here. 
The task is not so simple then as simply applying Gramscian categories intellectuals 
unmodified; in considering the contemporary academic field we must treat it as a specific 
historical phenomenon, but one in which individuals from a (relatively) diverse set of 
backgrounds increasingly enter, and in which their subsequent disciplining by capital takes 
place at some remove.  Without such a mechanical link between capital and intellectual 
production we are again presented with the Gordian knot of the agency structure debate - 
ever more complexly tied when dealing with this field so obviously critical and central to 
hegemonic rule, but also so clearly structurally at least one divorce form the immediate 
directives of power.  I return then to the earlier discussion where the solution lies in a focus on 
politically significant agency, but do so now with an indication of the appropriateness of 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of this agency and the nature of this semi-autonomous academic 
field.   
Habitus and Field 
Against both the notions of the heroic academic individual and the possibility of rational 
disinterested discourse threatened by external pressures, and that of the determining role of 
structural position, I wish to place Pierre Bourdieu’s use of the concepts of the 'habitus' and 
'field', which theorise the inter-relation between the individual and their context.  The habitus 
is an individual’s history and (historical) social context internalised – it is thus derived from 
class position, education, training and occupation, as well as more individual elements such as 
family and taste, though these themselves reflect  class.  Habitus is ‘embodied history, 
internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history - is the active presence of the whole 
past of which it is the product' (Bourdieu 1990: 56).  This produces a durable set of dispositions 
which structure practice.  Practice however can only be accounted for by ‘relating the social 
conditions in which the habitus that generate them was constituted, to the social conditions in 
which it is implemented’ (ibid). This latter is the field, that is a system of social positions – such 
as a profession (law, journalism, academia). 
Different fields stand in hierarchic relationships to one another, and have differing relations 
with the socio-economic context (the field of power, incorporating class relations). There is 
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then a hierarchy of fields both between political and academic discourse, and within academia 
between disciplinary fields – for Bourdieu, in France, Philosophy crowns the pile.  In the Anglo-
Saxon world, at least in social science, we may think of economics fulfilling the same function.  
We can see this in relation to the field of IR: low in the pecking order, thanks to its proximity to 
policy, often subsumed under political science, with other disciplines tramping freely over its 
terrain without feeling the need to familiarise themselves with the disciplines’ content 
(notably, and related to the cosmopolitan discourse I examine,  in globalisation theory 
(Rosenberg 2000));  perhaps only security studies and area studies stand in an inferior 
relationship to IR.  This brings out Bourdieu’s point, that the hierarchy is in inverse relation to 
the empirical: the greater the distance the greater the ability to euphemise, that is express a 
political position in terms that refer more to the historical form of the field than the immediate 
context. 
This field effect in academic production is powerful and requires any adequate analysis to 
contain a ‘dual refusal, rejecting not only any claim of the philosophical text to absolute 
autonomy, with its concomitant rejection of all external reference, but also any direct 
reduction of the text to the most general conditions of its production’ (Bourdieu 1991: 2).  This 
means that whilst the form of any production relates to ‘the inner structure of these 
intellectual networks which shapes ideas, by their patterns of vertical chains across the 
generations and their horizontal alliances and oppositions’ (Collins 1998: 2), that network, 
understood as a hierarchic field of struggle, must also be understood as existing in its external 
social context,  and the ultimate content, the social meaning of this production, cannot be 
understood outside of this context.   
Bourdieu uses the concept of homology to relate the forms of such content across different 
levels of euphemisation. Bourdieu’s treatment of Heidegger’s philosophy, tying it into the 
broader political milieu of the time, giving a powerful account of the salience of Heidegger’s 
Nazism to his thought (Bourdieu 1991).  Here he uncovers the expressive drive, the politico-
ethico message, as a socially conservative one, radicalised both by the direct circumstances of 
the crisis of Weimar Germany and Heidegger’s own trajectory as a first-generation academic. 
The field effect, the effect operated upon discourse within a field by the specific constraints of 
the field can be ’invoked to prohibit or reject a priori any comparison of the work of Heidegger 
[…] with the works of economists like Sombart or Spann or political essayists like Spengler or 
Junger, who would appear to be temptingly similar to Heidegger (ibid: 2).   
120 
 
 
Expression then is independent, reflecting individual habitus and an individual’s trajectory and 
struggle within a field, but this is independent only in that this is an individual negotiating of 
dependence on the specific rules governing the field it is expressed in.  Expression in ‘scholarly 
language, which is produced in fields wracked by the interest and values of the dominant 
classes, are in a way primary ideologies, which lend themselves ‘quite naturally’ to uses 
conforming to the values and interest of the dominant classes’ (ibid: 81).  The imposition of 
this form serves ‘to express its distance from all determinations, especially social ones, which 
reduce the priceless individuality of a thinker to the banality of a class’ (ibid: 82). 
In approaching the philosophical field Bourdieu then insists we must abandon a political or 
philosophical reading in favour of a ‘dual reading’ of writings that are defined, due to the 
effects of the field, by their fundamental ambiguity – that is by reference to existing in two 
social spaces at once (ibid: 3).  For much of IR this ambiguity is close to non-existent: one 
cannot mistake the thrust of Robert Kagan’s arguments, and his adherence to even the 
minimal theoretical rules of IR, and their service to the euphemisation of US power, is itself 
minimal. Nonetheless, as we approach the greater ‘sophistication’ of critical theories this dual 
reading becomes more relevant. 
In this field effect the ‘decisive mediation’ represented by positions and oppositions within a 
field, and the related imposition of specific disciplinary form, produces an ‘alchemical 
transformation’ that protects such discourse from direct reduction to the class position of its 
producer. The structure of the field and its history is therefore central to understanding the 
relationship to the external.   The ‘great debates’ for example have defined the structure of the 
IR field – euphemising the political exclusion of Marxist approaches which integrated the 
political and economic in analysing imperialism (Maclean 1981; Maclean 1988).  
The implications of this field effect are drawn out in next chapter where this adds another 
dimension to the idea of first and second order hegemony. In brief, the argument is that in the 
second order hegemony – scholars’ self-conception of the discipline as an American social 
science and concomitant positioning of their work in relation to this, oppositional or otherwise 
– it is a single reading of the field, of theory qua theory, that is being reacted to.  This tends to 
hold even where there is seen to be a relation between the ‘hegemonic country’ and 
‘hegemonic discipline’ as the hegemony within the discipline is still reacted to in this way, 
within the field understood as a theoretically defined field – the image of the discipline, as a 
theoretical field dominated by positivist realism is taken to also constitute the socio-political 
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expression being objected to (cf. Smith 2002).  What is missed by this is precisely the ‘great lie’ 
(Krippendorff 1989) – the various forms of euphemisation and partiality that the theoretical 
field constructs.  Opposition restricting itself to this field taking it as proxy, or even on face 
value as a constitutive part of that being opposed therefore misses the complexity of the 
relationship that underpins the construction and development of the theoretical field.  This 
becomes clearer in the trajectories in chapter six, where especially in Ole Wæver’s 
construction of security as ‘critical’ we see the implications of such a single reading and the use 
of theoretical positions as a proxy for socio-economic relations. 
Before I turn to discuss the application of this theory I note here finally that both to effect 
‘revolutionary’ disciplinary change, and to succeed at the highest levels in the field (and the 
two are internally related, as to succeed one must offer something new, and for the 
acceptance of novelty’s validity one must have sufficient cultural, field specific, capital) one 
must first internalise successfully all the rules and positions of the field, to naturalise them 
within oneself.  These conditions apply then a fortiori to the notable individual academic 
figures considered later, and support the contention that their consideration in fact gives an 
understanding of the field represented. 
Methodology : ‘Persons not paradigms’ 
This question, of the interaction between politco-ethical expressive drive and the context in 
which it must be expressed and comprehended, is what the concept of habitus and the field 
and their interaction in the form of individual’s trajectories within a field captures.  As the 
discussion above concluded, whilst Bourdieu’s approach does not cut the Gordian knot of the 
agent-structure debate, casting the debate in terms of power, understood in the relational 
terms set out in who/whom?, invites an approach analysing strategic action within divergent 
fields, themselves imbricated with one another and the political-economic field of power.  This 
approach focuses then on strategic action within these fields, rather than structure or agency 
per se.  Ole Wæver offers a preceding example of a theoretically sympathetic focus on 
individual IR scholars and their trajectories, the closest to a Bourdieusian consideration of IR 
theory we have yet had.90  This work demonstrates the relative novelty of this approach within 
the field, and through a contrast with the methodology used by Wæver I outline the additional 
purchase my Bourdieusian model gives.  
                                                             
90 The recent  Bourdieusian/practice turn in (European) IR theory being outward facing – that is applying 
field theory to diplomacy or policing, or subjecting ‘IR concepts to a Bourdieusian reinterpretation’ 
(Adler–Nissen 2013: 14). All excellent work, but not what we are aiming for here. 
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In this earlier project, Ole Wæver summarises it as focusing on ‘persons not paradigms’, this 
focus marking a ‘break with the usual procedure in the [IR] field’ which tends to represent IR 
‘as consisting of a number of disembodied ‘schools’ or ‘paradigms’’ (Neumann and Wæver 
1997: 1-2).  As Wæver argues this obscures the actual production of work in the field, as such 
work requires that ‘theorists make personal choices’, and,  indeed, the most interesting 
theorists and work tends to operate across the boundaries of the paradigms, reflecting ‘points 
where numerous cross-pressures meet; different academic projects and discourses combine 
with numerous extra-academic factors’ (ibid: 3).91   
Wæver focuses down on the operation of this cross-boundary work at the individual level, 
noting ‘an integrated academic persona(lity) is not secured once and for all by picking a 
‘position’’ (Wæver 1997: 2).  However, as I argued earlier the prevalence of such ‘cross-
boundary’ work is also understandable politically at a more aggregate level – that is IR, 
through this kind of work containing an admixture of approaches or paradigms, can be better 
understood in its effects (in the maintenance of Western hegemony), than through a focus on 
surface theoretical battles or ‘debates’. 
Wæver then here brings us to a focus on the question of agency, but what is lacking is 
integration with the field of power. Wæver is of course not blind to this, but treats it through 
‘layers’: ‘One has to work inside-out, starting with scholars in their immediate social context, 
which is mainly other scholars in relation to whom they act strategically, then adding as a 
second layer their working conditions, funding and academic institutions, and then finally 
larger political and economic processes’ (Wæver 2010).92 In contrast the Bourdieusian model 
covers the integration of these levels, which allows us to approach the crux of the argument of 
the relation of the IR field to the field of power and the field effect on politico-ethical 
expression – not just perspectives on how ‘personal choices’ are made, but how and why 
individual expression can have effects at odds with its nominal intention.  
As one of the most thoughtful of sociologists of IR, Wæver does also considers the effect of the 
field  as it is understood through the maps and images participants carry of it; the ‘self-images 
which the discipline has established and used to guide its course’, which individual scholars use 
                                                             
91 Written at arguably the peak of post-structuralist influence within the field – as the works and maps 
of the field he uses suggest – he also has to defend this approach against the ‘death of the author’, 
which this characterisation of a ‘meeting point’ reflects. 
92 This is his explicit statement on such a sociology of knowledge in considering Buzan and Hansen’s 
Evolution of International Security Studies (2009); the model is implicit in the 1997 work.  
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to locate their work.  In this he points out the enigmatic nature of the neo-realist hegemony in 
the discipline – in an argument extendable to the related positivist hegemony93 – that whilst 
self-identified neo-realists, or indeed paradigmatic or dogmatic neo-realist works, are far 
fewer than one would expect for such a hegemonic position, it is the constructing of all other 
positions in relation to neo-realism that maintains its hegemonic position.     
So I take up Wæver’s injunction that we ‘take seriously the question of how [self-images of IR] 
function, what they are, and what could be achieved by trying to reshape them’, especially as 
they ‘are implicit operators in (and thereby shape) actual academic practice’ in setting the 
scene for the two trajectories (Neumann and Wæver 1997: 9).  In doing so in relation to 
European IR, I also address the question of US hegemony through this relation between 
hegemony within self-images of the discipline (second order hegemony) and the actual 
content of the work produced and successfully published (first order hegemony).  Moreover, 
this development of the fields is also related to both the Cold War experience of a US led 
West, and the developing post-Cold War bipolar West.  All of this is taken up in the next 
chapter, before I progress to the final chapter where these consideration are brought to bear 
through studying two academic trajectories: those of Mary Kaldor and Ole Wæver himself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
93 For example, Steve Smith railing against positivist hegemony to an ISA audience largely not self-
identified as positivists (Smith 2002). 
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5. Thinking Cosmopolitan Power Europe 
Introduction 
In considering European IR what I offer here is not an exhaustive history or comparative 
exercise – though I build upon such work that has already been done - but a reading of it as 
significant politically, through the role of a specifically European IR in the renovation of 
Western hegemony. Building from the discussion of more policy related conceptions pf Europe 
in chapter three I contend this centres on the concept of cosmopolitan Europe.   Through this 
the chapter is implicitly structured by Gramsci’s distinction between the cosmopolitan and the 
international, the latter encompassing ‘production and exchange, while cosmopolitanism is 
cultural and class-based, the narrow perspective of a small elite, ‘that of the bourgeois, who 
travels for business or pleasure’’ (Ives and Short 2013: 638, Gramsci cited in ibid.).  In line with 
such a class analysis, Jonathan Friedman and Kajsa Ekholm Friedman see the rise of 
cosmopolitan discourse as linked to both growing inequality and hegemonic crisis (Friedman 
and Friedman 2013).  This is the context that marks the emergence of both an explicit 
‘cosmopolitan Europe’, and ‘cosmopolitan power Europe’ discourse as well as the implicit 
cosmopolitan content of contemporary, especially constructivist European IR theory (Diez and 
Manners 2007; McCormack 2009). 
I start by arguing that cosmopolitan Europe is an idealist account of European integration 
antithetical to that I have given, and trace the development within cosmopolitanism as its 
consanguinity with liberal imperialism became apparent, conflicting with its proponents self-
identified ‘critical’ stance.  This development, towards an Arendtian cosmopolitanism, 
demonstrates the need to go beyond the surface of conceptual and theoretical development 
to understand the interaction between ethico-political drives, the field they are expressed in 
and their political effects. This is made clear in the last section of this first half of the chapter in 
which the political ontology of cosmopolitanism is considered, noting that it builds to the idea 
of the citizen as height of human fulfilment, thereby placing itself on Trotsky’s ‘threshold of 
historical society’ through its abnegation of the constitutive role of class struggle.  
The second half gives both the contemporary and Cold War historical context for this 
development as it relates to the IR discipline in Europe and US hegemony within the discipline. 
To do this I distinguish between first and second orders of hegemony: the former is the make-
up of the contemporary work in the discipline and the disciplining thereof – what scholars 
actually do, and the publication gatekeeping, impact on job prospects and funding that shapes 
this; the second is the self-image of the discipline that scholars work with, how they relate 
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their work to the field and conceive of its oppositions and cleavages.  In setting 
cosmopolitanism as a reaction to US hegemony as it manifested in these forms the significance 
of this history, particularly in European peace research and the understanding of US hegemony 
as a positivist realist hegemony, becomes clear.  
Signal here then are the enduring legacy of a foundational Cold War US hegemony within the 
discipline and the concomitant expression of European interests outside of this hegemony in 
European peace studies.  As there is a considerable extant literature here what I offer is sets of 
summary contentions focused on the ongoing salience of this history. As it is a more 
contentious assessment I demonstrate more fully that the IR field has developed to contain a 
bi-polar Western hegemony, building on existing analysis of publication patterns to give an 
illustrative longitudinal curricula analysis of the Central European University’s graduate IR 
programme, which shows both the continuance of a second order US hegemony (in the 
description of the field’s theoretical coordinates) and the shift to a developing bi-polar 
Western first order hegemony (in the concepts and logics of action introduced to the 
students). 
Cosmopolitan Power Europe 
Underpinning European legitimacy in interventions, especially as through the EU, is the 
concept of cosmopolitan Europe.  It is this conception that underpins the characterisations of 
Europe as an international actor found in normative and ethical power Europe discourses 
(Sjursen 2006; Aggestam 200894).  It also closely ties into global civil society discourses, which 
in turn legitimise interventions from the ‘international community’ more generally, and the 
operationalization of all of these conceptions in the framing of actual or potential European 
responses to the post-Cold War challenges of ‘new wars’ as also a new and  progressive form 
of action. 
In all of this, cosmopolitanism and associated conceptions, there is a transcendence both of 
‘atavistic’ nationalisms or racisms, but also of liberal principles of political ontology. First 
naturalising the divisions – of polity and economy and associated conception of the state, the 
individual, civil society and the relations between them - in order to transcend these 
‘outmoded’ structures. Thus cosmopolitan democracy and global civil society radicalise the 
                                                             
94 Aggestam in particular captures the submerged tension between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism in the universalisation of such a constitutively European cosmopolitanism. 
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liberal individual against the state – placing political rights over the state, not set within it - 
through civil society incorporating private economic actors as well as NGOs , to place the state 
under the supervision of the private sphere, with civil society, rather than the state, the 
legitimate guarantor of individual rights. There is therefore a continuity between the 
neoliberal restructuring of the state discussed earlier, in which the ‘state [is]under the 
supervision of the market, rather than [the] market supervised by the state’ (Gane 2012: 626), 
and concepts such as ‘monitory democracy’ attempting to give power to ‘global civil society’ in 
the form of transnational private actors (Keane 2009).  
In this section I will work through the argument above, in the order given, building to a 
Gramscian understanding of this cosmopolitan power – most apposite as it is (more or less 
wilful) misreadings of Gramsci that much of the self-consciously progressive work in this vein is 
constructed against.  In this, we are seeing another iteration of the post-Marxist tactic 
described in chapter two – Marx, or Gramsci, being misrepresented and this caricature used to 
allow a retreat from holistic Marxist approaches in favour of idealisms.  Jürgen Habermas is a 
consistent link here, in shifting ‘Marxism’ away from relations of production to a post-Marxist 
‘angelism of language’ – a conception of language and its role entirely opposed to that of Marx 
and Gramsci (Anderson 1983; Ives 2004: 134-171) - in that both his work on the public sphere 
underpins much of this civil society work, and that he is a significant proponent of 
cosmopolitan power Europe himself.  As he puts it in the NED’s Journal of Democracy: 
‘Cosmopolitans see a federal European state as a point of departure for the development of a 
transnational network of regimes that together could pursue a world domestic policy, even in 
the absence of a world government’ (Habermas 2003). 
Cosmopolitan Europe 
Cosmopolitan Europe represents an idealist account of the interrelated questions of the post-
Cold War existence, constitution, and role of Europe.  In this it represents an antithetical take 
to that I have developed above to the same processes – an ‘alternative’ ‘new critical theory of 
European integration’ (Beck, Grande, and Cronin 2007: 27, their emphasis). 
Cosmopolitan Europe is then fundamentally a creation of the EU and the struggles to 
understand it as a polity outside of a class framework; from this starting point the 
transcendence of the state-system and creation of a post-modern political formation – or 
‘post-national constellation’ - requires a new conceptual apparatus and associated form of 
identifier for Europe.  In this construction both analytical and normative are intermingled, 
building the ‘illimitable narcissism’ of European thought on the EU, upon this transcendence of 
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‘outmoded’, repressive, war-prone state structures. Through this the EU is constructed as an 
inherently progressive normative actor against preceding modern European history, 
understood through an inter-state lens.  This then gives meaning to the idea that those outside 
this post-modern configuration - sometimes extended to include the US in a broader Western 
‘zone of peace’ – are trapped in a historical condition which Europeans have overcome.  It thus 
continues the longer history of European thought in which the rest of the world can be helped 
to catch up with civilized Europe, through European tutelage of one form or another. 
Ulrich Beck, prominent within the formation of this vision, lays out the brave novelty of his 
conception: ‘In fact, advanced research on Europe has scarcely dared venture beyond the 
conventional basic pattern of nation-state thinking’ even ‘when speaking of ‘governance’ or a 
‘multilevel system’’ research on Europe serves ‘to conceive of and cast the EU in the image of 
the nation-state’, and is accordingly ‘blind to Europe’ (Beck 2007: 109).  What this ‘advanced 
research’ misses is the ‘European miracle’ in which enemies can become neighbours 
fundamentally through a transcendence of national ‘containers’ and the creation of non-
national liberal democracy. This Nobel Prize winning ‘miracle’ and its development into a 
‘European Way’ is set-up in clear separation from the ‘American Way’, as the latter retains a 
nationalist frame, whilst the former is built upon transnational civil society and cosmopolitan 
democracy. 
 
Cosmopolitan approaches then set themselves against the methodological nationalism of the 
social sciences, and especially IR’s realism and/or neo-realism95 - approaches that, significantly, 
are seen to be becoming fallacious, not as always having been ideological.  Instead then of the 
internal relation between class and state-society formations and change I have argued for 
above, class based approaches too are similarly becoming outmoded – belonging in fact to 
such defunct ‘nation-state’ thinking.  Instead cosmopolitanism is ‘post-class’, and, as unable to 
deny the reality of ‘global capitalism’, constructs instead a ‘global civil society’ against ‘global 
capital’ (Beck 2005; Beck, Grande, and Cronin 2007).  
Thus visions of global civil society are derived from the authors idealised vision of an EU 
Europe and its possibilities – of nation separated from state and of democracy separated from 
citizenship with a European civil society that precludes talk of ‘democratic deficit’.  Jürgen 
                                                             
95 There is no meaningful separation between them in these cosmopolitan analyses. 
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Habermas, for a long time the philosophical anchoring point of this discourse, lays this out in 
the European context: 
discussions have to be synchronized within national public 
spheres that are networked across Europe—that is, conducted at 
the same time and on the same topics—so that a European civil 
society with interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, 
citizens' initiatives, and so on, can emerge. Transnational mass 
media, in turn, can construct a multivocal, communicative 
context only if national educational systems provide for a 
common linguistic basis.     
(Habermas 2003: 98) 
 
Ulrich Beck in turn stresses the intertwined internal and external elements in ‘cosmopolitan 
Europe’, a phrase ‘intentionally ambiguous denoting both internal development and the 
possibilities of Europe’s shift towards cosmopolitan democratic ideals, and the ‘global 
contribution the project of cosmopolitan Europe could make to the realization of a regime of 
multiple cosmopolitanisms’ (Beck et al 2007: 26).  This in turn ties in to the role of Europe in a 
bi-polar West as ‘[o]nly a cosmopolitan Europe - and that means a transatlantic Europe that 
seeks and finds its global political role in the threatened world and does not confuse a 
cooperative balancing policy towards the United States with an antagonistic policy against the 
United States’ (ibid: 26) can fulfil such a role within the conditions created by the end of US 
hegemony (ibid: 217-219). 
This is rather too explicit for cosmopolitanism’s critical credentials to remain untarnished.  
Such Habermasian liberal cosmopolitanism is too clearly legitimating of Western interventions 
– as Habermas’ explicit political judgements too make clear (see for example the collection in 
Habermas 2006).   For critical European thought that both seeks to avoid class analysis and 
maintain a progressive position, most importantly without the conflict that class based analysis 
entails, a more euphemised relation to this organic situation must be developed.  Here the 
recent ‘turn’ to Arendtian cosmopolitanism, as an internal reaction to liberal cosmopolitanism, 
becomes significant. 
Arendtian Cosmopolitanism: liberalism vs liberal republicanism 
During her lifetime, and beyond through the Cold War, the main political implications of 
Hannah Arendt’s thought were clear.  The usefulness for the West during the Cold War of her 
focus on the individual against totalitarianism, and concomitant drawing of equivalence 
between Nazi Germany and the USSR, is obvious and a central plank in legitimating liberalism 
at the time as the ‘vital centre’ against such states. Focusing on this Cold War applicability, 
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Kees van der Pijl notes her affiliations with the Rockefeller and Guggenheim foundations and 
how the claim that totalitarianism itself is inclined to ‘radical evil’ ‘impart[s] a friend-foe matrix 
on Morgenthau’s realism’ (van der Pijl 2014: 90, 101). As well as contemporaries and fellow 
émigrés, Arendt and Hans Morgenthau were also friends – more than this though both were 
central, if not the central, pillars of the ‘political studies enlightenment’ in political theory and 
the emergent International Relations discipline respectively (Katznelson 2004; Williams 2013; 
cf. Rösch 2013, cf. Owens 2009).    
The project of this enlightenment was to refound liberalism, after the near fatal blow of the 
Second World War and the Holocaust, rescuing its core values but ‘(all-importantly) without 
the unrealistic optimism and naiveté of so many of their predecessors’ (Jones 2005: 544). The 
attempt, for classical realism too, was to ‘move beyond both 19th-century visions of ‘classical’ 
liberalism and its 20th-century ‘progressive’ forms’ as ‘only a liberal politics shorn of its 
‘utopian’ elements — both epistemic and political — could […] be suitably equipped to 
advance a renewed liberal politics’ (Williams 2013: 652).   
It is this that gives the true character and role of classical realism in IR, as an attempt to save 
US liberalism from itself – rather than as its antithetical ‘other’, this latter a role it only took up 
with its caricaturing by Waltz.  This link makes the post-millennial surge of interest in Arendt 
within International Relations of particular interest, giving the underlying politics to what can 
otherwise seem faddishness in the picking up of thinkers within IR.   Arendt’s relevance for 
International Relations has recently received book length treatments by Patricia Owens (2007) 
and Patrick Hayden (2009), alongside Anthony Lang and John Williams’ edited volume (2008), 
with numerous journal articles too, and an increasing inclusion in volumes drawing together 
thinkers of relevance for the discipline (Edkins and Vaughan-Williams 2009, Moore and 
Farrands 2010, Bell 2010). 
Patrick Hayden’s trajectory demonstrates the position of this interest within 
cosmopolitanism’s development, as he shifts from a development of cosmopolitanism from 
Rawlsian starting points (Hayden 2002), to a more general development of Cosmopolitan 
Global Politics (in line with my treatment above as a transcendence of IR realism, understood 
as realpolitik), drawing in Mary Kaldor’s work on global civil society and the transformation of 
war to cosmopolitan law enforcement (see below) (Hayden 2005, and cf. Hayden and el-Ojeili 
2006 for more of this cosmopolitan ‘critical globalisation’ theory).    In this latter work Arendt 
appears only for her expression of the need for a permanent international criminal court – 
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however  by the 2009 volume Arendt’s work is a central focus (Hayden 2007; Hayden 2009; 
Hayden 2010).  
This suggests Arendtian cosmopolitanism should be located as a solution to problems within 
cosmopolitanism, as the intellectual projects intertwined with cosmopolitanism (and with one 
another) of global civil society and globalisation theory have lost their lustre as both their 
analytical weakness and shallow grasp of the political have become increasingly exposed and 
obvious, most notably as their arguments have been used in the justification of actual liberal 
imperialist endeavours.  As Anthony Burke puts it, ‘what Arendt argues in her work is of great 
importance for a reconstructive critique of cosmopolitanism’ (Burke 2008: 45).96 
This critique of the political implications of this preceding liberal cosmopolitanism from the 
Arendtian direction is strong.  Patricia Owens in particular sets Arendt’s work against that of 
the liberal cosmopolitans exemplified by Habermas.  She correctly sees that the effects of 
Habermas’ political vision cannot easily be separated from that of the neoconservatives he is 
nominally so stridently against.  This is a problem with Habermasian cosmopolitanism noted 
elsewhere. Vivienne Matthies-Boon identifies the shared ‘core ideological values and 
perceptions’ between Habermas and the neoconservatives as a belief in the universal value of 
democracy, understood in procedural terms as formal democratic processes, tied to a neglect 
of history, particularly of colonialism and post-colonialism.  
It is this vision that means that whilst he is nominally ‘fervently opposed [to] the neoliberal and 
neoconservative policies of the Bush administration’ his own work is easily appropriated by 
just such a discourse (Matthies-Boon 2011: 167; an example of appropriation is to be found in 
Delahunty and Yoo 2009), despite being arrived at from radically different starting premises 
(neoconservatives rarely accused of scholasticism or excessive academic rigour)97.  Matthies-
Boon however holds that Habermas can escape this danger, that it does not necessarily follow 
                                                             
96 Craig Calhoun and John McGowan highlight the resurgence of interest in Arendt’s thought within 
political science more generally in the 1990s as a search for a solution to the ‘widespread crisis in critical 
imagination’ within the academy created by the end of the Cold War.  In this, they note Arendt’s work Is 
’deep and rich enough’ to be helpful to the development of postmodern and deconstructive as well as 
Habermasian approaches, as well as having a role in bolstering identity politics (Calhoun and McGowan 
1997: 5, 8). 
97 The problem with Habermas’ position can also be seen in the central significance he gives to George 
W. Bush representing a break in US foreign policy. An indication of the falsity of this can be seen 
discursively in the historical breadth of US political resources drawn upon in Francis Fukuyama’s creation 
of a ‘realistic Wilsonianism’ in his strange anti-mea culpa ‘After the Neocons’ (Fukuyama 2006), and 
empirically in anything but the most idealistic study of US foreign policy (cf. van Apeldoorn and de 
Graaff 2012). 
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from his basic positions, so Habermas meaningfully can and ‘needs [to] explicitly differentiate 
his cosmopolitanism from theirs and to anticipate the contours of how such misappropriation 
might occur’ (ibid: 180). 
However Habermas does indeed offer just such a differentiation in his cosmopolitanism, 
focused on the individual under international law, or where this is judged ethically lacking 
under ‘cosmopolitan law’ as the highest arbiter. The distinction then rests on the cosmopolitan 
transcending of nationalism and the state – on conceptions of post-national democracy and 
global civil society – with a central role for monitoring of state actions and legitimacy deriving 
from this global civil society.  This though does not tackle the central issue of the ‘potentially 
constitutive role for humanitarian violence in the creation of a ‘global public sphere’ with 
cosmopolitan intent’. This then is a deep problem for cosmopolitanism and in constructing a 
solution ‘Arendt’s thought offers […] significant critical tools to question’ this link to ‘coercive 
interventions and liberal imperialism’ (Burke 2008: 514, 516) 
Before moving to these tools, note that Patricia Owens’ attack is intended against more liberal 
interpretations of Arendt too – Owens is constructing Arendt as a non-liberal thinker.  As 
Owens notes of Hayden’s work, in failing to ‘pursue Arendt’s more radical argument’ whose 
‘target was capitalism and liberal ideology more generally’ ‘ Hayden leaves us with an image of 
Arendt as a sort of chastened liberal’ imbricated with the cosmopolitanism of Ulrich Beck 
(Owens 2011: 884-5).  He thus ‘assimilate[s] Arendt to a reformed liberal cosmopolitanism. 
The effect is that one of the most idiosyncratic, iconoclastic and nonliberal thinkers of the 20th 
century is reduced to a normative international theorist’ (Owens 2011: 885). 
It is something of a commonplace to note that Arendt is relatively uncategorisable in 
contemporary political philosophical terms, particularly as structured by the 
liberal/cosmopolitan and communitarian divide.  This reflects the decline of a distinctive civic 
republicanism as it has been absorbed into the broader liberal tradition, as it is within this 
(classical) civic republicanism that Arendt’s thought, and her cosmopolitanism sits (Lloyd 1995, 
Passerin d’Entrèves 1994). This tradition of individual human freedom and development 
realisable only through political association and action within a community lies outside the 
‘stale’ oppositions of liberal and communitarian thought (Calhoun and McGowan 1997: 7). The 
tools identified to reconstruct cosmopolitanism below relate to this tradition, whilst my 
summation of the political ontologies of cosmopolitanism of both kinds indicates why the civic 
republican tradition is so often merged into liberalism more generally.  
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The tools useful in reconstructing cosmopolitanism therefore include space for political 
communities, rejecting Habermas’ focus on the individual within a global public, through 
noting the constitutive and limiting role of particularistic political communities – a 
cosmopolitan order must therefore exist between these communities (Owens 2007, 146–148). 
As Arendt’s approach, though highly individualistic, is not just based on the liberal individual 
but on the space for debate and deliberation between them, this generates not a 
straightforward Habermasian model but considerations of both the limits and possibilities of 
cosmopolitan politics (Owens 2010, cf. Villa 1997, cf. Cascardi 1997).   
Most particularly Arendt takes seriously the question of the founding of such cosmopolitan 
orders, the failure to address this leaving ‘liberal and Habermasian cosmopolitanisms’ ‘unable 
to conceive the transcendence of nation-state politics and identities in a non-ideological and 
non-imperialist manner’.  Habermas’ focus on the individual and the transcendence of the 
nation-state left him open to a ‘top-down emphasis on the need for supra-national authority’, 
whereas directly against this ‘Arendt held that a legitimate order must be a horizontally 
founded ‘international authority’ (Owens 2010: 82; Arendt cited in ibid). 
Central though, and the central problem, is the separation of politics from power, through 
separating power from violence, with war and violence for Arendt sited as the antithesis of 
politics98. She is thus totally at odds with political realism. Patricia Owens puts it pugnaciously 
claiming political realism ‘debases the very possibility of meaningful politics; it is simply a 
legitimated form of domination. This is a description of government under capitalism rather 
than a theory of politics’ (Owens 2012: 567; cf. Owens 2007: 13-32).  This can only leave a 
theory of politics outside of the reality of power as it is exercised, revealing itself as pure 
idealism.  David McGowan approvingly agrees seeing in Arendt an ‘idealistic purification’ of 
politics, giving us what we should look to politics to provide, not what the political actually is 
(McGowan 1997; cf. Owens 2007: 31). 
This then is scholastic fallacy redoubled.  Firstly, if Habermas is convicted of ‘moralism as 
egoistic universalism’ as the suppression of the constitutive role of the conditions of access to 
                                                             
98 Rejecting any kind of continuum between, war and politics (principally against Foucauldian based 
reversals of Clausewitz’s maxim) Patricia Owens gets to the nub of the disagreement seeing it as an 
ontological disagreement over the potential existence or otherwise of the ‘integrity of a distinct public, 
political realm’ (Owens 2007: 31). 
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his public sphere means his theory of politics is abstracted away from power, then when even 
Habermas finds Arendt guilty of ‘a politics that is cleansed of social and economic issues’  it is 
clear that the criticisms we saw Bourdieu level at Habermas apply to Arendt a fortiori 
(Bourdieu 2000: 65 (see above); Habermas 1977: 15).   
Magnifying this is the assessment of Arendt’s thought itself outside of political context.  Many 
accounts point to Arendt’s personal experience and the contemporaneous political 
conjuncture she lived through: none of those seeking to build on her thought however place 
her work within the structural context given by van der Pijl and Katznelson. Indeed, this relates 
to using Arendt’s thought itself, as the ‘framework of Arendt’s analysis cannot incorporate 
socio-theoretical considerations of this [dynamic] kind’ (Fine and Cohen 2002: 154).  Within 
Arendt’s work there is no conception of the relation of the creation of liberal universalism to 
the reaction against it (ibid), her thought here is therefore static, in the sense of political 
thought sheared from its geopolitical moorings, and creates a flat model of a liberal centre set 
against the ‘political evil’ of the  extremes of left and right.  The effect is to replace politics with 
ethics in the idealist sense criticised in chapter one, worse but accordingly unsurprising this 
‘ethical vision is strangely immaterial’ (Burke 2008). 
Cosmopolitanism and liberal political ontology 
Take up of Hannah Arendt then provides an answer to the problem of liberal 
cosmopolitanism’s complicity in liberal interventionism, up to and including that of its putative 
ideological foe the Bush Jr Administration. It does so through moving beyond liberal 
individualism to a republican focus on the individual as actor in the world, on achieving identity 
and freedom – even creating authentic politics - through action in concert with others. This 
founding of politics therefore disallows the creation of true democratic politics through 
violence, possible within a more formal proceduralist vision.    
There is then a strong critical voice against specific imperial military interventions, and indeed 
the focus on the mutual creation of politics is hard to object to as an ideal.  The question 
however is an ontological one – of whether such an ideal has or can exist, and under what 
conditions (cf. n. 98 above).  Following from this also, whether attainable in the absolute or 
not, how one could approach it.  In this the ‘citizen is one of the most powerful ‘wishful 
portraits of being truly human’’ , but ‘bound to remain abstract and rhetorical in bourgeois 
society’, and in this way the image of the citizen ‘precedes in however overblown and general 
a way the guiding image of the comrade’ (Rehmann 1999: 11, Ernst Bloch in Rehman 1999: 
11).   
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The objection here then centres on the neglect, in taking up her thought, of the implications of 
the strongest and most common criticism of Arendt from the left.  This criticism is focused on 
her strict distinctions between and rigid separation of spheres of social life, and it is this that 
places her within a liberal political ontology.  In particular the strict distinctions between public 
and private reflect the liberal reification of the separation of the political, social and economic 
seen in the ‘Arendtian tendency that looks towards the conceptual partitioning of modes of 
human activity into closed and self-contained spheres that preclude interpenetration’ (Holman 
2011: 333) 
 
Thus whilst  Patricia Owens is right to assert that Arendt cannot be understood outside of her 
interaction with Marxist theory (Owens 2007, 2011), the very structure of Arendt’s theory is, in 
these divisions and distinctions, a repudiation of Marxist theory.  The nature of this interaction 
is however also deeply problematic as ‘Arendt’s interpretation of Marx can only be described 
as highly tendentious’, if not ‘blatantly’ mistaken, and she thus ‘does not provide a critique of 
those aspects of Marx’s thought that would seem to invalidate her theoretical structure, but 
rather a critique of an imagined content within Marx, which, in fact, produces the initial need 
for this theoretical structure’ (Holman 2011: 334-5). 
 
The Marxian concept of labour at once cuts across all three of the dimensions of her vita activa 
– of labour, work and action – there is no separating out of the specifically political sphere of 
action as it is embedded within labour as a whole. In seeking to reject this holistic embedding 
of the political we see then the deep structural idealism within her theory.   Politics, or action,  
as contained in a separate realm is therefore false, in an ideological way, historically 
constructed and ‘lacking relevance outside of the context of the social formation which [Marx] 
will identify as capitalism’ (Holman 2011: 337).  Arendt then fails to recognize within Marx his 
‘desire to promote the very possibilities for free action that so much concern her’, to which his 
theoretical development of the concept of labour is central (Hansen 1993: 37–38; Holman 
2011: 351). 
 
As noted, this becomes clearest through concept of the citizen as politically active individual in 
society. Jan Rehmann notes the difficulties introduced to Marx’s thinking by the German term 
Bürger referring simultaneously citizen and bourgeois.   He notes that Marx’s contribution 
‘reveals a ‘fundamental division’ between the two. He separates the different features, pits 
them against each other, and finally demonstrates that the citoyen is treated as the ‘servant’ 
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of the egoistic bourgeois’, meanwhile the ‘sphere in which man acts as a communal being is 
degraded to the sphere in which he acts as a partial being’ (Rehmann 1999: 4).  What is 
significant, and it prefigures Bourdieu’s criticism of the ‘invisible property qualification’ 
underlying the Habermasian public sphere also, is the formal separation of these realms. This, 
as noted throughout Marxist theory, gives the illusion of political freedom under capitalism, 
and it is this that Arendt reifies. Despite then focusing on the alienation inhering in the modern 
and the danger capital presents to the public sphere she misses that this is made possible, and 
the subordination of the citizen to the bourgeois to which she and Habermas object, is enabled 
precisely through these divisions and this conception of the political. 
 
This then does not overcome the problematic normative social structuring effects of liberal 
cosmopolitanism as the fundamental political ontologies are shared.  Cosmopolitanism, 
especially through its normative global civil society aspect, is notably often constructed against 
tendentious misreadings of Gramscian Marxism.  Similar to Arendt’s reading of Marx, there is a 
consistent reading into Gramsci of their own theoretical divisions, with the function of 
discrediting what is in fact a holistic approach, towards which they would otherwise be almost 
ineluctably drawn by their normative drive and moral opposition to the effects of capital’s 
global predations99. 
Joseph Buttigieg exposes this tendency in the work of the LSE’s Centre for Civil Society 
(including work by Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier, and Marlies Glasius), citing numerous 
examples throughout their corpus of work. In particular he cites John Keane’s contribution to 
their Global Civil Society 2001 volume, repeated verbatim in Keane’s 2003 Global Civil Society, 
where he refers to the ’Gramscian bias which draws a thick line between (bad) business 
backed by government and (good) voluntary associations’, such a ‘one-sided emphasis on the 
free civic choices of men and women has the effect of obscuring other planetary forces that 
currently constrain and enable their actions’ (Keane 2003: 63).  As Buttigieg notes ‘Gramsci’s 
rejection of economism (i.e., the economic determinism inherent in simplistic or vulgar 
versions of the base-superstructure model) is taken for a separation tout court between the 
economic sphere and civil society’ (Buttigieg 2005: 42). 
                                                             
99 How else to explain the consistency of this misrepresentation and use as a strawman? Indeed as we 
see in considering Mary Kaldor below these ‘global civil society’ works are rooted in the attempt to think 
beyond democratic socialism. 
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This normative division within civil society, between its NGOs and its less palatable private 
operators is in fact characteristic of liberal cosmopolitanism and global civil society work more 
generally, as Barry Buzan notes in preferring his own international society approach as it 
avoids this analytic/normative conflation (Buzan 2004a: 80-82).  John Keane’s highlighting of it 
here is to enable the reintegration of  business into the ‘good’ category of ‘global civil society’ 
arguing ‘turbocapitalist firms, aided by the local and regional networks of smaller firms with 
which they do business, have definite civilising effects on the global civil society in which they 
are embedded’(Keane 2003: 82)100.  This is pure cosmopolitanism, in the class sense I 
introduced of the worldview of the business traveller, as ‘[t]heir corporate negotiations are an 
obvious case in point. If they are serious about establishing business links, say, with South 
Korean firms, then they know that there are certain social rules that have to be followed’ (ibid: 
82).   
Gramsci’s approach in fact operates as a ‘ critical counterpart to current liberal tendencies of 
embellishing and harmonizing civil society, because it lays bare the ideological structures of 
civil society and allows us to understand its social contradictions: on the one hand the material 
organization of the hegemonic (e.g. neoliberal) ideology, its apparatuses, hierarchies, gender-
relations; on the other, elements of resistance, counter-cultures, the development of mass 
movements, their fragmentation and dispersion etc.‘ (Buttigieg 2005: 44).  Civil society here is 
not then a normative concept in the same sense, but an analytical heuristic serving to explicate 
the resilience of Western bourgeois society and the need for a different revolutionary strategy 
in relation to it.  But then these are arguments that have been made before. What should be 
taken from this is the task given by Jan Rehmann of bringing ‘home’ the critical content of the 
‘citizen’ and civil society.  The task of retrieving the critical vision that wants to find and give 
‘‘voice’ to those affected by old, new, and emerging inequities in the broadest sense, and 
providing a political and social platform for such voices to be heard.’ (Kaldor, Anheier, and 
Glasius:  2003: 3–4.).  More theoretically, to enable ‘meaningful engagement between the 
                                                             
100 It is worth noting here that Keane intuitively moves to productive capital in his examples – where at 
least at manager/cadre level there is some awareness of the need for socialisation and sustainability. By 
contrast, he rejects an analysis of global trends from within the dominant fully disembedded realm of 
financial capital  seen in George Soros’s account of ‘the intensification of the profit motive and its 
penetration into areas that were previously governed by other considerations’ meaning ‘[i]t is no 
exaggeration to say that money rules people’s lives to a greater extent than ever before’ (Soros 
1998:102, cited in Keane 2003: 81-2), as this exaggerates the exploitative role, and underplays the 
nourishing role, he seeks to create for capital in civil society. 
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Arendtian and Marxian political-theoretical traditions’ drawing in ‘politics as action, as 
spontaneous collective activity oriented towards the production of radically new beginnings’ to 
the benefit of Marxist approaches (Holman 2011: 349-350). 
This then is the crux of the matter, the critical intent being expressed within the field.  Chris 
Brown captures this succinctly:  ‘Before the rise of academic cosmopolitanism, [‘engaged, non-
banal’] internationalism was how those with a left/progressive sensibility approached 
international relations – a good question would be how and why th[e] notion of practical 
solidarity came to be displaced by th[is] kind of pointless abstract theorising’ (Brown 2012: 
115). 
Without (thankfully) needing to arrive at any definitive answer on the correct interpretation of 
Arendt, we can see from all this the great hope for cosmopolitanism as an academic 
expression of normative/politico-ethical drives, alongside strongly contested debate over its 
limits and possibilities.  In this it ties in with the argument overall, of European difference as a 
genuine expressive drive giving it true emancipatory potential, but limited by a lack of self-
reflexivity both on its class origins and the relations of its own production, and a determined 
blindness to the continuing central importance of class relations to the political. As Chris 
Brown suggests, this is not something that can be nailed down at the theoretical level: 
cosmopolitanism can mean a great many things.  To understand it we must get beyond the 
idea of concepts and paradigms as the limits of political expression, to the actual political 
expressions they are intended to contain, those expressing themselves in this way, and the 
field they are expressing them within.   
‘European IR’ as context for development of cosmopolitan Europe 
Before I outline the contours of the context from which this cosmopolitan vision has 
developed, a few comments on what I mean by ‘European IR’.  Although where scholars are 
trained and pursue their careers is of great significance, here in setting the contextual field for 
the trajectories I explore in the next chapter I delimit ‘Europe’ not in a simple - though far from 
clear-cut - geographical sense, but primarily through its political component, bringing back into 
play the argument that politically significant thought is organically connected to the conditions 
of its production.  In all this I am focusing upon the West, so during the Cold War the focus is 
Western Europe, though the Cold War Central and Eastern European experience is seen in the 
negation of Marxist-Leninism post-Cold War.  
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This organic link is already present in accounts of ‘Western IR’ given in the introductory 
chapter.  Here, whilst the focus is often on epistemology or conceptual imperialism, the link to 
contemporary Western (neo-)imperialism, and preceding European colonialism, is always at 
least implicit.  As indicated, I am focusing on intra-Western dynamics, so the key shifts in the 
field are between the Cold War US hegemony to a post-Cold War bi-polar West.   
Within this contemporarily it is within security studies, broadly defined, that European 
approaches are most discernible. That is, it is within security studies especially that we find 
approaches that are not ‘‘sectorial’ (that is security studies) manifestations of the main 
theories as defined by the ‘grand debates’ of the discipline at large’, nor ‘copied form the 
United States’ (Wæver 2012: 48 ),101 but theorising grounded and developed from specifically 
European experience and debates that nonetheless reverberate through and influence the 
broader discipline (Wæver and Buzan 2013: 405). In security studies’ merging of the Cold War 
experiences of IR and peace research it is not surprising that this should be so, and accordingly 
it is here that cosmopolitan Europe is most politically meaningfully applied and 
operationalised.  The contest over Europe’s role in a bi-polar West this contains, alongside this 
being the primary site where the first order shift to bi-polar theoretical production has taken 
place, in reaction to and contesting the second order US hegemony, has turned security 
studies from a rather staid sub-discipline to the most ‘fruitful’, ‘most dynamic and contested 
areas in International Relations’ (Williams 2003: 511). 
In setting the context then I build a justification for considering a bi-polar Western IR as an 
emerging reality as well as offering some summary contentions focused on the ongoing 
salience of the Cold War field of IR and peace research, which underpin any explanation of why 
‘one part of the West suddenly deviated so radically from its dominant counterpart on the 
other side of the Atlantic’ (Wæver 2012: 49) and which inform the cosmopolitanism discussed 
above.  The two trajectories in the following chapter bring these relationships together in their 
applied cosmopolitanism. 
An American Social Science – Cold War IR and second order hegemony  
Whilst debate over the ultimate origins of the discipline continues, the central question on the 
nature of the discipline from the second world war onwards is not whether, but to what 
                                                             
101 In this context it is notable in itself, and indicative of my difference with these ‘post-Western IR’ 
approaches and the US/West conflation, that Wæver’s thoughts on contemporary European IR is 
included within the project of geo-cultural epistemologies and ‘Thinking International Relations 
Differently’. 
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degree IR was, or later remains, an American social science (Hoffmann 1977; Holsti 1985; 
Wæver 1998, Smith 2000; Walt 2011; Kristensen 2013).  Current research points to an 
increasing ‘Europeanisation’ of the discipline, with publication now dominated by ‘Northeast 
American and West European elites’ (Kristensen 2013), however this dominant US founding 
meant that for the Cold War period European IR was almost by definition a terrain of ‘clones, 
copies and franchises’ (Jorgensen 2000102). 
 
The central element of this is the constitutive role of an artificially transplanted field of 
scholarship on the theorising taking place within it.  As Jorg Friedrichs notes, the rubric of the 
‘Great Debates’  structured European IR without relating to European academic contexts; for 
example the behaviourist turn was within the US academy (Friedrichs 2004; cf. Jorgensen 
2000). This extends also to the social taxonomy the discipline interrelates with – nowhere else 
outside the US was thought on the international organically developed as a sub-field of a 
political science; with political science itself an approach to politics contemporaneously 
specific to the US.  It was this grafted, non-organic nature that gave a lifeless feel to European 
IR that the caricature captures 
 
This makes sense of the focus on ‘strategies’ identified earlier in the literature considering 
European IR (Friedrichs 2004; Friedrichs and Wæver 2009). US hegemony was totalised with 
the boundaries and structure of the field set by the US discipline. Developing an organically 
(Western) European or national IR within such an accepted disciplinary context is accordingly 
difficult and requires strategies for engaging or disengaging with this field’s very structure.  
This then is also the limitation of such approaches focusing on strategy, they deal with the 
potential within the field, divorced from sociological extra-disciplinary factors (as opposed 
                                                             
102 In claiming there is more to the history of ‘continental’ IR theory than this, Jorgensen points to three 
areas that I cover as lying outside of IR theory: namely European Peace Research, Marxist approaches 
and their marginalisation, and the development of EU studies.  Whilst this alerts us to the danger of 
circularity – looking for and defining IR as practiced by the mainstream means you will find only copies in 
Europe - in fact Jorgensen points to both the drawing on of very different resources outside of IR by 
these three European approaches in defining themselves against IR, and concomitantly their de facto, 
and usually institutional, position outside of the IR discipline. In this he supports my argument on the 
meaningful distinction between European and US IR  and that on the sources of contemporary European 
IR, albeit casting a broader IR rubric backwards into the past than I do as he divorces the discipline from 
its organic relation to US foreign policy  production, setting his argument explicitly against Hoffmann.  In 
fact, he describes quite neatly precisely what I argue in this section, that European IR scholars have 
largely only a single reading of the field, taking it as constituted by its theoretical expressions only not its 
political drivers and effects. 
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merely to external ‘events’, which as Ole Wæver points out is a central failing of IR’s thinking 
about itself (Wæver 1998, cf. Holden 2002)). 
However, as Hoffman asserted with his seminal characterisation, extra-disciplinary factors 
were central to the (re-)birth of the discipline as such a US social science. In its simplest 
relation to Western hegemony, if, in Stephen Walt’s take on the US social science, ‘major 
powers inevitably spend a lot of time thinking about global affairs and the rest of the world 
pays a lot of attention to what thinkers in the major powers are saying’, then European IR 
becomes more central as a bi-polar West forms, though working within both a field structured 
by this preceding hegemony and by the ‘second image’ hegemony of the continuing 
structuring of images of the discipline around US hegemony (Walt 2011: u.n.). 
The various accounts over the years of IR as an American social science have focused on 
differing forms of hegemony from journal publication patterns and gatekeeping, and 
disciplining utterances from prominent figures within the discipline, to the way the discipline is 
taught, with textbook or curricula analysis.  Considering the diverse ‘manner in which this 
widespread claim has been put forth’ Helen Turton finds assertions of US dominance ‘largely 
speculative’ and too ‘generic and ambiguous’ and so the ‘central issue is not whether the 
United States dominates the discipline but the degree and manner in which it does’. What is 
required is a disaggregating of the concept of US dominance as the US may dominate in some 
ways and not others (Turton 2013: 10).103 Thus while the ‘American IR community is 
intellectually hegemonic institutionally and theoretically’ in empirically investigating the 
contours of this dominance within IR Turton finds it unquestionably dominant in only one of 
five areas, in its institutional preponderance, whilst in IR theory the American academy is 
dominant in volume of production but within a theoretically pluralist discipline - evidence is 
lacking of US dominance in agenda-setting, methodology and gatekeeping (ibid: 227). 
 
Recently too there is the growing idea that IR theory as a coherent ‘thing’ has come to an end 
(cf. EJIR special issue September 2013).  Christine Sylvester sees IR now as consisting of a 
                                                             
103 This is Helen Turton’s PhD thesis, offering much needed detailed empirical analysis of various forms 
of US dominance in the field, uncovering the ‘reality of this diverse academic environment’, which 
should result at the least in reconsideration of the use of IR’s self-image as an American Social Science.  
The thesis is currently under embargo as due out in monograph form as part of the Worlding Beyond 
The West series, so I would like here to thank Helen for providing me with a copy of the thesis.  I look 
forward to the debate upon its publication! 
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variety of camps - whether of feminist IR, or postmodern IR or realist IR - and laments their 
insularity and the lack of communication between them.  All the while however, ‘IR’ itself 
continues along through holding conferences and especially through teaching something called 
IR in universities.  Despite, for Sylvester, scholars actually operating and producing work within 
‘camps’ and associated camp journals and panels, clearly there is still a field  that can be taught 
in comprehensible way (Sylvester 2007, 2013). 
This relates to first and second orders of hegemony.  The former is the make-up of the 
contemporary work in the discipline and the disciplining thereof – what scholars actually do – 
and publication gatekeeping job prospects etc.  The second is the self-image of the discipline 
that scholars work with, how they relate their work to the field and conceive of its oppositions 
and cleavages.  This second order is reflected starkly in textbook introductions to the discipline 
and teaching, where the coordinates of the IR map are given; whilst scholars work itself is 
produced within this map but often across what are taught as its boundaries or cleavages.  
What the ‘end of IR’ means therefore is the end of the first order US hegemony globally, as the 
work scholars produce outside of the US is an increasingly poor fit with US hegemony of the 
second order.   
As early as 1998 Ole Weaver, examining journal publication as a ‘direct indicator of the 
discipline’ (Wæver 1998a: 697),  saw US first order hegemony remained in an insular US field, 
but within European journals there was a mix of US and European work, both in terms of the 
nationality of scholars and adherence to his understanding of the US mainstream 
paradigmatically. Peter Kristensen’s recent work confirms this.  His 2012 study of citations in 
papers published in 59 IR journals 2005–2009 (some 20,000 articles), produced a network 
image of journals and their relative prominence and proximity to one another (Kristensen 
2012).  Within this US publications remained dominant, but it also revealed an increasingly 
coherent and weighty European cluster of journals. 
Kristensen’s 2013 work, analysing journals from 2010, confirms this, and gives a more 
variegated and detailed picture. He seeks to go beyond (whilst including in his analysis) the 
traditional focus on US dominance and its extension into Anglosphere, or US-UK condominium 
dominance, to the city and institutional level.  Again, the US is found to be dominant but not 
disproportionately so, given the size of the community – and less so than in other social 
sciences.  Overall whilst noting the ‘decreasing US influence and concentration, it should be 
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emphasized that IR as it is found in the journals studied here remains dominated by a few 
countries in the Anglosphere and Western Europe’ (Kristensen 2013: 20).  
 
In seeking to go beyond citations in network analysis, Kristensen also looks at patterns of co-
authorship, which reveals ‘[t]he production of knowledge in top IR journals is not dominated 
by ‘America’ but is clustered in elite networks centered around certain nodes in Northeast 
America, Western Europe, and Israel. These elite networks are neither confined to nation-state 
spaces nor completely deterritorialized and globalized’ (Kristensen 2013: 3).  These also 
however represent two different networks, one between the US and Western Europe, and one 
between the US and Israel. Implicitly recognising the first and second order split and its 
salience he also adds the caveat that ‘it is worth questioning what difference it makes to 
subject the self-images of the “American social science” to empirical scrutiny if it is a social 
construct. If its practitioners continue to behave as American social scientists, it will be an 
American social science’ (ibid: 20). 
 
Within Europe then a first order US hegemony can no longer be said to exist.104 However it is 
also clear that the prior existence of such hegemony remains of significance in the second 
order hegemony that is still existent – US hegemony remains a truism, with effects on IR 
production in Europe (Friedrichs 2004; Kristensen 2013).    
 
What then are the implications for, and effects on the contemporary European field.  Firstly, 
we can note the derivative, dead nature of works produced within a field separated from the 
organic source for the field.  This is something grappled with extensively within the ‘post-
Western IR’ literature with meditations on the nature of meaningful difference from the US 
hegemonised ‘global’ IR discipline seen as containing colonial narratives.  Within Europe this 
takes a different form, as after all the overall theoretical matrix of inter-state anarchy is 
derived from a reading of European history.  Here the salience is of the realist-liberal poles and 
the great debates being understood literally, in field terms – rather than, as in the US 
discipline, tending to be admixed in practice and used as needed.  That is, for US scholars the 
(conscious or unconscious) practice of a dual reading of the field – of its theoretical and socio-
                                                             
104
  Indeed it never did within thought on international relations, just within IR – the change then is 
within IR itself, and its organic relation as a discipline to class power and Western hegemony is what 
makes this shift within the discipline so important. 
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political nature – is natural, for European scholars such a dual reading generates dissonance; 
working within IR divorces expression form its socio-political drives, whilst the expression of 
organic political interests sets one against the IR field.  Cold War European IR by definition falls 
into the former category, whilst European peace research tends towards the latter. 
The two principal longer term effects on European and critical work we have already seen in 
the defining focus of cosmopolitanism in transcending an outmoded neo-realism and 
methodological nationalism, a variant of the more general critical diversion of setting oneself 
against state-centrism and positivism, and defining oneself in relation to the field in this way.  
By focusing on its manifestation in the field neither grasps what it is, in its explicit normative 
commitments, actually against.  Cosmopolitanism sets itself against both neoliberalism and US 
unilateralism (Bush Jr merely the most recent example of this), but targets neo-realist 
understandings of the international resulting in the diffuse idea of globalising civil society as 
oppositional to globalising capitalism.  Further in conceding that the realist international was 
once an accurate frame, rather than an ideological construction deriving from the taxonimising 
of the social into domestic and international, and economic and political used against theories 
of imperialism, the history and changing coordinates of class formation of this global capitalism 
are obscured leaving only facile globalisation theories (cf. Rosenberg 2002). 
Similarly, thus answering the ‘question of the historical context and emergence of ‘critical IR’’ 
more generally in Europe, especially thereby in refusing it as a ‘privileged vantage point’ 
outside of intellectual history, explains the ‘the abstract and theory-driven nature of critical 
theory and its lack of realistic understanding as to how to challenge the dominance of 
hegemonic ideas in today’s foreign policy practice’ (Holden 2002: 260, 255; cf. Cammack 2007; 
Kurki 2011: 130).  It is the focus on the artificial field divorced from its organic relation and 
understanding that leads to the situation of ‘critical theory as increasingly lacking in relevance 
in contributing to the revitalisation of policy practice or perceptive critiques of it’ (Kurki 2011: 
130).    
 
Cosmopolitanism overcomes this to a degree by its grounding in the post-Cold War European 
experience, albeit idealised (in both senses).  The two figures I focus on in my trajectories show 
the power of this organic link as both derive their theorising from the European context 
primarily before then taking up and opposing their theory to this second order hegemony.  For 
Kaldor, as we will see, this relation requires teasing out somewhat – shrouded by references to 
‘Clausewitzian’ and ‘old’ models which in fact contain the realist schema.  For Ole Wæver the 
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relation is direct, as in theorising from the European security context but through ‘dissident’ 
Anglo-American IR he is explicitly trying to overcome the limitation of a critical theory that 
develops from its relation to existent realist theory and not the concrete political. 
European Peace Research and the International Security Studies ‘Conversation’ 
The Cold War European peace research field, as notably distinct from the US field, can be 
divided into two  phases, marked by what Håkan Wiberg refers to as crises – the first in the 
1970s, the second the 1980s. In the earlier phase, whilst methodologically similar to the US 
field the European field was normatively more radical. In the later phase, developing during 
the ‘second Cold War’ of the 1980s European peace research become both ‘pro-European’ – as 
against a preceding concern with north-south imperialism – and ‘pro-security’ – prefiguring the 
post-Cold War shift to security studies proper.   Our focus here is on the second phase, as the 
most significant, whilst I briefly outline the first as it set up the European field as a distinct 
entity. 
The end of the Cold War presented a further crisis for peace research, and whilst peace 
research continues, albeit in a poor condition perhaps even requiring ‘resuscitation’ (Patomäki 
2001; Jutila, Pehkonen, and Väyrynen 2008) 105, its significance for my argument is as part of 
the security conversation that has led to a flourishing European International Relations which, 
in a reversal of the locus of innovation as a field, now overshadows this antecedent tradition.  
Indeed, as Heikki Patomäki notes, ‘[s]ince [Johan] Galtung, few have developed the critical 
ideals and methodology of peace research’, Patomäki’s notable exceptions of Ole Wæver’s and  
Hayward Alker’s academic careers more ‘closely linked with the side of International Relations’ 
than peace research (Patomäki 2001: 734). 
 
The first ‘crisis’ of peace research around 1970, was the crystallisation of the general 
‘broadening and deepening of the Peace Research agenda in the late 1960s and 1970s’ 
(Wiberg 2005; Buzan and Hansen 2009).   This crisis ‘pitted the protagonists of the ‘old agenda’ 
(studying causes of war, armament dynamics, integration, peaceful systems etc.) against those 
of the ‘new agenda’ who wanted to focus on exploitation, dominance and dependence, 
imperialism etc.’ (Wiberg 2005: u.n.), a development contemporary to and intertwined with 
                                                             
105 In the critical ‘new agenda’ sense - as distinct from ‘conflict resolution’, ‘a more recent concept’ 
developing within peace research that since the ‘1990s […] has taken on a new, more significant and 
central meaning’ (Wallensteen 2011: 7). 
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dependency theory’s heydays. The debate was fierce and polarising in its language - Lars 
Dencik, one of the radical new school of militant peace researchers characterising existent 
peace research as a technology of control and ‘pacification’, whilst such militancy and its 
propinquity to positions condoning revolutionary violence was seen as heresy by their 
opponents - but the end result was to create a broadened peace research agenda, shorn of the 
extremes of both sides (Lawler 1995: 77).    
 
Much has been made of the Marxist influence in European peace research (Buzan and Hansen 
2009: 124-127, 146).  Nonetheless where not deracinated such Marxist theory always held a 
very marginal and contested position as the idea of ‘peace through revolution’ runs counter to 
the central pacifist ethos of peace research. Kenneth Boulding notes usefully that ‘[i]t is hard 
to find dialectical thinkers who have a taboo on violence, as struggle is so important to them. 
To those who think that the dynamics of the world consists of winning struggles, a taboo on 
violence may seem very confining. However, I have put Herman Schmid, the Swedish 
Communist peace researcher in this category, with the understanding that the taboo may not 
be absolute’ (Boulding 1977: 77).  Schmid for his part argued ‘that a violent revolution of the 
oppressed may be justified in the name of true peace’ whilst aware that ‘it would not be very 
meaningful to keep the label ‘peace research’ given the usual connotations of the term’ if his 
approach were to prevail (Schmid cited in Lawler 2005: 82; cf. Neufeld 1993).   
 
Whilst the US largely remained ‘old agenda’, Europe embraced the more ‘radical’ ‘new agenda’ 
but minus its ‘extremes’ and with the field however sharing at least a common understanding 
of ‘negative peace’ (i.e. absence of direct violence) and ‘positive peace’ (absence of structural 
violence too) as roughly coterminous demarcations, the situation could be one of ‘friendly 
quarrels’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 129-134; Boulding 1977).  In analysis that speaks to today’s 
characterisations of transatlantic divides in political thought Western Europeans had retreated 
from reality into ‘fantasies of justice’, whereas Americans had succumbed to a ‘niggling 
scientism, with sophisticated methodologies and not very many new ideas’ (Boulding 1978: 
347). 
 
It is this ‘fantasy of justice’ and its construction that we should take from this period.  Johan 
Galtung is certainly the dominant European  figure here. His conception of positive peace, 
bridging liberal and Marxist approaches, constitutes the strongest vision of the distinctiveness 
of the European new agenda field (Lawler 1995; Buzan and Hansen 2009: 123-129).  Herman 
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Schmid’s critique of Galtungian peace research provides a neat summary noting that at core it 
was problematically ‘anticipating the continuing evolution of a global social system that 
transcended relations between states’, with the problem lying in the ‘presumption of an 
identity of interest among its [international system] elements in order to facilitate the 
application of [his] functionalist sociology’ Schmid in Lawler 1995: 74).  In common with such 
functionalist sociology generally this is depoliticising (see for example Ralf Dahrendorf’s 
development of ‘conflict theory’ against structural functionalism). Peter Wallensteen, grasping 
the general applicability of this critique, notes: ‘Peace research serves the whole of humanity 
without excluding anyone, at least intentionally or in advance. This […] is problematic because 
it pushes the subjects of politics into the background. The construction of political agents must 
be brought to the fore. What is the role envisaged for peace research in relation to 
construction of agency and agents?’ (Wallensteen 2011: 41). 
 
Galtung’s conception of Europe is the final significant element here.  The understanding builds 
upon his ‘structural theory of imperialism’ a theory that clearly owes much to dependency 
theory and contains the foci of the radical challenge within peace research, yet nevertheless is 
explicitly abstracted away against Marxist historical approaches into an ahistorical  ‘scientific’ 
model (Galtung 1971). This ahistorical model of imperialism can then be applied to both Soviet 
and Western imperialism as both supposedly contain the same structural relations between 
core and periphery.   From this, the European Community is seen as a developing neo-
imperialist power from its structural position and power - centrally the European Community 
would continue vertical divisions of labour central to this structural understanding, and 
therefore not contribute to development  (Galtung 1973). Nonetheless, this was separated 
from the internal character of a ‘Europe […] not inclined to either reward or punish (classic 
attributes of power) but to influence the world with its ideas. Europe would thus constitute a 
third way between the United States and the USSR’ (Laïdi 2008: 37).106 
 
It is this separation, and the idea that Europe should be ‘a non-military superpower’ in this 
‘ideological’ way (Pace 2007: 1042) that means his work, despite a seemingly useful focus on 
Pax Bruxellana as an attempt to (re-)create a truly Eurocentric world, is formative in the 
construction of the ‘normative power Europe’ discourse, alongside François Duchêne 
                                                             
106 One can also note here that Galtung similarly distinguishes between American Empire (bad) and 
American Republic (good) throughout his work. 
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(Manners 2002).  Indeed that his vision excludes interest and violence from true politics, and 
that change to a universal transcendent positive peace consisting of an unstated European 
social model can be achieved ‘rationally’ can be seen from his views on the desirable 
contemporary role for the EU, which ‘will have an enormous status and influence as the model 
region , having achieved so much inner positive peace; directly, structurally and culturally’ 
(Galtung 2010). 
 
The events of the 1980s, combined with both the ongoing, and increasingly methodologically 
sophisticated  critique of the European field’s characteristic (soft) positivism as inherently 
conservative, and the influence of especially Dieter Senghaas’ ‘Feindbild’ or ‘enemy image’ 
literature brought a significant shift in European peace research. The ending of détente, 
second Cold War and siting of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe brought to the 
fore the difference in Western European and US interests.  The concept of deterrence through 
the threat of limited nuclear war in Europe made superpower rivalry (and/or more abstractly 
bipolarity), rather than simply the Soviet Union the gravest threat, as ‘the means and doctrines 
of defence appear[ed] more threatening to the wellbeing and existence of Western Europe 
than anything the Soviet Union seem[ed] likely to do’ (Buzan 1989: 30).  Not only was the 
prospect of conflict in which Europe would be devastated overwhelming, it also seemed 
needless as  Western Europeans also largely did not share the ‘new’ ramped up US image of 
the Soviet threat (Buzan 1989).  The inability to express this difference within the IR field 
proper within Western Europe at the time led to a vibrant and necessarily different European 
peace studies expressing this difference. 
 
The popular social base of this position is seen in the growth of a new peace activism opposed 
to the siting of cruise and Pershing missiles, most notably the formation of European Nuclear 
Disarmament (END), with peace research becoming part of this complex, with many peace 
researchers both advising the movement and activists (Wiberg 2005).  The heightened conflict 
also meant the ‘relative balance between military and development issues shifted back again 
in the direction of the former’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 127).  Western Europeans also began 
to see themselves as ‘outside’ of the Cold War conflict, with Europe the victim of it. From here 
the Cold War seemed increasingly irrational, down – developing the earlier positivist peace 
research view of rationalism and the medical metaphor for the role of the peace researcher as 
physician – to pathology of one kind or another.  Altogether peace research notably became 
‘pro-security’, but outside of a nuclear deterrence frame and developed to enable its 
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transcendence through, for example, common security concepts and non-offensive defence, 
and ‘pro—Europe’ as the previous image of Europe’s role within Western core imperialism 
faded with the shift in focus (Wæver and Buzan 2013). 
The work of the ‘West German school’, in particular the Feindbild literature, became 
increasingly important linked to Germany’s specific experience with the division of Europe, 
with the divide along US-Soviet lines within one country making clear the external nature of 
such bifurcation (Guzzini 2004: 43).  Dieter Senghaas’ characterisation of an autistic deterrence 
culture - that is a closed system with an inbuilt logic - reliant on ‘enemy images’ for its 
legitimating logic, expressed the overall shift towards seeing equivalence between the blocs 
and matching obsessions of the nuclear superpowers.  With this the picture of Germans on 
both sides of the Wall connected in a community of victimhood was broadened to Europe as a 
whole.  Similarly the concomitant promotion of  German national self-interest as ‘non-
ideological’ against this ideological division extended to this idea of a whole Europe caught 
between ideologically motivated powers - leaving a non-ideological (Western) European soft 
social democracy, the later much touted ‘European model’ or ‘European Way’. Against this the 
US and Soviet elites were seen to be using the Cold War to control their populace and vassal 
empires (Guzzini 2004: 43), with ‘enemy images’ fulfilling ‘functional needs to rally domestic 
support and national/group identity’ (Guzzini 2013a: 240-242). 
 
I will show the concrete effects of this Cold War European peace research on post-Cold War 
European International relations in the two trajectories below, including Heikki Patomäki’s 
notable figure of Ole Wæver.  However I draw out three features here which combine in a way 
that can be seen in the underlying political ontologies of the European international relations 
approaches I examine.  
 
Firstly, as Stefano Guzzini argues in broad terms, this later European peace research was a 
‘forerunner of present constructivism-inspired scholarship in IR’ as well as post-structuralist 
approaches focusing on self/other politics (Guzzini 2013a: 242, 2004: 43). More significantly 
though is the specifically European nature of this constructivism as seen in its development in 
critical security studies.   Classing critical security studies as a primarily European development, 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver distinguish between constructivist approaches in US security 
studies which they attribute to US IR scholars involved in ‘theory wars’ on the constructivist 
side, moving into security studies ‘to prove constructivism on the home ground of materialist 
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approaches: security’, and that of the European ‘schools’ (Aberystwyth, Copenhagen, Paris) 
which  did not develop deductively but emerged ‘as part of the engagements on a distinct 
security scene’ and their theoretical innovations ‘have become’ rather than being derived from 
part of IR theory (Wæver and Buzan 2013: 405). As well as making these schools difficult to pin 
down in theoretical terms, in a way that has fruitfully generated both debate and attempts at 
application across a diversity of contexts, this derivation from the European scene made 
debate between and about these European schools the field for other more general debates 
on, for example, the role of discourse, the ethical position of the researcher, or of Critical 
Theory’s relevance (ibid: 405-6). 
 
Secondly, the central significance of the ‘pro-Europe’ shift, away from the dependencia focus 
on Western imperialism during détente to a focus on bipolarity and nuclear deterrence in the 
1980s with Europe as the victim ‘caught in the middle’ between the superpowers.  This gives 
an essentially Europe-centric view of the Cold War. This is not so much of a break as a shift 
within overall continuity:  equivalence between the blocs was already there in Galtung’s work, 
as was the idea of a ‘non-ideological’ rational European model.  However the East-West focus 
now came at the expense of North-South considerations, and so the Cold War took on a 
Eurocentric understanding in Rick Saull’s definition – that is as Eurocentric as opposed to West-
centric - where viewing it as ‘a conflict between Moscow and Washington’ comes at the 
expense of the longer and broader understanding of it ‘as a global conflict waged by the 
United States as the leading imperial power against social revolution’ (Saull 2011: 1127).  This 
global understanding makes clear the Eurocentrism of the concept of the ‘second Cold War’ as, 
even excluding early intervention against the Bolsheviks, the Cold War continued throughout 
through ‘successive waves of revolutionary struggle that originated at the micro-level within 
particular societal contexts and spread across the world unevenly—in Cuba in the early 1930s 
and then the mid-1950s, China in the early 1920s through to the late 1940s, Vietnam in the 
1930s and then from the mid-1940s up to the 1970s, Egypt in the early 1950s through to the 
1970s’ (ibid: 1137)107.  The war was only ever really cold in Europe. 
 
Thirdly it is this understanding of the Cold War that allows the shift to being ‘pro-security’ 
within a peace research merging into a broadened security studies.  Tarak Barkawi picks up the 
                                                             
107 Though the European experience of US imperialism, in the US dismantling of European empires post 
World War II is reflected in this Europeanist division within the West.  
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politics of the shift from war and peace to security –arguing for a critical war studies – noting 
that the ‘discourse of national security […] transforms the relationship of force and politics into 
one of protection from threat, proliferating means to security in the relative absence of debate 
over ultimate ends or purposes, and security studies […] participates in this process’ (Barkawi 
2012: 3).  
 
As a whole ‘[t]hese [security] discourses came to revolve around the notion of defence from 
aggression, articulated initially with the identity politics of the Cold War, even as Western 
power was used ‘offensively’, to forge a world order conducive to Western interests. Force 
was regularly used to see off alternatives to this order, principally in the Third World, but was 
referred to in languages of police actions and assisting allies (Barkawi 2012: 3).   We can see 
exactly this happening in Barry Buzan’s  assessment published in 1989 (written pre- the fall of 
the Berlin Wall) where a more robust Western Europe self-defence would free up US resources 
for ‘use elsewhere’ producing ‘a much more comfortable division of labour in relation to the 
overall security of the West’ (Buzan 1989: 42).  
A Western Social Science – Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe 
The contemporary European IR field is structured by these two legacies, of US hegemony and 
the expression of divergent Western European interest within the Western Alliance in 
European peace research.  As argued above, the broader Western field is now increasingly a bi-
polar Western field.  Examination of the development of the field in European IR’s  
‘barbaricum’, the area ‘simultaneously lying inside and outside IR ‘civilisation’’108, of Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) IR brings out these elements of the legacies and Western bi-
polarity, as well as the field’s ongoing political role. 
The post-Cold War creation of disciplinary IR was an integral aspect of the creation of Western 
academic fields to replace a previously Marxist-Leninist academy.  This work was 
simultaneously presented in terms of the universal validity of these disciplines, and in their 
role in underpinning societal reshaping along Western liberal capitalist lines.  As captured in 
                                                             
108 ‘Barbaricum is Jozef Bátora and Nik Hynek’s characterisation of Slovakian IR, here expanded to the 
region, which gives a less passive understanding than ‘periphery’ or ‘semi-periphery’.  As they note of 
the regional institutional layer upon which I focus:  ‘The majority of Slovak IR institutions and staff have 
been members of the Central and Eastern European International Studies Association (CEEISA) and the 
indirect influence of the most influential regional site — the Central European University (CEU) is 
beyond any doubt’ (Bátora and Hynek 2009: 188). 
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the overarching ‘End of History’ thesis the two are seen as internally related – Western liberal 
capitalism being the end of the line in human development, and thus universally valid.  
In its broad structure then, the IR transplanted was that of the Cold War ‘Anglo-American 
discipline’ with syllabi recognisable to those trained in IR in the West, in line with the 
continuing second order US hegemony of the discipline in its foundational structuring and 
delimiting, and disciplinary self- reflection and self-perpetuation (Moody 2010; Hagmann and 
Biersteker 2012; van der Pijl 2014).  
The political element of this transfer of Western disciplines is brought out by George Soros’ 
role here.  Interwoven with his role in supporting civil society organisations and think tanks in 
the region, George Soros was central to this establishment of IR, alongside economics, political 
science, public policy and associated disciplines in the region.109  The centrepiece is his Central 
European University which is intimately bound up with his broader Open Society political 
philanthropy in the region– an instance of ‘philanthropic management of the social sciences’ in 
the interests of ‘reforming the world’ and institutionalizing his vision of a world safe for 
continued capitalist exploitation (Guilhot 2007; cf. Stone 2010).   
The CEU is very much a centrepiece, serving as a unifying and professionalising hub for more 
widespread activities supporting the establishment of Western social science in virtually every 
CEE and FSU state – a ‘cutting edge’ in Soros terms for establishing Western academic 
disciplines in CEE.110  Overall Soros was an ’extraordinarily important and influential catalyst to 
the development of political science in the region’ without whom, and the  ‘hundreds of 
millions of dollars spent in this effort over twenty years’ truly heterodox thought could have 
taken hold as these disciplines ‘would have spun out into their own widely distant orbits, or 
                                                             
109
 I do not cover his role in the Westernisation of the natural sciences across the region and Russia.  
Nonetheless, he was similarly able to leverage his funding, most notably though far from exclusively 
through his International Science Foundation (ISF), into wholesale academic restructuring in this area 
too, with more direct benefits to Western capital and the US military in the exploitation of former 
Eastern bloc natural scientific resources (Leiter 1996; Levitin 1995; Markusova et al. 1999).  Again there 
are antecedents in the role of the US in the Cold War restructuring of Western European natural 
sciences  (Krige 2006). 
110 It is worth noting here also the important role played by the conservative US Pew Foundation in 
supporting the International Affairs Network (IAN) which sought to create a network of institutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe with a focus on the study of International Relations (IR).  This was the 
antecedent organisation to the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA) 
mentioned in n.108. 
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conceivably even imploded, becoming black holes in a galaxy of separately burning stars’ 
(Eisfeld and Pal 2010a).  
The need for such an imposition of Western social science if the region was to be reshaped 
successfully along capitalist lines is acknowledged by those participating in it, and reflected 
upon by those engaged in the disciplines in the region themselves.  Diane Stone, whose work 
on think tanks and her embeddedness in Soros’ network we saw earlier, founded the Masters 
level course in Public Policy (MPP) at the Central European University.  Reflecting upon this 
activity she notes that by its very existence as a field of study its political implications are made 
evident. Its embeddedness within a Lockean cultural context reflected linguistically with 
‘public policy’ often ‘translated directly as ‘politics’ or given the meaning ‘training to do 
politicking’’ in the local languages, further noting that ‘public policy degree programs 
inherently diffuse values and practices through their design and content’ (Stone 2007: 547).   
This role complements the broader Western (she cites institutions such as  the Open Society 
Network, the European Commission, World Bank and UNDP) ‘mission to replace the Marxist 
economic paradigm and the way economics had been  taught under the communist regime 
with a new one of modern, Western economics’ (ibid: 545). Initially 'little credence was given 
to the socio-political aspects of transition and market reform', an oversight that programs such 
as the MPP have been designed to rectify (ibid; cf. Soros 2011a; Eisfeld and Pal 2010b). 
This ties George Soros work, and the Open Society Foundations, into the longer Cold War 
strategies and networks ensuring a capitalist friendly Western Europe, through the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom and its affiliates, and programmes of cross-cultural exchange across the 
Iron Curtain seeking to work ‘against Communism, to cultivate intellectuals who later came to 
prominence after the fall of the Berlin Wall’ (Guilhot 2006: 380; van der Pijl 2014: 214-215). 
Indeed the Fondation pour une Entraide Intellectuelle Européenne (Foundation for European 
Intellectual Solidarity, FEIE) the central conduit for such Cold War exchanges in 1990 ‘literally 
merged into Soros’ network of foundations as its last director, Annette Laborey, went to head 
the Paris office of the Open Society Institute’ (Guilhot 2006: 456).  In the post-Cold War world, 
whilst ‘some [of these] programmes eventually disappeared, their protagonists did not, and 
many went on to reformulate goals, to create new institutions, and to occupy new positions in 
the reshaping of ‘civil society’ in Europe’, a process in which Soros has remained central 
(Guilhot 2006: 380). 
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This brings out both the European and the cohesive Western elements to the development of 
this transposition of IR – Soros’ concept of the Open Society is modelled at least as much on 
European as US societal models, and against the free- market fundamentalism of the US that 
he sees endangering liberal capitalism.  Indeed his philanthropy overall reflects a specifically 
European political habitus (cf. Guilhot 2007), and this is embedded in the university’s mission 
statement: ‘CEU is based on the premise that human fallibility can be counterbalanced by the 
critical discussion of ideas and that this critical spirit can be sustained best in societies where 
citizens have the freedom to scrutinize competing theories and openly evaluate and change 
government policies’. Thus we see a shift through its ongoing development of the CEU moving 
from a centre of technical training for ‘democratising’ and privatising elites in the region, to 
embodying a more sophisticated locus of societal authority through development to a ‘real’ 
university, a ‘Cosmopolitan University in the Social Sciences’ (ibid). 
Applying this more nuanced role for the social sciences and breaking down Western hegemony 
in the discipline beyond the simple continuation of US hegemony as I have done allows a richer 
and more revealing picture in syllabus analysis also, whilst not contradicting either the politics 
of its establishment or the ongoing significance of the ‘American Social Science’ given in the 
existing accounts referenced above.  To do so, and reflect the ongoing development of the 
discipline in the region, I contrast two earlier studies of the CEU’s Masters level IR theory 
syllabus with an analysis of the 2012-2013 iteration.111 
The earlier analyses are that of Thomas Biersteker and Jonas Hagmann covering the academic 
year 2007-2008, and  my own covering the academic year 2009-2010 (Hagmann and Biersteker 
2012; Moody 2010).  The latter is from a study focusing on the ‘Dissemination of Anglo-
American Approaches to IR in Central and Eastern Europe’, the former covers ‘23 American 
and European International Relations graduate programs’ (including, and reflecting the US 
bias, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, see n.112 below)  to give a survey 
‘[b]eyond the published discipline’.  
Table 5.1 contains the results of these analyses. As is clear the coding is not directly 
comparable, but with a common focus on the proportion of US scholars allocated as core 
                                                             
111 Reflections in the editorials of the Journal of International Relations and Development (JIRD), the 
journal of the Central and East European International Studies Association, at times of transfer to a new 
editorial team give a good overall snapshot: a picture of an increasingly self-confident IR community  
(Guzzini, Šabič, and Jackson 2008; Bátora et al. 2012).  See also the JIRD special issue on IR in the region 
(JIRD, 12:2, 20009).   
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readings can, alongside my current analysis, give a snapshot of change.  In both my studies the 
method of geographical coding of scholars is compatible with that of Biersteker and Hagmann, 
focusing on where the scholar spent the ‘bulk of their professional career’ rather than country 
of birth. The paradigmatic distribution I come to momentarily 
I include a cumulative percentage column, and order the geographical blocks as given to allow 
comparison also of the US-UK ‘condominium’, and the ‘Anglosphere’, though my argument 
above suggests their decreasing utility post-Cold War especially in light of the undiminished 
and almost total parochialism of the US discipline (this last reflected also in Biersteker and 
Hagmann 2012).  This, alongside my earlier coding and Biersteker and Hagmann’s distinctions 
in their text (not coding) between ‘European’ and ‘British’ work has also necessitated 
separating out UK and continental European work.   
Table 5.1 – Geographical distribution of authors in CEU IR Theory course core readings (% 
)[cumulative %] 
 
 2007-2008112 2009-2010113 2012-2013114 
US 68 [68] 50 [50] 30 [30] 
UK  
32 {0} [100] 
27 [77] 21 [51] 
Other ‘Anglosphere’115 8 [85] 16 [67] 
Europe {CEE} 15 {5116} [100] 34 {0} [101] 
Other 0 [100] 0 [100] 0 [101] 
 
Western hegemony is clear – there are no readings assigned from outside the West, a finding 
replicated across all of the 23 programmes Biersteker and Hagmann analysed (Hagmann and 
Biersteker 2012: 13).  Work from CEE has also yet to make it consistently into the core 
readings.  In 2009-2010 all of the CEE readings were authored by the course convener, Michael 
Merlingen.  Merlingen undertook his postgraduate education in the US and Canada (Bowling 
Green State University, USA and University of British Columbia, Canada) but has been at CEU 
since 1998.  The current convener Xymena Kurowska was trained at  European University 
                                                             
112 Adapted from Hagmann and Biersteker 2012. Their geographic coding reduces the utility of the 
survey.  It consists of ‘US’, ‘national’ (of respective institution, here Hungary), and ‘other’, though the 
commentary reveals this last category to always consist of Western work, and in the case of CEU ‘draws 
strongly on European scholarship’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 13).  
113 Adapted from Moody 2010 
114 IR theory syllabus http://ires.ceu.hu/courses/20122013/international-relations-theory.  
115 Being Canada and Australia (all Canadian work surveyed published in English).  2009-10 all of this 
work was Canadian, for 2013-14 it was 50/50, each contributing 8% of works cited. 
116 Attributable to course convener setting his own work as core texts in this year. In 2013-14 course 
convener’s work was all in the additional readings. 
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Institute, Florence, but cites other authors from her own edited volume in the core readings, 
not her own chapters (Kurowska and Breuer 2012). 
Within this however there is a clear decline in the weight of US readings assigned, and from 
2009-10 to 2012-13 an increase in European work cited – Biersteker and Hagmann’s US focus 
leaves them  noting only that the 2007-8 CEU syllabus (alongside those of EUI Florence and 
Bologna) ‘draws strongly on European scholarship’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 13).   The 
course now is true to its self-description in its treatment of international relations theory,  
covering the ‘strong tradition of international relations scholarship in North America, the UK, 
and Western Europe’ (http://ires.ceu.hu/).  
 
There is also another temporal layer to this, relating to the publication dates of the works 
assigned.   In 2007-8 the average date of publication of the works assigned was 1988, with only 
42% of the work published post-Cold War (they code post-1990) (Hagmann and Biersteker 
2012: 14).  CEU was teaching the Cold War discipline of IR at that time. For the 2012-13 
syllabus 96% of the works assigned were published after 1990, 73% in or after 2000, and a full 
25% were published in or after 2010.   The syllabus now more closely reflects the current 
discipline.  
 
This suggests a further revealing way to look at the syllabus in relation to the distinction 
between first and second order hegemony. The most recent syllabus is explicitly split into 
three consecutive sections, starting with a mapping of the theoretical field of IR, before 
progressing to ‘concepts’ in IR (anarchy, sovereignty, norms, etc.), and finally ‘logics of action’ 
in IR.  The geographical base of scholars assigned across these three sections is given below in 
table 5.2.   
 
Table 5.2: Geographical distribution of authors in CEU IR Theory course sections 2012-13 (%) 
 Theories Concepts Logics 
US 31 [31] 46 [46] 8 [8] 
UK 35 [66] 13 [59] 0 [8] 
Other ‘Anglosphere’ 19 [85] 0 [59] 25 [33] 
Europe 15 [100] 41 [100] 67 [100] 
 
The three sections are not of equal size, ‘Theories’ comprising 49% of total readings, 
‘Concepts’ 28% and ‘Logics of Action’ 23%.  The first section gives the images, or ‘frameworks’ 
of the discipline, and here the Cold War US-UK condominium appears significant, though the 
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work is of recent vintage, whilst non-UK European work is weakest. Paradigmatically this 
remains, as is true for the preceding two earlier analyses also117, a standard mainstream 
mapping of the field passing through realism (classical, neo), liberalism (classical, neo), 
Marxism and critical theory, constructivism, the English School, post-structuralism and feminist 
theory.    The latter two categories, ‘Concepts’ and ‘Logics’, especially ‘Logics’ which is focused 
on the ‘newest discussions’, reflect more the contemporary debates within the discipline, and 
here the average across the two is for just over half the work to be authored by European 
based scholars (52%).  
 
The other compulsory course for ‘IR track’ students is International Security Studies.  Lacking 
historical comparators I have not analysed this curricula in the same way but note it has a 
focus on ‘in particular the contributions of what has been labelled as the Welsh, Copenhagen, 
and Paris schools of security studies’.  Accordingly a third of the course covers strategic studies 
(and peace research), with the remaining two thirds covering ‘c(C)ritical approaches’, with the 
Copenhagen School taking up twice as much time within the course as any other ‘critical’ 
approach.118  
 
Without wishing to overstretch such an illustrative overview, this indicates that the findings of 
‘Europeanization’, that is a Western European and US combined hegemony, of citations within 
the discipline may well be starting to be reflected in a shift in the second-order hegemony of 
teaching the accepted parameters and content of the discipline too. This suggests at the least 
that future curricula analyses should code for these considerations of Western bi-polarity and 
levels of hegemony in line with the indicative support this analysis gives to their existence.   
What these consideration together – of change in the IR discipline in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and of the political founding and continued support for IR there - bring out is that 
when those in such a periphery talk of ‘Western IR’ it is increasingly of a truly Western, not just 
US, hegemony whereof they speak. 
                                                             
117 Hagmann and Biersteker code with subdivisions of rationalist and reflectivist approaches following 
Ole Wæver’s mapping of the field (in Wæver 1998).  CEU however does not stand out from the broader 
European-US divide in which ‘European schools tend to complement rational choice perspectives with 
reflexive and historical works, as opposed to the US schools, which complement those with formal 
theory and quantitative works’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 12), beyond a greater than usual 
assignment of ‘non-postmodern constructivism’ (ibid: 11). 
118 Syllabus: http://ires.ceu.hu/courses/20122013/international-security 
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Conclusion 
The first half of this chapter interrogated the conception of cosmopolitan Europe underlying 
much of the policy debate that was covered in the part one of the thesis, tracing the rise of a 
recent Arendtian turn in this discourse.  The crux of the change was found to lie in the 
conception of the role of force in the establishment of cosmopolitan political orders. Through 
this is then revealed the homology to the normative power – global power debate seen in 
chapter three.  Thus far this remains at a high level of abstraction; the next chapter again 
shows the critical issue to be the founding of political orders – the kind of power to use in 
creating a cosmopolitan global order – in the application of this cosmopolitanism.  It also 
shows the subterranean existence of this cosmopolitan Europe conception within non-
explicitly cosmopolitan theory, supporting the idea of this as a core element of a European IR. 
I then gave an account of the European context for the development of this cosmopolitan 
discourse via a conceptualisation of the IR discipline as (still residually) structured by preceding 
first and second order hegemonies of US IR.  This gave an image of a Cold War field of IR 
proper in Europe as both a first and second order US hegemony, whilst European peace 
research contained first order (Western) European theoretical production in reaction to this 
hegemony, with the understanding of realism as constituting this hegemony having significant 
political consequences. That is, the self-understanding of their work was against the Cold War 
global order, but understood principally as refracted through realist IR, seen in its theoretical 
image, not as an ideological tool.  Post-Cold War Western IR is moving to a bi-polar US-
Western European hegemony, and some of the implications of this were explored through an 
illustrative longitudinal comparison of graduate IR course syllabi at the Central European 
University.  Again this remains relatively abstract;  as the methodology outlined earlier 
indicates it is the negotiation of this terrain in the two examples of applied cosmopolitanism 
given in the next chapter – that is how the field is significant through these actors strategic 
navigating of it – that ultimately gives political significance to both of these constructions of a 
European IR. 
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6. Applied Cosmopolitanism: Two Trajectories 
Introduction 
As the earlier methodological section argued, a good way of understanding the relative 
autonomy of the academic field, of offering a dual reading, is through the trajectories of 
individual scholars.  Here I offer two trajectories in support of the argument: one ‘easy’ case of 
explicit cosmopolitanism; one harder case of theory not usually thought of in such terms, 
certainly not self-defined as such, but that nonetheless operates within the same conception 
of politics and thereby relation to cosmopolitan Europe. The two trajectories are those of Mary 
Kaldor and of the Copenhagen School, focusing primarily on its founding partnership of Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver.  The selection criteria develop from my argument so far.  Both, in their 
prominence  and distinctiveness of their theorising, are seen as emblematic of the success of 
European IR by other scholars engaged in surveys of the IR discipline in Europe: Mary Kaldor 
the primary ‘exemplar’ of European thought as contained in ‘new wars’, self- consciously set 
against US ‘old wars’ thinking (Sylvester 2012: 485-6); the Copenhagen School seen as the 
‘flagship of Scandinavian IR on the continent’, within an assessment that sees Scandinavian IR 
as containing the desirable strategy for developing further the ‘embryonic ‘Euro-discipline’’ of 
IR (Friedrichs 2004: 74-5).  As prominent figures in critical security studies, this reflects that 
such ‘critical security studies’ itself is seen, through being ‘surprisingly productive’ and 
generating ‘theory of broader relevance and inspiration to the field of IR in general’, as forming 
a central plank of European contributions to the discipline as a whole (Buzan and Wæver 2013: 
405).  
More though, both represent ‘applied cosmopolitanism’, containing a deliberate relation to 
the policy world and not simply being what Chris Brown saw as ‘pointless abstract theorising’ 
(Brown 2012: 115; cf. Kurki 2011). Whilst they also contain and derive from a ‘notion of 
practical solidarity’ it is a cosmopolitan solidarity.  They are therefore good candidates to 
represent the most politically significant and strongest examples of European progressive 
difference contributing to the renovation of Western hegemony.  Mary Kaldor has the most 
direct relation to the policy world as I will outline below, but also as we saw is a founding 
member of the ECFR with a strong relationship with George Soros. The Copenhagen School, 
incubated in the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) has the characteristic peace 
research tradition relationship of critically engaging with whilst not necessarily being part of 
policy debate.  As we will see Ole Wæver also takes part in more direct on the ground 
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facilitation work, aimed at desecuritising issues with various stakeholders through his Centre 
for Advanced Security Theory (CAST) at the University of Copenhagen. 
As I have argued, whilst a field may contain and generate a great diversity of thought, that 
which is politically significant is organically related to the social conditions in which it is 
produced and this thought should therefore form the focus of a political assessment of the 
field.  Divining which these ‘organic’ approaches are is more difficult, but I have argued for 
European cosmopolitanism to be understood as such.  Thus whilst far from capturing the full 
diversity of IR in Europe, a focus on applied cosmopolitanism is a productive focus for 
understanding a specifically European IR, as it relates and is defined by this relation to its 
conditions of production. One immediate and beneficial effect of such an ‘applied 
cosmopolitanism’ focus is that it also cuts through the frequent differentiation between 
‘critical security studies’ proper, and human security as a critical approach to security, with the 
former often characterising the latter as ‘problem-solving’ theory or a ‘hegemonic discourse 
co-opted by the state’ (Newman 2010: 77). As we will see Wæver suggests, and as I argue 
above, it is better to proceed without such a priori signposting of just what is ‘critical’. 
As we saw, during the Cold War peace research gave an outlet for Western European concerns 
outside of the stranglehold of US hegemony in IR, and here ‘critical approaches to security in 
Europe’ provide the same opening, lying ‘at the centre of specifically European theorising’ with 
‘distinctive European research agenda(s) in the traditionally US-dominated field of ‘security 
studies’, whether these be of the ‘Aberystwyth’ ’Copenhagen’ or ‘Paris’ schools’ (C.A.S.E. 2006: 
444).  The form of such theorising is clearly integrated with and developed from continuing 
engagement and conversation with ‘dissident’ IR in North America (C.A.S.E. 2006: 447). In 
content though, in continuation of the argument of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver that European 
security ‘schools’ developed from a particular European ‘security scene’ and innovations 
therein and that their constructivism is therefore of a different nature to mainstream IR 
constructivism and not derived from US IR theory, they contain an organic expression of 
European cosmopolitanism derived from European experiences. 
Both Kaldor and the Copenhagen School bring these organic academic contexts together with 
their academic work bridging the end of the Cold War, covering the shift from peace research 
to security studies, and remaining highly productive throughout.  Seeing European security 
studies in this way, as the continuation of a fruitful site for negotiating a relationship with 
second order US hegemony in IR, rather than as merely a sub-discipline, also makes sense of 
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the breaking down of the supposed sub-disciplinary academic structure (of a core of IR theory 
and sub-disciplines of ISS and IPE) found in contemporary security studies.   Such security 
studies contains the ‘post-Cold War security–development nexus’, with far broader than 
merely security concerns as ‘[t]he merging of development and security has given global liberal 
governance an expansive and inclusive political logic’ (Duffield 2001: 259).  This makes 
comprehensible why it has been debate within this European subfield that has contained many 
of the most dynamic and fruitful discussions in contemporary IR.  Whilst interesting 
disciplinarily the primary political significance here is not necessarily this nexus itself – peace 
research as we saw already integrating the issues of security and development - but the 
cosmopolitanism within it; that is the organic European contribution to it. 
They also fulfil three of the main selection criteria used by Ole Wæver and Ivor Neumann in 
selecting scholars to cover in Masters in the Making - those of ‘noise’,  of presenting a ‘puzzle’ 
of some kind, and that study of them would tell us something worthwhile about the discipline 
of IR more generally119.  ‘Noise’ is a measure of importance in the discipline measured simply 
by ‘being talked about’ and there is no doubt that both Mary Kaldor in both her new wars and 
human security works, and the Copenhagen School, especially with securitisation theory, have 
provoked widespread ongoing debate and secondary literatures.   
The ‘puzzle’ with Mary Kaldor is the divergence between her own and others views of her work. 
She is often seen as having ‘shifted’ from a ‘quasi-Marxist’ to a global civil society/ 
cosmopolitan framework, whereas she sees her position as evolutionary and coherent. This 
relates also to her now being characterised in more radical quarters as one of those providing 
the ‘normative sources of the new world order’, yet her own view remains of herself as a 
critical scholar (Douzinas 2007: 162). 
For the Copenhagen school there are similarly two related ‘puzzles’. The first is the theoretical 
coherence of the School, most emblematically in its ‘post-structuralist realism’. The second is 
the inability somehow of critics to get a firm grasp on the politics of the school and Ole 
                                                             
119 For discussion of the value of this volume for my method see the discussion in chapter 4. ‘Masters’ 
are defined as those whose work is still in print decades after their death, so a primary criteria for 
Wæver and Neumann was being a strong contender for this.  Whilst the long-term endurance of works 
is not of such significance to me here, I suspect given the seminal works produced by Mary Kaldor and 
within the Copenhagen School they have a strong case here too (New Wars third edition was published 
in 2013, and People States and Fear’s second edition was reprinted in 2007 for example).   
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Waver’s insistence that the politics of his work has been consistently misunderstood – most 
commonly in accusations of ‘Eurocentrism’.  Thus we see the Copenhagen School 
simultaneously decried for eschewing emancipation yet also the dominant approach within 
critical approaches to security.   
The ‘solution’ here to both is tied up in the nature of European cosmopolitanism, the basis for 
its presentation as critical, progressive and emancipatory, and the distinction between ‘critical’ 
work and that built on class analysis.  I am not though simply arguing such theoretical work can 
be exploited by hegemonic interests, or expounding on the ‘enduring problem of idealism’, this 
having been well covered before.  Reflecting on such existing radical critiques Tara McCormack 
notes that they ‘do not develop an argument about why critical and emancipatory approaches 
are doomed to appear as little more than the theoretical wing of contemporary liberal 
interventionism’ (McCormack 2009: 18). Her own explanation ‘why’ focuses on internal 
theoretical critique and analysis of the continuities between the discourses of state and 
international organisations and those of critical theorists – focusing on their common attempt 
to ‘transcend’ realism/sovereignty/state-centrism.  This, and the argument that this is an 
idealism in which the ‘critique of critical theorists is little more than a statement of their own 
moral values’ I have already covered, with the addition of the relation of class and scholastic 
occupation to such moral values (ibid: 137). So what I aim to do through approaching the field 
through these trajectories is to move beyond such a critique, valuable as it is, to uncover the 
relation of European cosmopolitanism to the conditions of its production. 
The ‘puzzles’ shape the differing structures of the two trajectories, but ultimately my defence 
of this selection, and of this approach itself, rests  on the last of Wæver and Neumann’s criteria 
– that the two trajectories tell us something worthwhile not just about the discipline of IR, but 
about European IR and its relation to the renovation of Western hegemony.   
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Trajectory 1: Mary Kaldor and the Field of Power120 
 
So in the end the most important ingredients for the dish that I became 
would have been family experience; some very important people such as 
Edward Thomson; and the experience of being a peace and human rights 
activist. 
(Kaldor 2009) 
 
At first blush it may seem a long way to go from being a radical peace activist, founding 
European Nuclear Disarmament (END) with E.P Thompson (1982) and publishing in Marxism 
Today (Kaldor and Holden 1986; Kaldor 1990b; Kaldor 1991a), to accepting the (delightfully 
oxymoronic) rank of Commander of the British Empire for services to democracy and global 
governance (in 2003) and sitting on one of the World Economic Forum’s policy panels (on 
Energy Security, WEF 2009). This movement seems to embody a similar theoretical shift ‘from 
a quasi-Marxian analysis of militarism and ‘modes of warfare’ , in her work in the 1980s, to 
becoming one  of the most prominent scholars of ‘new wars’ and ‘global civil society’’ 
(Stavrianakis and Selby 2012: 11), these latter areas ones that more radical scholars see as 
constituting the theoretical wing of liberal interventionism (Douzinas 2007). 
 
Mary Kaldor however sees a clear continuity and development in her work from the 1980s to 
today (Kaldor 2013b).  I argue here that she is right to do so, and that both the continuities, 
and shifts others identify in her work demonstrate clearly the main contours of my argument 
in this chapter – firstly identifying her cosmopolitanism as having antecedents in the form of 
the peace movement leftism she espoused in the 1980s, and secondly the validity of the move 
beyond internal critique of theory to the central role of habitus and the field in shaping the 
form of emancipatory expressive drives.  In doing so it sharpens the argument made so far by 
showing Kaldor’s thought as politically significant in its organic relation to the shifts underlying 
the conditions of its production.  More than this, her development of human security as part of 
corporate social responsibility for BP and as a security doctrine for the EU for Javier Solana 
                                                             
120 I feel I should note here that graduating from Martin Shaw’s excellent MA course in Contemporary 
War and Peace Studies has provided an invaluable background for my understanding within this section, 
especially relating to Clausewitz and Mary Kaldor.   Shaw’s own trajectory from socialist Labourism 
(including standing as a Labour candidate in 1987) and revolutionary socialism and back, via END, to a 
global society position not antithetical to Kaldor’s own is fascinating in itself, and also in placing Kaldor 
as representative of strategic action in a changing field, rather than intellectual maverick.  
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demonstrates the intersections of such work with the field of power.  In both cases reports for 
sponsoring bodies accompanied further abstraction into academic work – for the former the 
‘Bellagio’ report to oil executives (2007: x) for the latter the Barcelona and Madrid Reports to 
Javier Solana (2004, 2007). 
I trace her trajectory through three periods: her Cold War ‘quasi-Marxist’ period working in a 
‘leftist’ peace research activist-research nexus, through to the explicit abandonment of 
socialism (1990); the post-Cold War development of the new wars thesis as a new model for 
legitimating cosmopolitan intervention; and her development of this theory in a human 
security direction in the interests of the oil industry and then the EU. The Cold War period 
establishes the political parameters of her thought from which the later work develops so will 
be given more treatment here than the latter two. Throughout there are two dominant 
threads of an autonomous military logic, separable form the socio-political, as the central 
problem, and of a developing idealist cosmopolitan politics, alongside a consistent vision of 
Europe as offering an ‘alternative politics’ to the prevailing militarised milieu. It is this which 
makes sense particularly of the self-understood progressive nature of her later work with the 
military, for example sitting on the UK governments Defence Advisory Forum (2009-2010), as 
through it she is struggling to shift the internal logic she sees within the military establishment 
(cf. Beebe 2012). 
What her trajectory overall demonstrates then is how academic production ‘may serve 
politico-normative agendas independent of [the scholar’s] personal value commitments’ 
(Neufeld 2001: 133), and thus despite being driven by a clear emancipatory drive,121  the 
interaction of habitus and the field means one can still act as an organic intellectual for capital. 
After all, what more perfect image can there be of the academic as ‘‘dominated dominator’ - 
structurally subordinate but with the symbolic power to legitimate or discredit the dominant 
group’ (Speller 2011: 47) - than Kaldor lending her academic weight to the pseudo-
intellectualising of academic-manqué George Soros by chairing Q&A sessions with him?122 
                                                             
121 For all its expression in bourgeois adventurism, it is hard to doubt the sincerity driving Kaldor’s 
activism and academic work.   
122 Soros is a major donor to the Global Governance Centre at LSE of which Kaldor is co-director with 
David Held. Examples of lending this academic credibility, both individually and through the LSE more 
generally include approving citations of Soros’ books (see esp. Kaldor 2003), as well as chairing and 
moderating talks and seminars he gives both at LSE and through his Open Society Foundations (most 
recently (see LSE Events 2014). 
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Cold War development 
Mary Kaldor’s early career and her intellectual origins lie in the late-Cold War peace activism-
research complex, with her work an academic expression of this activism – in turn derived 
from a personal familial background combining peace activism and Eastern European political 
dissidence (she notes her mother and uncle in this context respectively). Her concern from this 
combination being that peace activists ‘weren’t really concerned about issues like human 
rights and the problem of communism in Eastern Europe. So somehow I wanted to bring those 
two things together’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.). 
Her first job, from 1967 – 1969, was at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
where she compiled the first statistics on the arms trade. From there she went to the 
University of Sussex until 1999, working within the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), the 
Sussex European Institute (SEI) and most significantly at the Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU), where her work focused on the political economy of arms and the arms race. 
Her most significant activism during this period was as a founding member of European 
Nuclear Disarmament (END), also editing its European Nuclear Disarmament Journal (1983–88). 
END issued its founding statement in April 1980 in response to NATO’s decision in December 
1979 to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles across Western Europe.  Notable from this 
founding statement is the equivalence drawn between the US and USSR, refusing to ‘apportion 
guilt between the military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties’ (END 
1980).  Though focused on nuclear disarmament, more significant – particularly given many of 
its members later transition to the Helsinki Citizens Assembly – was its work with dissidents in 
Central and Eastern Europe, attempting ‘détente from below’. 
Her scholarly work was an academic expression of this activism.  The field at the time was, if 
one identified as being of the ‘left’ – even socialist as Kaldor did123 - quasi-Marxist, and she was 
also deeply influenced by her interactions with E.P. Thompson.  Her Cold War work, whilst 
avowedly not Marxist, is therefore replete with Marxist terminology, especially in Warfare and 
Capitalism (Kaldor 1982a), and The Baroque Arsenal (Kaldor 1982b).  Regardless of the 
accuracy of these works, there are two central threads to her work at the time: the separating 
                                                             
123 For the nature of this essentially Labourist socialism see for an early example ‘Democratic Socialism 
and the Cost of Defence: The Report and Papers of the Labour Party Defence Study Group’, which she 
edited alongside, Dan Smith, and Steve Vines (Kaldor, Smith, and Vines 1979). 
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out of a military logic from political logic (cf. Kaldor 1986); and the identification of peace as 
anti-ideology (Kaldor 1983; Kaldor 1985; Kaldor and Holden 1986).   
‘Warfare and Capitalism’, in E.P. Thompson’s Exterminism and Cold War, introduced the 
concept of the ‘mode of warfare’, developed through analogy with the mode of production.  
This was not a Marxist project relating these modes internally; in fact Kaldor was seeking to 
break conceptual links between warfare and capitalism and develop the ‘mode of warfare’ as 
possessing an autonomous logic. It was this that was developed within The Baroque Arsenal 
(1982b).  The ‘mode of warfare’, having fed off the ‘mode of production’, came in turn to 
dominate and shape it, in military industrial complexes understood as creating statist war 
economies in both East and West.124    We can see in this the influence of E.P. Thompson’s 
argument in the same volume that industrial societies, East and West, are best understood 
through their containing a thoroughgoing gearing towards the logic of mass extermination.  
Whilst not the empirical focus of such works, set against these is an idealised civil society, 
understood as outside of the state.  
The first strand then constructs the Cold War in the Eurocentric manner seen in the previous 
chapter's consideration of European peace research, and also brings out the overdetermining 
role of a separable military logic in such conceptions.125  From this the difference for Kaldor 
between East and West is that whilst the West contains a MIC, the East is a MIC.  The West is 
therefore preferable as this autonomous military armaments logic can be overcome, through 
civil society in alliance with ‘progressive capitalists’.   The second strand that I come to now is 
dependent on this first move, and the outcome of both an idealist politics and conception of 
Europe as essentially passive in the Cold War: ‘the people of Europe do not want to be drawn 
into a war between the superpowers for which they have no reason and over which they have 
no control’, which is true ‘from Poland to Portugal’ (Kaldor 1981: 45). 
                                                             
124 The ‘baroque’ element derives from the idea that the interaction between conservative military 
establishments and a dynamic arms industry leads to the development not of new approaches to 
defence but of ever more sophisticated versions of the same Fordist weaponry of the Second World 
War. 
125 In more recent work Kaldor notes the shift in the composition of her assumed military-industrial-
complex, from arms manufacturers supposedly ‘interested in producing useless weapons systems but 
not in war’ to ‘the newly emerging network that also consists of private security service providers, who 
benefit from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.), without reflecting on the implications 
of acknowledging this transition for the significance she gives to their asserted motives. Such a shift and 
change in composition of membership cannot be adequately conceptualised within a theory that sees a 
‘military-industrial-complex’ as overdetermining to class strategy, rather than subordinate to it. 
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As we saw this fits the general milieu of contemporaneous European peace research, a focus 
on war and nuclear weapons as the problem, generating a nominal equivalence between elites 
in the East and West.  This then opens the space for an equivalence or commonality between 
the ‘politics from below’ on both sides – E.P. Thompson’s great influence here, as he ‘taught 
[her] that we were against the cold war, not just nuclear weapons’ (Kaldor 2007d: 15) - 
between the new peace  movements opposing nuclear weapons in the West and dissidents 
seeking to create ‘civil society’ in the East in the name of human rights, which were already 
secure in the West; though for Kaldor ‘[a]s a reasonably paid intellectual […] I personally prefer 
the Western Alliance’ (Kaldor 1981: 45). 
 
Indeed contact with these social movements in Central Europe was profoundly formative 
as ’they were articulating ideas that expressed what we were trying to do in the peace 
movement but which we hadn’t got the language for – they gave us ‘anti-politics’,126 ‘civil 
society’, and even ‘globalisation’ […] It was a terrific education for me’ (Kaldor 2007d: 15). 
 
The influence of the political theory of the Central and Eastern European dissidents on political 
theory in Europe as a whole is under-recognised, submerged under both the political actions of 
many of the dissidents once in power and the flattening effect of the ‘end of history’ argument 
- their thought often conceived of as merely derivation from and application of Western 
liberalism (Isaac 1995; Falk 2003: 313-354; Kaldor 1990b; Barnett et al. 1991).  Nonetheless, as 
Kaldor indicates, this is a significant root of the global civil society literature, with the 1980s 
‘cult of civil society’ work of theorists such as John Keane, Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, as 
well as Kaldor, forming its conceptual base (Wood 1990, cf. Buttigieg 2005 and discussion in 
preceding chapter).  In the 1980s in particular the attempt for many on the left investigating 
these ideas as articulated in central Europe was to overcome the problems they saw in 
socialism in Western Europe, ‘re-democratising’ socialism and escaping (the) Marx (of their 
tendentious readings) – though this reconstruction of an essentially liberal conception of civil 
society was called out even then, as was the effect of obscuring of exploitation.  Ellen Meiksins 
Wood‘s characterisation of them as ‘an army of 'post-Marxists' one of whose principal 
                                                             
126 Kaldor notes, ‘anti-politics’ was not against politics but about ‘doing politics differently’, and folded 
thereby into the conception of the political associated with the conceptualisation of civil society. 
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functions is apparently to conceptualize away the problem of capitalism’ remains applicable to 
global civil society work today (Wood 1990: 60).   
 
The specific context in which the common European political theoretical history of 
conceptualising civil society is developed then becomes very significant. Kaldor is correct, in 
her way, when she says ‘the words have quite different meanings because of different 
experiences and cultures. Words like Europe, socialism, privatisation, markets, feminism, have 
quite different significance in East and West’ (Kaldor 1990a: 43). However, whereas for Kaldor 
this differing conceptualisation formed the base for an ‘alternative politics’ dedicated to 
‘changing the very nature of power relations’, the development of these concepts outside of 
capitalism is what allowed their use in the manoeuvres of these ‘post-Marxists’ that Wood 
sees as a ‘full retreat’ from socialism (ibid; Wood 1990: 60). The concept of civil society 
thinkers such as Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik – to take two of the lodestones for Kaldor - 
were working with was the ‘Western’ conception as developed through Locke and Hegel.  In 
doing so in part they were asserting a common European history and culture of 
cosmopolitanism.  However, whereas the concept had developed in tandem with the 
development of capitalism, in the East the concept was developed outside of it, in opposition 
to ‘totalitarianism’.  As a result there is no way to grasp the tension between the citizen and 
bourgeois in their thought and as a result civil society becomes an end in and of itself, 
unproblematic to a degree impossible even within the thought of Habermas or Arendt.  
 
In line with the argument above on the political ontologies of Arendtian cosmopolitanism, 
overall their thought contains a Lockean state-society structure, but with the political 
conceptualised through a primary focus on action in society – on the social before the political 
or economic individual with a concomitant stress on morality or individual virtue and 
responsibility.  This is a development of political thought in a way particularly suitable for a 
social democratic Europe seeking to avoid the ‘problem of capitalism’.  This vision developed in 
a situation in which ‘dissidents were relatively free to resuscitate the concept of civil society 
and conveniently side step the issues of the implications of a privately-controlled capitalist 
market economy’ (Falk 2003: 327) and has had profound effects, lying at the base of Kaldor’s 
‘alternative politics’.  Civil society – in a situation where its creation was an end in itself – 
continues in this vision to be an end in itself, counterposed to ‘global capitalism’ with its 
intertwining and co-constitution with ‘global civil society’ ignored from this theoretical base.  
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Thus whilst the majority of analysts within political science see either a rehashed liberalism or 
at most ‘liberalism plus’ – the plus a focus on morality in politics – in political thought in the 
region from this period, it makes more sense to see them as reviving and developing the 
classical and republican focus on civic virtue and the citizen in Arendtian fashion (Falk 2003; 
Isaac 1995).  This is true both in their construction of Central and Eastern European states as 
‘totalitarian’ as well as the concept of politics developed against this construct, and indeed 
both Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik explicitly took Arendt’s work as one of their primary 
points of departure.  Accordingly civil society is conceived as inherently non-violent – a politics 
threatened by primarily state violence - with concomitant dissident commitment to this ethic 
in creating the new politics (Keane 1996: 80; cf. Keane 2003: 202 for continued expression of 
this explicitly Arendtian ethic within global civil society work). 
 
All of this becomes clearer still with the end of the Cold War, as seen from her 'European 
perspective'.  Kaldor characterises the Cold War period as an 'imaginary war' which she sees as 
a 'joint venture' between Western ‘Atlanticism’ and Eastern ’Stalinism/post-Stalinism’ in which 
an initially political and economic confrontation became 'militarised' into an ‘imaginary war’ in 
which  the leaders of both East and West created the enemy  as a means of managing internal 
conflict (Kaldor 1990c).  This serves to repress the conflict as a truly political one, with a focus 
upon how it became ‘militarised’ and the effects thereof.   
With such a characterisation of militarised ‘enemy images’, rather than fundamental socio-
political conflict, the end of the Cold War cannot be seen as the West’s victory and an end to 
history, rather, with the removal of these stasis inducing overdetermining blocs, history for 
Europe ‘has just resumed’ (ibid). Against ‘mainstream commentators’ that see the end as ‘the 
decisive defeat of socialism and the triumph of liberal (actually neo-liberal) values and policies’, 
she questions whether the West can even be called capitalist, as this was part of the ‘imagining’ 
of the war: ‘The Cold War has always been a discourse, a conflict of words, ‘capitalism’ versus 
‘socialism’’ (Kaldor 1990a: 25). It is this rejection of the material that also allows the 
valorisation of her own role as the conflict was won by the ‘undermin[ing of] the words and 
the language of the Cold War’ a process carried out by ‘the new social movements, and 
especially the peace movements‘ (ibid: 33).  With the conflict understood as such a militarised 
joint venture, history and politics (potentially) resumes if the peripheralisation of military 
authority that the end of the Cold war brought continues, offering  hope for the future as it 
may allow the creation of a genuine 'international civil society’ (ibid: 36).  
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This marks the shift away from even nominal socialism, seen as irretrievably tarnished, 
creating the need for a new as yet unspecified, inchoate ‘third way’ the nature of which is to 
be developed through dialogue with Central and Eastern Europeans (cf. Kaldor 1991b), and the 
content of which is then developed in her later theorising on (global) civil society as we saw 
above.  This task was framed by a series of questions, the answers to which her focus on 
unifying civil society across Europe render pre-ordained:  ‘Is social justice an adequate 
substitute for the term ‘socialist’? Do we have to begin the painful and isolating task of 
redefining and resuscitating socialism? Or should we attempt to develop a new term that 
encompasses new concerns about democracy, the environment, gender and race, as well as 
traditional concerns?’ (Kaldor 1990a: 38). 
 
Pursuing this analysis in activism Kaldor founded and co-chaired the Helsinki Citizens 
Assembly, dedicated to ‘peace, democracy and human rights in Europe’ aiming to translate 
‘détente from below’ into ‘the post-Cold War from below’ maintaining a focus on civil society.   
Accordingly, as my argument so far should lead us to expect,  ‘every American foundation 
wanted to support us’, though she ‘never actually had money from the Open Society’, George 
Soros seemingly feeling her approach lacked his cutting edge (Kaldor 2009).  Through the 
‘Helsinki Citizens Assembly (hCa) the idea of which was to help civil society in difficult places 
and to work together across the East-West divide. I [Kaldor] got tremendously involved in 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia, because branches of the hCa were started, and being there led to all my 
work on new wars’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.). 
‘New’ Wars  
The new wars thesis posits that there has been a qualitative change to a new form of warfare 
occurring roughly at the end of the Cold War; Kaldor is the seminal and dominant figure within 
the development of this thesis. The wars of Yugoslav dissolution were central to this 
development, spurring Kaldor’s ‘new thinking’ on war.  Within this ‘ethnic cleansing’, as a term 
not the practice with its long history, is central, coined at the time and a ‘literal translation of 
the Serbo/Croatian/Bosnian’ (Belloni 2008: 125).  The ‘new wars’ of the  post-Cold War era are 
accordingly different as driven by identity politics, waged mostly against civilians and are 
financed through networks, criminal and other, that take advantage of the globalised war  
economy. Bosnia is thus used as the prototype of a‘new war’ where the distinction between 
war, organised crime, and large-scale violations of human rights blur, and where civilians bear 
most of the costs of political instability. 
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Many have argued against the novelty of these features arguing that it is only their specific 
concatenation, in the Bosnian war particularly, that can be argued to be novel – especially 
when this conflict is stripped of a broader context.  For example, seeing a lack of evidence for 
the novelty of these characteristics Stathis Kalyvas concludes the ‘distinction drawn between 
post-cold war conflicts and their predecessors may be attributable more to the demise of 
readily available conceptual categories then to the existence of profound differences’ (Kalyvas 
2001: 105), whilst Martin Shaw notes ‘the loss of Cold War narratives, particularly war as 
revolution’ as creating a ‘vacuum' (Shaw 2000: 178). This idea of Kaldor’s theory being 
constructed in the vacuum of the loss of Cold War narratives gets to the heart of what Kaldor 
believes is ‘new’ about her theory, both in theoretical and political terms.127 
She casts her ‘new wars’ concept against both the preceding Cold War (and before) reality of 
‘old wars’ and ongoing ‘old wars thinking’ amongst policy intellectuals and politicians.   This 
‘old war’ concept she refers to as ‘Clausewitzian’ – however many have found her initial 
summary of his view of war as ‘the use of military means to defeat another state’ inaccurate 
and tendentious, designed to create novelty for her own thesis.  Two in particular that she has 
since responded to, largely conceding their points (Kaldor 2013a),  are Andreas Herberg-
Rothe’s response where he notes that Clausewitz ‘devoted a chapter in On War to warfare 
waged by non-state actors’ and therefore ‘Clausewitz’s concept of state must be understood 
as any kind of community’ (Herberg-Rothe 2007), and Bart Schuurman’s consideration where 
in summarising his own and others problems with the novelty and ‘post-Clausewitzian’ 
conception of her thesis he notes that ‘ultimately rather than supplant the Clausewitzian 
concept of war, new wars theory reinforces it’ (Schuurman 2010: 97). In fact when one 
considers the two most notable elements of novelty underpinning her conception of new wars 
– that war is no longer inter-state, and is now driven by identity politics and criminality not 
political calculation – one can see that what she is casting herself against is the neo-realist 
definition of warfare, the Cold War European image of the IR discipline, not Clausewitz.128   
The dissolution of the Cold War political narrative underpins the normative dimension of the 
thesis also, giving the political conceptualisation within which new wars, and the politics of 
intervention they legitimise is set.  Rather than East-West conflict, ‘globalisation’ becomes the 
key driver of identity formation in ‘the aftermath of the events of 1989’ (Kaldor 1996: 43).  This 
                                                             
127 It can at times seem that for Kaldor the most significant element of the whole enterprise is that ‘I 
have therefore reformulated the definition of war’ (Kaldor 2013a: 13). 
128 Or perhaps more accurately, against Clausewitz read through neo-realism. 
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shift demonstrates the problem with her earlier conception of the Cold War, not as 
imperialism and contender state reaction, but as an isolated bipolar struggle.   With the Cold 
War’s end ‘globalisation’ appears as an abstract concept disembedded from territory or class, 
not  as the concrete expression of the abstract tendency of capital towards globalisation 
realised to varying but always limited degrees through political projects and therefore tied to 
both territory and class, expanding in the wake of defeat of the latest contender state.  This 
then underlies the ‘neglect [of] the socio-spatial source of the project of cosmopolitan 
democracy under a transnational substitute for the state, in the professional and informational 
service class of global capital’ (Drake 1999: 4.4). 
With ‘globalisation’ the defining classifications of people become ‘non-territorial’:  the ‘new 
divide’ is therefore based not on East – West or even inter-state divisions, but lies between 
‘cosmopolitans’ and various forms of ‘particularisms’ – a ‘new nationalism’, novel in that it ‘is 
much more particularistic and fragmenting than earlier nationalism.  It is about labels much 
more than substance; national identity is no more than a label, not a prerequisite for 
democratic participation or cultural regeneration’ (Kaldor 1996a: 53).  Politically the division is 
between the pacific universalist values of the cosmopolitans emerging from transnational 
institutions from above and civil society from below, and particularistic identity politics 
antithetical to these values.  The conception of the truly political then becomes central, as in 
opposing such cosmopolitanism any such particularism becomes not political but anti-political 
and essentially criminal.   
The first half of the title of Mary Kaldor’s 1996 article ‘Cosmopolitan Responses to New Wars’ is 
therefore the more significant half, and also represents the real novelty within the thesis129 – 
its uptake related to the need for a new post-cold war legitimating rubric for intervention by 
the ‘international community’.  This is brought out most clearly in the move to designate such 
wars as criminal, rather than political, and the redefining of action by the international 
community away from intervention to a policing response (Kaldor 1996b). This too has roots in 
the hCa work in the former Yugoslavia where her work was with what she saw as civilised 
cosmopolitan pockets, ‘islands of civility’, set against the ‘new nationalisms’ driving the 
conflicts -  this cosmopolitanism linking them to, and requiring support from the West.  It is 
thus this ‘new’ division that allows the shift to conceptualising interventions as ‘policing’ 
                                                             
129 In Kaldor’s subsequent defence of the novelty of her concept  she concedes a great deal of the 
argument, pointing precisely to the change in ‘logic’, to criminality, as the novelty of new wars - in the 
process dropping the bulk of the rest of what she claimed made ‘new wars’ new (Kaldor 2013a). 
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actions.  Indeed, she sees her own contribution, as this ‘reframing’ of violences, as ‘different 
ways of framing different types of violence imply different solutions or different ways of 
addressing the problem’ with the aim all along ‘to reconceptualise political violence as ‘new 
war’ or crime and the use of force as cosmopolitan law enforcement rather than war-fighting’ 
(Kaldor 2009; Kaldor 2013a: 14).130 
This then changes the way Western intervention is conceptualised: global cosmopolitanism 
makes the ‘Western’ tag politically irrelevant and the logic of making wars a question of 
cosmopolitan law-enforcement transcends the internal/external and thus renders debates of 
intervention or non-intervention meaningless.  The struggle derived from this is to reformat 
Western militaries and the logic of their use accordingly, as support forces that are essentially 
‘glorified policemen’ (Shaw 2000). 
Human Security  
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh traces the human security concept back to the early 1980s transition 
from an academic focus on ‘peace’ to ‘security’ and the broadening of the security agenda,  
relating it clearly to critical approaches to security more generally and with which it shares the 
starting point of a challenge to neorealist security ‘orthodoxy’.  In contrast to other critical 
approaches however, human security has been predominantly developed within, or in close 
contact with, policy and political institutional settings (Tadjbakhsh 2007: 9; Newman 2010). 
As a critically applied concept human security began and (perhaps) ended its career at the UN 
(Tadjbakhsh 2007: 9).  The most important articulation at the beginning of this institutional 
journey was that of Mahbub Ul Haq in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, setting out 
an ‘ethical, comprehensive and universal vision of security’. The hope was for this to form a 
coherent post-cold war narrative for the UN, centring on global justice and equity, but as a 
civilian conception, without any military component. The concept was further developed 
through other UN agencies, governments131, and government sponsored organisations such as 
the Commission on Human Security and the Human Security Trust Fund.    The 2001 report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), initiated by the 
                                                             
130 I note in passing the support this gives for the contention that the constructivism found in European 
approaches is derived inductively, not deductively, as per Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s argument 
above. 
131 Initially the Canadian, Japanese and Norwegian governments took on its development, adopting it for 
their foreign policy.  From this developed the Human Security Network, a ‘loose grouping of thirteen 
governments committed – at least in a declaratory sense’ to people centred development (Newman 
2010: 81), 
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Canadian Government and made up of UN General Assembly members, marked its 
development to the titular project of The Responsibility to Protect.  The concept of broadening 
security to individuals is here hardened up to create a duty to intervene for their protection – 
and implied ‘duty to prevent, to react and to rebuild’ (Matlary 2008: 137) - through this 
responsibility, which also reverses the burden of justification, previously on the intervening 
powers, by talking of a state having to justify its ‘moral claim to be treated as legitimate’ (ICISS 
2001: 136; Chandler 2004: 64-5). This is a major change of principle in the intervention norm in 
international politics: sovereignty becomes conditional, with the conditions set by the 
‘international community’, to whom sovereignty for the area passes if the conditions are not 
met.  Further development of this concept through  a 2004 UN High-Level Panel on Security 
report, and subsequent general endorsement of this report at the UN General Assembly in 
2005 marks the demise of the ‘first generation’ of human security as a critical concept, seen as 
suffocated through co-option (Martin and Owen 2010).132   
Such context in part explains the development of human security as a ’problem solving’ 
concept, developed in relation to policy, not through methodological debate (Newman 2010: 
77-80).  This method of development was in part used to overcome the problem common to 
broadened security agendas of vagueness from potential all-inclusiveness, as Lakhdar Brahimi, 
chair of the UN Panel on Peace-keeping puts it:  ‘I don’t use the term human security because I 
don’t know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me’ 
(Brahimi in Martin and Owen 2010: 215).   
However, this mode of development was also strategic. Theoretical development was avoided 
precisely because the Western norms for intervention it implied would be resisted and thus 
development of the concept proceeded through ‘concrete projects that had some relation to 
physical security, such as child soldiers or the trade in small arms, without focusing on the 
intervention norm directly’ (Matlary 2008: 136).  Janne Haaland Matlary, who was deputy 
foreign minister of Norway at this time and in charge of human security policy, notes ‘[e]ach 
time I mentioned the concept of human security to non-Western states during this work, the 
reaction was wary. Was this a new way for the West to secure a right of intervention under the 
pretext of human rights?’ (Matlary 2008: 136).    
                                                             
132 The baton for a second generation of human security then passes to the EU, where if the lessons 
from the UN experience are learnt, the as yet unsuccessful project to have human security adopted as 
the security doctrine for Europe can still prevail (Martin and Owen 2010). 
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I will look at two projects where Mary Kaldor has developed her thinking on human security in 
just such a ‘problem-solving’ way: developing human security as part of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ for BP, with for her an aim to ‘work out what it might mean to be genuinely a 
‘human rights company’’ (Kaldor, Karl, and Said 2007: ix) ; developing human security for the 
EU as a security doctrine, which argued that ‘in order to implement the European Security 
Strategy, Europe needs military forces to be configured and used in new ways’ (Albrecht et al. 
2004: 5).  
‘Human securing oil’ 
Kaldor’s work in the edited volume ‘Oil Wars’ covers the ‘unipolar moment’, being begun in 
1998 at the behest of BP -  then facing up to the problems of ‘exploring oilfields in unstable 
parts of the world’, the ‘social equivalent of deep sea drilling’ – the work covered the period 
until publication in 2007. In particular the work covers the Iraq War and its aftermath, used as 
the prime case to examine the relationship between oil and war. Beside BP’s problem of 
stabilising potentially oil-rich regions, she is also concerned with the broader problem of the 
fact that the US ‘old wars’ approach means they misunderstood the situation in Iraq, which 
could have been grasped with ‘new wars thinking’, and are therefore unable to secure energy 
supplies.133   Alongside BP’s initial impetus, this work was funded, ‘independently’, by the Ford 
Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, with conclusions and recommendations deriving from 
discussions with oil executives in a ‘meeting at Bellagio, the Italian villa owned by the 
[Rockefeller] Foundation’ from which her report of this work to them gains its name (Kaldor 
2007a: ix: ix).  
The concept of new wars is directly operationalised in both the private interests of oil 
companies and those of the energy security of the West more generally through developing 
the idea of ‘new oil wars’, in which the interventionary logic of new wars is amplified as ‘the 
risk of war in oil-exporting countries is greater than in other countries and the need to address 
this danger is more urgent’. As for human security generally, preventive action is implied, as 
the aim is to produce recommendations for ‘measures all stakeholders can take to prevent 
bloodshed’, whilst understanding that the stakeholders she acknowledges are primarily 
                                                             
133 The nature of the work is set out clearly in the introduction with the motivating question ‘could it be 
that the nature of this relationship [between oil revenues and forms of state] rather than geopolitical 
competition explains Iraq’s conflict prone modern history?’ The answer, unsurprising if you consider her 
co-editor Terry Lynn Karl’s comparative political work on the internal causes of instability in ‘petro-
states’, is yes (Karl 1997). 
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interested in maintaining the minimal functioning state and sufficient rule of law to keep oil 
flowing (Kaldor, Karl, and Said 2007: 4, 2). 
These recommendations then are aimed at overcoming the problem of old war thinking, as 
evidenced concretely in the inability of the US to secure energy supplies using military force, as 
‘geopolitical competition, which is the key characteristic of ‘old oil wars’, is counterproductive 
if the aim is to secure the supply of oil’ (Kaldor and Said 2007: 275).  ‘[N]ew war thinking allows 
a multilateral solution to the problem ‘in which ‘[c]ivil society strengthening is critical’.  What is 
needed then is a ‘change of mindset: human security [is] the only way to ensure energy 
supplies in the future’ (Kaldor 2007b: 179).    
This can be seen as a continuation and application of her Cold War concerns and experiences.  
In her conclusion written with Yahia Said134, the overarching aim is regime change within 
‘petro-states’ to liberal democratic capitalist states, to resolve conflict, promote human rights 
and democracy135.  The practical difficulty is that oil supply has previously been ensured by 
maintaining good relations with whatever type of compliant government was in power in oil-
producing states. The solution is ‘a four way partnership involving civil society, companies, 
governments and international institutions [that] could offer a mechanism for strengthening 
civil society without jeopardising state relations’, applying to a new context the lessons that 
enabling civil society against totalitarian states during the Cold War provided (Kaldor and Said 
2007: 276). Such an approach underlies her associated belief in there having been ‘an 
alternative to war in Iraq’ as ‘there was a real possibility of ‘opening up’ the regime rather in 
the way that happened in east-central Europe in the 1980s as a result of a combination of 
pressure both from outside based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and from below’ (Kaldor 
2005: u.n.). 
 ‘A European Way of Security’ 
 
Central to the EU’s need to define Europe (in the body of the EU) is its conceptualisation as a 
different kind of power in international relations; a view often expressed in terms of ‘civilian 
                                                             
134 Yahia Said is Director of the Middle East and North Africa Region at the Revenue Watch Institute 
(RWI) and Research Fellow, London School of Economics. RWI began as a program of the Open Society 
Institute, and was spun off as an independent organisation in 2006. It is now principally funded by the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the Open Society 
Institute.  
135 ‘Substantive democracy’ must be ensured, involving interaction and monitoring between civil society, 
business and the state’ – Venezuela is thus held up as a poor model as its populism and social 
democracy ‘creates dependency’ (Kaldor and Said 2007: 278). 
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power’ or ‘normative power’ Europe.  It is this need to demarcate difference that underlies 
Javier Solana’s commissioning of Mary Kaldor to lead a study group to redefine European 
security policy along human security lines whilst he was High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  However, the actual implications of doing so, whilst 
showing the potential power of such an idealist project, led to its failure to be adopted. 
 
Kaldor sees the concept of human security as offering both an alternative strategic narrative 
and operational doctrine. For the former it seems to provide a unifying rubric for the existing 
aims of common foreign and security policy ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (article 11, Amsterdam 
Treaty; immanent from the expressed founding principles of the Union in article 6, Amsterdam 
Treaty), and thus secure the claim to be a different kind of international actor, expressing 
internationally the EU’s domestic values. Herein perhaps lies the problem underlying its non-
adoption, as Kaldor saw her role as providing more than merely an ‘analytical label that 
categorises the EU’s international role in the way that concepts such as normative power or 
civilian power have done’ instead seeking to provide a ‘dynamic organising frame for security 
action’ and ‘pro-active strategic narrative’ to unify EU foreign policy (Martin and Kaldor 2010: 1) 
and thereby overstepping the bounds of what was required. 
 
This drive influences the development of the broad concept human security concept contained 
in the Barcelona Report into the implementation focused Madrid Report.  Recognising the 
contested nature of the human security concept, Kaldor redefines it for use by Europe in this 
latter report, which sought both to demonstrate that human security was ‘already implicit in 
much of what the EU does’ and to develop from this a refined set of principles for action 
(Kaldor 2010: 6). The core of the Madrid report then is a set of five case studies ‘of EU 
engagement in regions where it has intervened to help stabilise societies that have suffered 
violent conflict’, the lessons from which serve to both legitimise the six principles broadly 
defined in the Barcelona report and refine them for future action (Madrid report – annex in 
Martin and Kaldor 2010, case studies tabulated 178-180)136, in a tactic reminiscent of the UN’s 
development of the concept.   
 
                                                             
136
 The six principles are: the primacy of human rights; legitimate political authority; a bottom-up approach; 
effective multilateralism; an integrated regional approach, and; clear and transparent strategic direction. 
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The practices of the EU from which Kaldor derives her recommendation are however of a 
‘European alternative’ approach to global governance that is simply less belligerent than the 
US (van der Pijl 2006b: 15).  In addition to the interventionary practice already discussed, and 
used as case studies by Kaldor, analysis of EU and US responses short of military intervention 
(from aid withdrawal and sanctions through to ‘democracy assistance’) to non-compliance 
with human rights and democracy norms in third countries, finds that both reacted based 
upon similar security or economic concerns, the difference lying in the US responding more 
often, and more forcefully than the EU (Warkotsch 2010).  A human security ‘alternative’ 
developed from and adapted to such current practice will therefore be broadly compatible 
with liberal interventionism across a wide spectrum of global governance concerns. 
 
This then makes clear the relation of the earlier work by Kaldor to work on human security as a 
security doctrine for Europe. Her 2003 article on ‘American power: from ‘compellance’ to 
cosmopolitanism?’ (coming before the Barcelona report), reproduced as chapter 2, ‘American 
Power’, of 2007’s ‘Human Security: reflections on globalisation and intervention’ 
(contemporaneous to the Madrid report) offers a prescription for effective US power – it must 
act in Kaldor’s cosmopolitan vein if it is to shape the world in its interests.  She, of course, 
defines any thought of US interest being tied to material resources or domestic multinationals 
as ‘old-fashioned’: for her the US represents the Arendtian vision we have seen of the US 
republic as a model to the world of an ‘open, reasoning society’. Its interests then are, and 
should be, in spreading (American) democracy to the rest of the world (2003: 22).  We thus see 
her take issue with an (unnamed) Asian human rights activist’s claim that America represses 
democracy when it is in its interests, accepting only that current (Bush era) unilateralism ‘may 
have the effect of repressing democracy’ (ibid). 
 
The means, of unilateralism and the type of military force used, not the ends of the use of US 
power is therefore her target. She berates the US for viewing ‘sovereignty as conditional for 
other states, but unconditional for the United States because the United States represents 
‘good’ (ibid: 12), insisting instead that sovereignty be conditional for all.  Similarly it is the 
unilateralism of the ‘extraordinarily wide remit for military action’ the US has claimed for itself 
by lining up a ‘duty to protect freedom’ with ‘preventive self-defence’ against terrorism that 
she challenges.   Nonetheless she agrees with George Soros’s comments on the internal 
condition of other states as ’important for our internal security’ and thus subject to ‘military 
containment’, though naturally ‘conceived as international law enforcement, not war-fighting’ 
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with this force to be applied by and subject to the conditions of the ‘international community’ 
(ibid: 19).  
 
Trajectory 1 – Conclusion: Retrieving the critical intellectual 
Through this trajectory we have seen a continuity of concerns with the role and nature of the 
military establishment and with the creation of an ‘alternative politics’ deriving from the 
Central and Eastern European development of Arendtian  republicanism.  Throughout too, we 
see her conception as violence as lying outside of politics and society – remove the military 
and this ‘alternative politics’ will flourish.  This then has developed into her central concern of 
an ‘applied cosmopolitanism’ – precisely the issue of establishing such a politics that Patricia 
Owens sees as lying at the heart of Arendt’s contribution to cosmopolitanism. Seeing such a 
politics as immanent within society Kaldor does not however reject the use of force in 
establishing the conditions for it – though such a use of force is through this conceptualisation 
cast as defending society and politics from violence. Nonetheless ‘trying to create the 
conditions in which human beings can solve problems though debate and reason rather than 
through violence and struggle […] is extremely difficult’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.). 
One can see how easily this slips into fellow-travelling with neoconservative foreign policy: 
‘there is a link. I felt it in my own soul, as it were. All of us who started off as peace movement 
activists and became passionate about human rights found it hard not to flip over to the other 
side [to neo-conservatism].’  The difference is principally one of means, as ‘[t]he neocons on 
the one hand are passionate about human rights but on the other hand they think bombing is 
legitimate in support of human rights’, whereas the difficulty, and her task – all along – is ‘of 
holding peace and human rights together’ (Kaldor 2007d: 23-24). 
That there is also more of a difference in political vision too comes out in her response to Mark 
Duffield’s argument that ‘‘human security’ linked to intervention is a new way of playing the 
governance game’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.; Duffield 2007). Whilst his argument is ‘seductive’ it is, 
simply, ‘too negative’:  
... what is the alternative, and I think the real problem is that for him 
there’s no middle position between imperial intervention and global 
revolution. When you look at his alternative, he talks vaguely about 
solidarity and I think there just has to be a middle position, or at least 
we have to believe in the existence of a middle position, which for me 
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is reflected in a human security agenda, which I would argue is not 
imperialist because it has to be executed within a multilateralist 
framework based on the equality of human beings. And we simply 
can’t use conventional warfare, our actions have to be different, and 
that’s how I understand the middle position.            (Kaldor 2009: u.n.) 
This is her vision of applied cosmopolitanism, returning to the question of the practice of 
solidarity identified as the serious issue within cosmopolitan approaches in the previous 
chapter. In doing so she draws out the power of critical thought in cosmopolitanism to 
legitimate the action of a bi-polar West, within which the preferred vehicle remains the EU.  
Most recently, characterising ‘[t]he EU as a New Form of Political Authority’ offering a ‘model 
for global governance’, Kaldor  lauds the expeditionary nature of European power arguing the  
‘Common Security and Defence Policy is designed to make a contribution to global security 
rather than to protect borders using military force, as in the case of classic nation-states’.  To 
increase the legitimacy of this model, contained in both the EU and CSDP, ‘[t]he EU should 
explicitly adopt the concept of human security as a basis for external security policy’ (Kaldor 
2012: 79-80).  Here then we see all these concerns coming together in considering how to 
apply the power of cosmopolitan Europe externally.  
 
Trajectory 2: Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School137 
The Copenhagen School’s work represents the ‘most thorough and continuous exploration of 
the significance and implications of the widening security agenda for security studies’ 
developing from the post-Cold War problematizing of security (Husymans 2007: 480).   The 
School itself is built around three main ideas: securitisation/desecuritisation, sectoral security, 
and regional security complexes (Wæver 2004; Huysmans 2007).  Here I will focus on the first, 
as securitisation is what unifies and defines the school most distinctly and where the 
contestation over its normative / political content lies (Wæver 2012; Hansen 2012). 
In the terms of the academic field – of scholarly impact, papers and books published, and 
grants awarded – the Copenhagen School has been the most enduringly successful of these 
                                                             
137 An earlier version of this section was presented to the Copenhagen Sussex postgraduate Network Workshop, 
held at the University of Copenhagen in December 2013. My thanks particularly to Lene Hansen, Lise Philipsen and 
Rebecca Adler-Nissen for helpful comments. 
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new post-Cold War approaches to security emerging in Europe (Friedrichs 2004; Balzacq 2005; 
Stritzel 2007; Buzan and Hansen 2009; de Graaf and Zwierlein 2013; and see for example the 
Centre for Advanced Security Theory138) .   As such it has inevitably been the focus of much 
questioning over whether it has been as successful theoretically and politically; from Bill 
McSweeney’s initial interrogation – from which the label Copenhagen School derives139 -  
onwards, with the School often standing in for Critical Security Studies as a whole in such 
analysis (McSweeney 1996; Hynek and Chandler 2013). 
These two sets of questions asked of the Copenhagen School, the theoretical and political, are 
analytically separable but inter-related (Wæver 2011).  The first set, of theoretical adequacy, 
has two elements; firstly the internal consistency of the theory and its claims, secondly its 
contribution to the theoretical field in general – here the broadening and deepening of 
thinking on security in terms of its referents, applicable sectors and nature of its constitution. 
The second set questions the political implications of the school’s work; Nik Hynek and David 
Chandler put it strongly, attacking ‘the complete rejection of any emancipatory ambition by 
the Copenhagen School’, as well demonstrating the interrelation with theory through  seeing 
this as the key to theoretical  impact and overall success (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 52; cf. 
Browning and McDonald 2013)140. 
Here I explore the inter-relation of these challenges, setting the school also in the context of 
the European field developed above.   Overall, as the approach I have developed indicates, the 
focus will be on the political significance of the school (rather than significance within theory), 
and the relation of this significance to both the academic field and concrete social context. The 
focus is on the foundational figure for the school of Ole Wæver, as it was his work that 
developed into securitisation theory, although I also first outline the significance of co-founder 
Barry Buzan.   
                                                             
138
 http://cast.ku.dk/about/  
139
 One of Ole Wæver’s earlier responses highlighted the potential disciplinary use of labelling a relatively cohesive 
theoretical challenge to the mainstream a ‘school’, a labelling that acts as a repressive tolerance that helps exclude 
the challenge from mainstream debate.  It will be interesting to see how much longer the Copenhagen School rubric 
can last, given its increasing diversity and dominance within security studies. 
140
 Lene Hansen outlines the terrain clearly: within the Copenhagen School ‘[e]mancipation is refuted, but 
emancipation is not the only concept through which a normative claim can be made’ (2012: 527, n.6). For her, as 
espoused in developing a contrast with Claudia Aradau’s work, desecuritisation as a concept has to carry this weight 
– though whether a particular desecuritisation is responsible or normatively desirable is always political and only 
decidable in the concrete. It is the conception of the political that is in question here. 
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Barry Buzan – Security  
 
‘We thought of realism as a great place to start but a really 
miserable place to finish.  The core from which you work out.’  
             (Buzan 2012, interviewed by Dan Nexon, 39m)  
The Copenhagen School’s prehistory lies in the uptake of the conceptions within the first 
edition of Barry Buzan’s book People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in 
International Relations (PSF) (Buzan 1983), within Scandinavian IR, particularly within the 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).  The interest was mutual, as the second edition 
demonstrates, notably in its use of Ole Wæver’s work (Buzan 1991: passim), which is perhaps 
unsurprising given Buzan’s overall project: as seen in the second edition’s subtitle, to construct 
‘an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era’, incorporating, as we 
saw, the peace research work undertaken in Europe (ibid: 12-13). As Ole Wæver notes the 
contemporary division between US and European security studies (as well as within the 
‘Anglosphere’) was ‘pre-visioned’ in the divergent reception to this work on either side of the 
Atlantic, with a ‘tepid’ reception in the US, whilst in ‘the United Kingdom [and] generally in 
Europe, Canada and Australia’ it became a ‘standard textbook’ (Wæver 2012: 66, n.4). 
Ole Wæver approached Buzan to collaborate, and as a result from 1988 to 2002 141, Buzan was 
a project director at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), with a resultant 
seminal work for the Copenhagen School of Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1997), 
jointly written by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde.   Buzan is clear on the division of 
labour between the two main founding protagonists, with Regional Security Theory (RST) 
primarily his contribution , whilst securitisation theory was ‘something  Ole Wæver had been 
working on for some time’, crystallising in the school’s work, and something Buzan happily 
‘bought into’ (Buzan 2012, 33m.). 
Nonetheless, whilst RST has obvious attractions for the ‘security community’ of Norden, the 
central political significance lies in the encapsulation of the shift in the peace movement in the 
1980s identified in the previous chapter – to ‘pro-security’ ‘pro-Europe’ positions - as in 
Denmark too a ‘new peace movement had grown up’ containing a ‘redefinition of the security 
                                                             
141
 In January 2003, COPRI was merged into the Danish Institute for International Studies (or in Buzan’s take 
‘summarily closed by the Danish Government’ (Buzan 2004b: xii)). 
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agenda’ along these lines (Pederson 1989: 273).  Buzan’s work concomitantly served to 
depoliticise the peace agenda in similar fashion within the academic sphere creating a ‘middle 
ground between power (IR, Strategic Studies) and peace’. This helped shift the previously 
bitter Scandinavian peace-security rift to what he sees as an superior, and apolitical, academic 
debate (Buzan 2012: 21m; cf. Wæver 2004). 
It is worth noting Wæver’s take on the institutional context of the school’s development, that 
COPRI’s founding during this ‘neo-security wave within peace research’, alongside the 
proclivities of founding director Håkan Wiberg, made it ‘never very ‘peace research’-
like’(Wæver 2004: 62-3).  This is an environment temperamentally suited to Barry Buzan also, 
whose interest lies in analysis of structures and processes not normative debates.  His PhD 
thesis, completed in 1973, was motivated by fascination with the contemporaneous peace 
movement, but from outside – developing into a historical thesis on ‘why peace movements 
don’t work’ (covering empirically the British peace movement 1919-1939) (Buzan 2012: 6 – 
9m.).   
For Ole Wæver the end of the Cold War reverses the positions of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ so that 
‘security’ is now the critical position.  He argues that liberalism’s rediscovery of its own 
‘positive peace’ in the democratic peace thesis dramatically changes the context of debate on 
peace.  However, as we saw ‘security’ is problematically ‘critical’ (at best). I examine Wæver’s 
work creating security as a critical concept below but here note that the problematic nature of 
assigning value to security was noted at the time also in response to PSF as, despite 
constituting a seminal moment in the broadening and deepening of security studies the focus 
remains on the state as referent object of security and the understanding of security remains 
as an absence of observable conflict. Both emancipation and the significance of ‘society’ had 
yet to be seriously considered – thus security is placed ‘at the top of the hierarchy of values […] 
more important than justice or equality’ (Smith 1991: 338; cf. Booth 1991a, 1991b, introducing 
the individual and emancipation to security, Shaw 1993 on society).  
Much more could be said about Buzan’s corpus of work and its political orientation,142 but the 
central point to take for us here is the foundational academic impetus for the Copenhagen 
                                                             
142 Steve Smith sees the opening of security within PSF as developing within liberal ideology, pointing to 
a liberal teleology (the development to a secure world of strong states and a mature anarchy), the 
contingent nature of conflict (that it is caused by misperception rather than essential and related to real 
interests), in turn stemming from the view of economics as a realm of cooperation – economic 
interdependence therefore lessening conflict (Smith 1991).  His work continues within this ideology, his 
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School (and indeed much other critical security work) is found in a work oriented to the 
general European milieu identified in the preceding chapter, of the turn to security within the 
second Cold War, and in peace research meeting the image of realism. 
Wæver and securitization theory 
[T]he need for the East is political changes that open up possibilities for 
politics in these societies. From there the other changes can be conquered 
by the people there. 
(Wæver 1989a: 9 
Securitisation was coined by Ole Wæver in 1995 though its intellectual development stretches 
back to the 1980s, and was developed from John Austin’s speech act theory. Securitisation 
theory contrasts itself with traditional security studies, which as a Cold War artefact it sees as 
having a relatively unproblematised understanding of the nature of security, deriving from a 
focus on material, principally military, distributions within an assumed inter-state system (e.g. 
uni/bi/multi-polarity, balance of power etc.).  In problematizing the concept of security, 
securitisation theory focuses on the process of the construction of security, on how within a 
political context issues are discursively constructed as security threats, and the political 
implications of doing so.  From this it is often seen as offering normatively neutral analysis of 
securitising processes, and there is indeed ambivalence throughout the school’s work on the 
desirability of differing issues being securitised. In general though, securitization creates ‘the 
Schmittian realm of the political’ of existential enemies and decisionism lifting issues outside of 
debate and normal politics, ‘and for precisely this reason it is dangerous and by and large to be 
avoided’ (Williams 2003: 515).  As far as is stated within the school, desecuritisation is the long 
term preference, though some securitisations are seen as responsible and necessary – the 
desirability of specific securitisations is something that can only be decided in the concrete 
context. 
Both the political theoretical components and political commitments of securitisation theory 
are seen as problematically diverse and the under-specification of their implications seen to 
place its coherence in danger.  Lene Hansen notes that ‘many have taken the view that the 
weaknesses – and strengths – of securitization theory ‘arise from unspecified yet deeply held 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
English School development of world society building on the more developed debate on the ‘analogous 
concept of global civil society’ (2004a: 84), and in analysing the post-Cold War world he sees the end of 
history as a beneficial thing as with no more battles over capitalism international society can flourish 
(Buzan 2013), and liberal democracies can work together with ‘joint gains in an open economy’ (Buzan 
2004b: 22).   
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philosophical views’’ (Hansen 2011: 358, Balzacq cited in ibid), and that ‘insufficient attention 
to politics in the theory of securitization’ leave it ‘open to interpretation’ and readings through 
a wide range of political theorists – though principally Arendt, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas 
and Schmitt (Hansen 2012: 526-7).  The potential for such multiple interpretations, and the 
opening for a variety of attempted applications in a diversity of contexts this offers, combined 
with the basic conceptual break contained in viewing security as a self-referential speech act, 
account for both some of the success in the academic field, as well as much of the criticism. 
However, like Lene Hansen I believe there is a ‘normative-political’ core to the school, and that 
its understanding lies in a ‘reconstruction of desecuritisation’ both in terms of the theoretical 
field it engages with and the development of the theory in the context of Cold War détente 
(ibid). Though I add that its success lies not in the politics of its post-structuralism but in 
relation to the politics underpinning cosmopolitan power Europe.    
Post-structuralist realism (PSR) is the core of Wæver’s securitisation theory, though neglected 
as significant theoretical background in much of the secondary literature; only Rita Floyd really 
gives it due significance (Floyd 2010: 23-31).143  Of even greater significance, though similarly 
neglected in the secondary literature, is the context in which securitisation was developed 
which gives meaning to the politics of securitisation theory – here only Lene Hansen sees it as 
truly significant (Hansen 2012).144  There are then three inter-related elements to cover, of 
which the last is the least well covered elsewhere and of most weight: PSR, which constitutes a 
political approach to theory – formulated as a critical international relations theory ‘beyond’ 
critical international relations theory; a theory of politics, inflected by other elements but 
principally Arendtian; and, engagement in the peace research/movement nexus in the ‘second 
Cold War’.  From this last we can contextualise the preceding two, in the use of Arendtian 
                                                             
143 Post-structuralist realism (PSR) is almost entirely absent as a term – though several of its component 
parts are considered – in the secondary literature.  Rita Floyd’s is a comprehensive reconstruction of the 
development of PSR through the use of early, largely unpublished papers by Wæver, alongside his PhD 
thesis and early lectures.  Her purpose however is to revise securitisation theory for her own 
application, not to consider it politically as I am seeking to. Here I principally use a paper not utilised by 
Floyd, Beyond the Beyond of Critical International Theory, though published as a working paper by 
COPRI, as it deals directly with the relation of PSR to ‘critical international theory’.   It is however 
consistent with, and indeed contains sections repeated verbatim in those Floyd covers. The utility of this 
is in its explicit engagement with theory, a contrast to the ‘theory in the background’ approach Wæver 
took in most of his other papers in the period, which Lene Hansen suggests ‘might have contributed to 
the controversy over the status of securitisation as political theory’ (Hansen 2012: 536, n. 60). 
144 Hansen’s own survey of the literature on securitisation turns up only one other instance of its 
consideration, again from Rita Floyd, though Floyd focuses more on the significance of the end of the 
Cold War (Hansen 2012: 536, n59; Floyd 2010: 33-8). 
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concepts of politics, as in the discussion of Mary Kaldor above, and post-structuralist realism 
not only as developing within the broader incursion of post-structuralist ‘dissidents’ into IR 
theory, but also as a ‘realism’ counterposed to what Wæver saw as the idealism of both these 
‘dissidents’ and the peace movement. Heuristically divided up these three elements relate to 
respectively, the field, Wæver’s ethico-political drive, and the more general social condition of 
its production. 
Post-Structuralist Realism 
 
The aim of Post-structuralist realism (PSR) is to ‘develop a theory that can be political’, ‘by 
being more post-structuralist than Richard Ashley and Robert Walker’.  In this, and justifying 
my separation of a political approach to theory from a theory of politics in this case, ‘in relation 
to realism this post-structural realism is therefore less ‘critical’ in the traditional sense’ (Wæver 
1989b: 1) .  The aim here is to destabilise realist concepts, and deconstruct them – the 
common post-structuralist strategy in which ’Critical International Political Theory should be 
written in the margins of the realist text.  Not as a new book’ (ibid: 89, his emphasis). 
 
Nonetheless he realises the problem of relativism this generates, wary of the self-enclosed 
discursive logic of Richard Ashley, and negating the possibility of the ‘beyond’ in RBJ Walker 
(‘where should that be’).  He therefore claims a Derridean approach in using the texts of 
realism as a foundation, reinserting the destabilised terms, and in effect forcing post-
structuralism through realism: ‘the critical potential is the implosive energy, involved when 
you (with over-enthusiastic indifference ) return the message and thereby cause an overload: 
the Realpolitik becomes too Realpolitik for the real politician’ (ibid: 90). 
 
It is therefore also ‘post’ structural realism in the second sense of coming after and building 
upon, rather than ‘against’, as the latter oppositional strategy leaves the field it is opposed to, 
here IR understood as contained by realism, untouched (ibid: 66-67).  In this then he retains 
the basic realist core of  the states system  - it ‘is a continuation of realism (classical realism) – 
with the mark of a post-structuralist reading’ (ibid: 5, original emphasis) - albeit with states 
understood as socially constructed (ibid: 30-32, prefiguring in its ‘crystallisation’ the later 
Copenhagen School position of the states system as sufficiently ‘socially sedimented’ as to ‘ 
become a possible referent object for security’ (Buzan and Wæver 1997: 242)). 
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We can see in all this the problem of the second order hegemony I have outlined.  Whilst 
throughout he points to classical realists as very flexible thinkers, and seems to see their 
emphasis on the decision maker and the undecidabilty of political choices as proto-post-
structuralist (even (half-?) jokingly placing Kissinger as a ‘critical theorist’ (ibid: 44 n.36, n.37)), 
realist theory is treated as theory qua theory, with Waltzian neorealism its ultimate theoretical 
realisation, shorn, for all Wæver’s references to Foucault, of a relation to any actual power.  
‘Great powers’ appear in the text, with not even a ‘such as the US’.  What is opposed is the 
manifestation of this power in the field, as understood shorn of its organic relation to power (a 
single reading of the field in Bourdieu’s terms), resulting in as futile, and as scholastic a 
strategy as that of the ‘dissidents’ he critiques on just these grounds.  
 
This strategy leads to his version of critical ‘security’.  R.B.J. Walker’s strategy is to ask ‘security 
for whom?’ and thereby draw out the implicit referent object of the state, and oppose it to 
human security.  Being ‘more post-structuralist’ than Walker involves ‘rejecting the ‘whom’ -
wherefrom he gets these ‘people’’, as, Wæver argues, ‘humanity’ is an ‘empty reference’.  The 
focus then is not on shifting the referent object – as in other ‘broadening’ approaches – but in 
destabilising ‘security’ itself. Rather than developing a theory of power he follows Foucault in 
developing an ‘analytics of power’, and from here we see the focus on the security speech act, 
inchoately introduced in these earlier works, which develops into securitisation theory (ibid: 
74). 
 
A common criticism of securitisation theory is of it as a neutral or technocratic ‘process tracing’ 
(Burke 2013: 79 for a ‘textbook’ presentation of this interpretation), but we can see here how 
this focus on the creation of security issues is, for Wæver, in and of itself political through its 
relationship to realism and strategic studies – though this is, in the classic critical failing, theory 
critique (mis-)understood as politics (cf. Jahn 1998; McCormack 2009). However, Wæver 
pushes his critique of post-structuralism further, agreeing with those who fault its lack of any 
‘ethics’.  In his ‘post structuralist’ international theory he wants to create ‘even an absolute 
commitment to some basic (political?) values’ (ibid: 54).  Taking as the base the ‘absolute limit 
for human morality [as] total slavery, the Concentration Camps’, he opposes to a ‘human 
rights’ approach one that focuses on the ‘minimum’ – ‘those rights that facilitate political 
action’, noting the ‘affinity to Hannah Arendt’s concept of politics’ (ibid: 57-58). 
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An Arendtian concept of politics 
His political theory he takes then from Arendt who ‘in my view captures uniquely well’ this 
‘essential feature of politics - that irreducible, open element that is the in-betweenness of 
politics’ (Wæver 2007: 13).  Development of his reading of Arendt need not overly detain us, 
her concept of politics is a common thread throughout his work, but it is worth situating it 
here as a post-structuralist reading focusing on the ‘undecidability’ of the consequences of 
actions.  This openness is then read as post-structuralist in its stress on the performativity of 
politics and the undecidability of actions as good or ill, except once done – and then assessed 
in the stories told about it (Wæver 1989b: 50-51).  Although securitisation theory has been 
read as containing a Habermasian theory of politics,145 Wæver is here clear on the difference 
between Habermas and his use of Arendt.  What is important is the space for action; 
Habermas’ public sphere is too rationalist with too little scope for constitutive agonism and 
action, too little scope for creating identity and the self (cf. Hansen 2012: passim).   Set against 
the Habermasian idea that ‘we (can) control language’ is the idea that we are ‘often controlled 
by language’ which makes clear that in Wæver's hands securitisation is not about the creation 
of a public sphere based on Habermasian discourse ethics (Wæver1989b: 50). 
 
This gives an entry into the often misunderstood normative content of Wæver’s construction 
of securitisation/desecuritisation.  The misunderstanding arises because there is a clear, long 
term, preference for issues to be desecuritised/returned to ‘normal politics’ and this is often 
seen to be the normative core. Certainly there is an idealised condition of asecurity – where, 
not feeling insecure people ‘work on other matters’ and ‘think in other categories: politics, 
economy, etc.’ (Wæver 1989b: 84). This is however something of a utopian vision –for Wæver 
entering politics as it is, ‘to move out into the political’, is a necessary task for critical theory to 
overcome the limitations of scholasticism: ‘out here directions are not marked with road-signs 
indicating what is ‘critical’ or ‘progressive’. In politics one cannot just be ‘against’: on the 
contrary one does something’ (ibid: 90).  In doing so a responsible actor should attempt to 
securitise some things that can be best dealt with within emergency politics.  Ultimately then 
this preference for securitisation/desecuritisation cannot be decidable outside of the concrete 
(cf. Floyd 2007, 2010).   
 
                                                             
145 Michael C. Williams a prominent example (Williams 2003). 
189 
 
 
Whilst this has led to debate on the ethics of securitising (specific) issues (notably ibid), what 
this means is that neither securitisation nor desecuritisation contain the normative content, 
which lies in the possibility of the process itself – the space for securitising action, as 
representative of this broader concept of politics.  Once securitised of course, the space for 
this process relating to this issue is by definition shut down, and so desecuritisation will 
generally return to preference. This then makes sense of the position of Schmitt within 
securitisation, as theorising the state of emergency, but not in his unilateral decisionism of the 
ability to declare such a state. Normatively then security policy and its setting is viewed 
through this Arendtian concept of politics – ‘it should be stressed that since securitisation is 
never (in contrast to Schmitt) decided by one sovereign subject but in a constellation of 
decisions it is ultimately inter-subjective (and truly political in an Arendtian sense)’ (Wæver 
2006: 286).     
 
From this we can see the conceptualisation of politics is absolutely central normatively, but 
this does not resolve the difficulty of securitisation as a process as an expression of this 
politics, and securitisation in its effects as a negation of this process.  For this we must 
understood it in its geopolitical context, in which the concept of desecuritisation was part of 
‘theorising détente [and] thus part of a political project that strove to open up space for more 
political struggle’(Hansen 2012: 536-7).  
Cold War context146 
Wæver’s own comments make clear what he sees as the political applications of securitisation 
theory seeing Cold War détente as ‘negotiated desecuritisation; negotiated limitation of the 
use of the security speech act’, which, so he argues, ‘contributed to the modification of the 
Eastern societies and systems that made possible the radical changes of 1989’ (Wæver 1997b: 
227).  Whilst his work of the time was not yet encapsulated in the rubric of desecuritisation, it 
prefigured it in advocating a shift from security to ‘politics’ as captured by ‘détente’, and in 
doing so  it combined his political approach to theory with both peace activism and being ‘a 
kind of security expert in Denmark’ (cf.  Hansen 2012: 536-8). 
                                                             
146 As the two scholars who consider the ethics of securitisation/desecuritisation within the context of 
the theory’s development, there are some parallels in my analysis with those of Lene Hansen and Rita 
Floyd (2012, 2010 respectively).  However, their analysis is geared towards the ‘application’ of the 
theory whereas I am assessing the potential and problematic aspects of the theory politically and 
relation to cosmopolitan power Europe, within which context is critical.  
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His political analysis of Cold War détente, whilst more theoretical and less activist than 
Kaldor’s contains marked similarities.  Firstly, the central significance of ‘enemy images’ of one 
another, and a European rejection of this seen in the central role this European ‘desecuritising’ 
of identities played in ending the Cold War.  Secondly, in its construction of Europe against the 
elites of both East and West; processes of both ‘all-Europeanization and Western-
Europeanization’ run the risk of accumulating ‘fears in limited but important groups - 'security 
elites' in West and East. And one day this will cause a dramatic backlash’ (Wæver 1989a: 10). 
Thirdly, the construction of civil society against totalitarian states of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and their protection: this last being the central question desecuritisation was designed 
to address - how to construct civil society activism as not a security issue for these state 
security classes.  In this way it is posed as a European approach against a US human rights 
approach that in its absolutism and focus on individual rights, not civil society as a space, 
risked destabilising regimes and provoking a security response (Wæver 1989a: 11).  As Wæver 
characterises it:  
 
A rule-of-thumb can here be to turn 'threats' into 'challenges'; security problems 
into politics; make elites avoid the term 'security' and open up domestically 
room for more open political struggle - even if the rules are not yet 'fair' 
according to absolute standards. If first the room for politics is opened there are 
lots of brilliant people in the societies who will carry the cause further. 
Wæver 1989a: 12 
 
This is a political challenge for Eastern Europe as ‘’civil society’ as an absolute claim is possible 
where there is no – or almost no- public realm; when the fight is for opening the space for 
politics’.  Nonetheless he doesn’t fall into the trap of generalising this as Kaldor has; there can 
be no such absolute normative claims for civil society as representing ‘an ideal of unpolitical 
politics’ as he sees it used in contemporaneous peace movement circles.147  Therefore 
‘[t]ransferring it into Western European politics is not necessarily that simple’ (1989b: 57).   
 
That this is a theory not of, but for the creation of the ‘public sphere’ becomes evident in the 
difficulties of its application post-Cold War, once developed into securitisation theory proper.  
                                                             
147 Pinpointing the misunderstanding of ‘anti-politics’, as we have seen in our discussion of Kaldor 
above, which in fact relates more or less directly to the desecuritisation of issues; their removal from 
‘totalitarian’ state politics. 
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A frequent charge against the Copenhagen School is of Eurocentrism, with securitisation 
theory’s theorising of the shift form ‘normal politics’ to securitised emergency politics seen as 
reflecting  specifically Western liberal social structures (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 485; cf. 
Bilgin 2011; Wilkinson 2007).  Wæver’s response to this ‘most common’ ‘misreading of the 
theory’ is useful here: the ‘depoliticizing effect of securitization is understood in relative terms, 
and therefore can be observed in both democratic and undemocratic societies.’ (Greenwood 
and Wæver 2013: 485-6). In fact, despite applications outside of Europe being framed about 
how well the theory can ‘travel’ (ibid; Wilkinson 2007; cf. Bilgin 2011 for further examples), the 
most intensive development of the theory, into a ‘second generation’ Copenhagen School, has 
stemmed from difficulties applying the theory to liberal western politics, and especially the 
EU.148 
 
This ‘second generation’ contains a broad divergence into internal (post-structuralist/ 
Derridean) and external (contextual/Bourdieusian) developments of the theory (Stritzel 2007: 
359; Stritzel 2011).149  The central development of much of this second generation work, 
sharing a common external critique of the school, is against the claim that ‘security has an 
inherent, universal logic (associated with urgency and exceptionalism, for example)’ as this 
‘lacks attention to the multiple ways in which security is understood and practised in world 
politics’, and so ‘greater attention is needed to the  varied social, historical and political 
contexts in which security is constructed’(Browning and McDonald 2013: 237).  Thus what 
gives this otherwise theoretically diverse second generation a ‘family resemblance’ is this focus 
on the nature and fluidity of the relationship between normal politics and the exceptional, and 
working to develop on the insight that ‘social construction of a security issue is a more 
dynamic, nuanced and complex process than the one described by the [original] Copenhagen 
School’ (Trombetta 2011: 135; Donnelly 2012: 49-64).  
 
                                                             
148 There is an interesting parallel with Wæver’s comment that ‘[a]lthough Deutsch's concept of security 
community has been accused of being Euro-centric, it is actually difficult to apply to present-day 
Europe’, in that both develop from the European moment of creation that becomes embodied in the EU, 
but as idealised abstractions (of differing kinds) of the process are difficult to apply to the supposed 
subject (Wæver 1998: 104). 
149 Stritzel’s 2007 division still widely cited and used (cf. Roe 2012 for inter-relation to the ‘ethics’ of 
securitisation) – in the more recent division he places as exemplars: Jef Huysmans, focusing on 
securitisation as Arendtian ‘political act’; Juha Vuori representing an internalist concern with the 
grammar of the securitization logic; and Thierry Balzacq and himself in a ‘contextual process/practice’ 
camp (2011: 348).  
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As an example of the difficulties in application to Western politics we can take the putatively 
archetypal case of the George W. Bush administration’s construction of the War on Terror and 
associated justifications for the war on Iraq.  Whilst often seen as a pre-eminent example of 
securitisation (Buzan 2006; Buzan and Wæver 2009), in using this discourse to develop 
securitisation theory Faye Donnelly makes clear that its central failing is the fragility too rigid a 
separation of normal politics and the exceptional gives to the theory (Donnelly 2012).   
 
Couched in general terms by Donnelly, the question is posed as how one can distinguish 
between a policy evolution and a securitisation, and the question of at what point enough 
rules of a particular kind are broken to constitute a securitisation.  Applied more specifically 
Donnelly demonstrates the embeddedness of ‘securitising’ speech acts within wider political 
discourses (or ‘overlapping language games’), characteristic of an administration determined 
as much to change the rules of the game and create its own reality – and thus shift ‘normal 
politics’ - as by explicit rule-breaking and decisionism, and the construction of emergency 
politics.     What is shown to be central is how the Iraq War was given meaning, how the Bush 
administration’s use of language both enabled and constrained their action – within which 
securitising logics (against the original securitising ‘blueprint’ she argues ‘there is always more 
than one way to speak security’)  formed part of the wider ‘language games’ constructing this 
meaning (Donnelly 2012: 3-5, 88). 150 
 
Where securitisation theory in its original formulation has been applied successfully is 
precisely not in understanding Western security discourse, but in the shifting of ‘non-European’ 
political cultures towards the EU’s self-conceptualised norms. Not that it captures the reality of 
such transitions151, but that it provides the political conceptions used within and enabling such 
a shift. 
                                                             
150 Donnelly’s work is an application of Wittgensteinian ‘language games’ to securitisation theory,  based 
on her PhD which was supervised by Karin Fierke, whose own work lies in ‘post-Wittgensteinian’ 
development of constructivist approaches to IR (for critical security studies in particular see Fierke 
2007). All of which bears out the academic fruitfulness of the conceptual break in seeing security as self-
referential practice crystallised by Wæver.   
151 Claire Wilkinson’s 2007 development of securitisation theory demonstrating by its omissions the 
weakness of the approach for this task.  She seeks to overcome its ‘Eurocentrism’ - based on it 
containing the assumption that the ‘Euro-American model of the state and the accompanying political 
culture is valid globally’ (2007: 7) - through application to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution’ of 2005, one of 
the US backed Soros facilitated ‘Colour Revolutions’ in the FSU.  This latter element is necessarily 
unmentioned by Wilkinson, who must focus on the de/securitising acts of formal power holders and 
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Pinar Bilgin, consistently engaged in ‘Thinking past 'Western' IR’ (Bilgin 2008), demonstrates 
this usage in Turkish security literature, where beyond its use in process tracing ‘two 
interrelated processes of desecuritisation in Turkey: recent liberalization of domestic political 
processes, on the one hand, and improvements in relations with Syria and Iran, on the other’, 
securitisation theory has a direct normative power and impact (Bilgin 2011: 406).  Locating this 
security literature in the context of EU accession debates she stresses ‘how securitization 
theory is utilized by Turkey’s scholars as a ‘Western European approach’ to security’, with the 
concomitant ‘[c]onflating [of] desecuritisation with Europeanization as such allow[ing] the[se] 
authors to portray Turkey as a Europeanizing (if not yet European) country whose civil society 
[…] and/or politicians […] diagnose Turkey’s problems as securitization and seek to address 
them through desecuritisation as ‘proper’ European actors would’ (2011: 399, 406). 
This is closely tied to Wæver’s iteration of the constructivist take on the end of the Cold War; 
Bilgin’s analysis worth citing at length as it gets to the core of the matter: 
Through offering securitization theory’s reading of how the Cold War 
was brought to an end in Western Europe (securitization was the 
source of the ills of the European Union and desecuritisation was the 
method through which they were addressed), these texts assure 
readers as to the appropriateness of the solutions adopted by Turkey’s 
policymakers. Accordingly, controversial policies that (re)calibrate civil–
military balances come across as entirely appropriate policies to be 
adopted by an EU candidate country. Second, viewed through the lens 
of securitization theory as such, Turkey comes across as being able to 
address its problems because it is following in the footsteps of EU 
actors. This second move locates Turkey in Europe by way of 
highlighting how it presently exhibits a ‘proper European way of 
behaviour’ at a time when sceptics at home and abroad question the 
likelihood of Turkey’s accession to the European Union.  (ibid: 408) 
Bilgin does also note that this should be unsurprising as despite laying a formulaic charge of 
‘Eurocentric ethnocentrism’ against the theory, she highlights that Wæver has ‘argued that 
securitization theory might have a greater potential for adoption by non-core scholars than 
some other critical approaches to security' precisely on the grounds of the potential similarity 
of situation and relation to non-liberal state formations of non-core scholars and ‘European 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
local poltical actors as they present themselves. Indeed she references the reports of the International 
Crisis Group without comment on the significance of the involvement of this organisation which was co-
founded and financed by Soros, who still sits on the Executive Committee of its Board. 
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civil societal activists of the 1980s’ which gives a similar dynamic to the issue of 
desecuritisation and the creation of a public sphere (ibid: 403-4).152 
This brings out the centrality of Cold War anti-totalitarianism and subsequent understanding of 
the construction of the EU, to the theory.  My focus has been on the development of the 
theory in the Cold War, the shift to the theory’s relation to post-Cold War cosmopolitan 
Europe follows naturally as Pinar Bilgin’s analysis of its use reveals.   The pacific image of 
(cosmopolitan)153 Europe is similarly created through a securitisation against Europe’s past.  
Europe is seen as a model of internal ‘asecurity’, the semi-utopian condition beyond 
desecuritisation where traditional military security issues cannot even be conceived within the 
‘non-war’ or ‘security community’ (Wæver 1998).  In his own take on the relation of geo-
cultural origins to the development of securitisation theory Wæver relates its development as 
a ‘meta-theorisation’ of the dilemmas of ‘widening’ security to non-traditional issues, which 
the asecuritised community of the EU brings to the fore (Wæver 2012, Wæver and Greenwood 
2013, cf. n. 152 for the shift in Wæver’s understanding here between 2004 and 2012). 
This brings us to a final acute point from Wæver on the nature of European power, and its 
distinction to US power.  Much European discourse over George W Bush era US foreign policy 
criticised it as Manichean, creating a strict us and them binary, with many considerations 
bringing out the continuation of Cold War rhetoric within this.  Against this, and ‘the wish of 
various poststructuralists and critical theorists to catch the EU and the West154 ‘Othering’ 
various neighbors – Islamic Middle East, Russia or the Balkans - the dominant trend in 
European security rhetoric is that the Other is Europe's own past (fragmentation), and those 
                                                             
152 Turkey she speculates being therefore ‘one of those places where Wæver would expect 
securitization theory to do well by virtue of the ways in which the language of geopolitics and security 
has been utilized by elites to justify statist practices and limit civil society’s room for manoeuvre’ (ibid: 
406). Bilgin doesn’t follow this argument through to question the actual nature of securitisation theory 
as ‘Eurocentric ethnocentrism’ in the way I have, and therefore supposes this applicability is not 
constitutive of the theory but would be a ‘matter of how it is utilized in a particular context’ (ibid: 404).  
The piece she cites is Wæver’s influential, ‘controversially’ unpublished, ISA paper on new ‘schools’ in 
security theory’ (Wæver 2004)(see Christine Sylvester’s response to the C.A.S.E. collective where the use 
of this unpublished paper is made a central issue (Sylvester 2007).  Sylvester is correct insofar as 
assessing Wæver’s  early work does require some effort as so much of it is unpublished or no longer 
readily available following COPRI’s merge into DIIS).  In its later published iteration on ‘the Europeanness 
of new ‘schools’’ the analysis shifts to suggest ‘other concepts [than security] may provide the headline 
for more productive and inspiring work on the same issues’ as security has done in different ways in the 
US and Europe (Wæver 2012: 66). 
153 Wæver does not use the term, though as I show his analysis fits within this model. 
154 Wæver’s failure here to differentiate within the ‘West’ reveals the pre-Bush era vintage, Clinton 
seeming to offer a change to Cold War US strategy (cf. Apeldoorn and Graaff 2012 on continuity and 
change in post-Cold War US grand strategy). 
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further away from the center are not defined as anti-Europe, only as less Europe’ (Wæver 
1998: 100); a succinct summary of the self- conceptualisation underlying cosmopolitan and 
normative power Europe.155 
Trajectory 2 – Conclusion: Political consistency 
Ole Wæver has been clear throughout his work on the centrality of an Arendtian concept of 
politics.  His recent recapitulation of the ‘Politics of securitization (theory)’ states this once 
again, and relates it directly to the rest of the theory – that it is ‘the political moves invested in 
the theory, i.e. the political act involved in designing and/or employing securitization theory 
(how to theorize politically)’ that is ‘ultimately crucial – and, notably, more strategic’ (Wæver 
2011: 466-7, original emphasis).  Whilst his consideration of the burgeoning debate over the 
‘politics of securitisation theory’ (cf. Gad and Petersen 2011) is done in a characteristically 
generous and thoughtful way this is directed against attempts to reconfigure securitisation 
theory along alternative ethical or normative lines, particularly the work seeking to bridge the 
division in critical security studies between Copenhagen and Aberystwyth (Ken Booth’s 
emancipatory critical security studies) and that arguing for a normative conceptualization of 
securitization/desecuritisation itself (he uses Booth and Claudia Aradau as illustrations).156 
In doing so he offers an analysis of the politics of theorising which mirrors the political realist 
approach I argued for in chapter one.  One approach ‘argues that a particular theory should 
take a stance on various issues or provide standards of judgement for specific cases’; this is not 
a sufficiently academic approach but ‘rather a political reflection that really belongs to another 
kind of actor, a political party – this approach does not assess what theory does as theory, but 
how it relates to a political position’. Its benefit is its ‘emphasis on real politics in society (not 
privileging academe), while its drawback is that it does not address intellectual academic work 
in a manner proper for this particular practice’.   The common alternative to the ‘politics of 
theorizing sets out to demonstrate a given theory’s dependence on some philosophical 
premises, which are then shown as being inferior to other, more progressive philosophical 
                                                             
155 In contradiction with this, Uliana Hellberg uses the discourse of Blair and Habermas to construct the 
EU as engaging in identity construction through ‘securitising’ the other (Hellberg 2011).    This highlights 
that the debate within Europe between muscular liberal interventionism and a more pacific normative 
power vision can be seen in conceptualising its identity construction through securitisation theory also. 
156 Others are not always so generous, Rita Taureck correctly, but more pugnaciously, arguing they are 
‘based on a total misunderstanding of the premises of securitization theory’ (Taureck 2006: 54).  
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positions’ with the drawback that ‘[t]he most political thing one can do within such a 
perspective is to solve a philosophical problem in the politically correct way’.  This second 
approach is then good at respecting the specificity of intellectual work, but errs in ‘placing 
politics in the sphere of philosophy’.  
The trick is to ‘get both points right’: ‘The politics of philosophical debates does not have 
primacy, politics outside academia does’, but theory is ‘not to be assessed as though that 
theory were a political actor in the normal sense.  It is not what the theory says, but what it 
does’ that is critical, and in this ‘how features of the theory systematically shape the political 
effects of using this theory’.  He thus concludes that the Arendtian concept of politics ‘does not 
simply reflect a personal penchant on the part of the theory’s founder’ the very ‘definition of 
securitization shapes every usage of the theory and entails this Arendtian concept of politics’ 
(Wæver 2011: 467-8, his emphasis). 
This is the approach I have taken in constructing this trajectory, with however the critical 
addition whose significance for his theory Wæver misses, that Arendt’s concept of politics was 
constructed against (her construction of) ‘totalitarianism’, and that this anti-totalitarianism is 
accordingly the central political effect available to his theory.  As a concluding remark I will 
briefly draw out the ‘political effects of using this theory’ explicitly and contemporarily. 
The concept of revolution, and revolutionary situations themselves cause great difficulties for 
realist IR theories – even post-structuralist realist ones.  Reflecting, alongside Maja Touzari 
Greenwood, on his experiences as  part of a CAST delegation to Egypt in 2010-11 to discuss 
widening conceptions of security, during the revolution there,  Ole Wæver concludes the  
theory is ill-equipped for understanding political change. These events set securitisation theory  
the theoretical task of overcoming ‘reference to existing political structures’ – this task derived 
from a ‘theoretical challenge’ ‘not because the case is non-Western, but due to the 
revolutionary situation’ (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 501). This however is to misrecognise 
the challenge presented by such a revolutionary situation, as revolutionary transformation of 
political structures in Central and Eastern Europe was constitutive rather than challenging to 
the theory. The difficulty lies instead where change cannot be grasped simply in terms of the 
construction of an idealised public sphere.   
 
Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen capture this through bringing securitisation theory 
into contact with the Cuban revolution.  Within this meeting they find securitisation theory 
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cannot but ‘parse [the revolution] as a form of totalitarianism’ and is thus ‘conceptually 
confluent with the views expressed by the Cuban revolution’s liberal critics’ and in ‘profound 
contradiction with revolutionary discourse […] forms of political organization and action that 
lie at the heart of the experience of revolutionary politics in Cuba’ (Holbraad and Pedersen 
2012: 169).  Fundamentally it cannot grasp the revolutionary unity between the people and 
the state, an inability which for them reflects the liberal political ontology underlying the 
theory expressed in the form of the ‘distinction between the individual person and the state’ 
(ibid). With the reconstruction I have given above it becomes clear that to this we should add 
the flattening effect on the comprehension of politics that Arendt’s static conceptualisations 
create – the conflation of all non-liberal societies under ‘totalitarianism’ and related inability to 
grasp dynamics of geopolitical pressures and changes.  Wæver brings this out himself in 
relation to Holbraad and Pederson’s argument, arguing that ‘revolutionary’ securitization often 
mythologizes the defence of ‘the people’ in a manner that comes close to classical ‘national 
security’ but even more so – ‘[a]s seen in the French and Russian revolutions, and perhaps 
most obviously in Cuba’s definition of threats against the ‘revolution’ decades after it took 
place (Holbraad and Petersen, 2012)’ (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 494, 494 n.12). 
 
Securitisation theory is not however an explicit theory of straightforward social restructuring, 
but a theorisation of practice(s) that nonetheless ‘systematically shape[s] the political effects 
of using this theory’ (ibid: 467).  Wæver’s thoughts on the role of securitisation theory during 
the Egyptian revolution bear this out, simultaneously demonstrating the inability of such a 
theory to truly place such change in political context.   For him securitisation theory’s role is to 
overcome a situation where political: 
‘positions are abstracted into poles and each defended against their 
enemy […] a constellation [that] erases the possibility of politics, because 
no common ground exists’, so a concrete contribution ‘could be to 
calibrate an institutional minimum structure as a common security focal 
point in order to secure a form of stability that facilitates change. It is a 
classical paradox known from, for example, the politics of East–West 
détente, that change is only possible when there is enough stability for 
absolute change to be ruled out […]In Egypt, this pointed to security sector 
reform (police brutality as a procedural problem) and constitutional 
politics. The dominant securitizations became increasingly destructive 
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delegitimizations of political opponents, whereas any form of productive 
political co-production would demand at least an additional security 
discourse of shared defence of the framework itself. (ibid: 495) 
 
Reasonable enough, if one sees revolutionary change as normatively undesirable and seeks to 
subvert it: ‘A central task discussed with our partners was to channel the young revolutionaries’ 
critique of the regime into concrete complaints over police violence and demands for reforms 
of the security sector’ (ibid: 495).  
However the issue of a new constitution brings out the interests at play in a way that 
securitization theory, framing actors in terms of securitising discourses within Egypt cannot 
grasp.   For Wæver NGOs and civil society groups are simply one of the four ‘revolutionary 
groupings’ at play, noting of them only that ‘civil society organizations, NGOs and human rights 
groups had grown massively in the previous two decades’ (ibid: 493). Typically though, as we 
saw in Central and Eastern Europe this has been a site for Western intervention, such growth 
relating to the fact that in the early 1990s ‘the United States began emphasizing civil society 
development in the Middle East’, stepped up considerably post 9/11 such that in 2009 the 
level of annual U.S. democracy aid in the Middle East was more than the total amount spent 
between 1991 to 2001’ (Hamid 2011: 19-20). 
 
Such ‘aid’ formed a continuance of Western ‘Open Door imperialism’, opening societies to 
Western capital (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012), with a ‘focus on economic reform first 
and political change later’. U.S. and European policy communities ‘coalesced around the 
notion of ‘gradualism’’. Stability was key; ‘Revolution was impossible.’ (Hamid 2011: 19-20; cf. 
van der Pijl 2011).  
 
Evidently control was lost to real democratising momentum. Nevertheless, during the crisis 
and the redrafting of the Egyptian constitution, pre-prepared draft constitutions were 
submitted for adoption from the civil society groups the Arabic Network for Human Rights 
Information and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (Reuters 16 February, 2011),157 
organisations funded in part by the Open Society Foundation and NED respectively.  None of 
this, nor the provenance of Mohamed El Baradei the preferred presidential candidate of these 
                                                             
157 http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE71F0N620110216?sp=true 
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groups, who sat at the time on International Crisis Group Board alongside inter alia George 
Soros, can be fitted into Wæver’s securitisation theory approach to the situation.  For him the 
revolutionary situation was down to ‘public pressure’, and as we saw ‘politics’ becomes 
restricted to limited disagreement within a space of ‘political co-production’ nationally 
(Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 496). 
During the 2011 revolution George Soros (displaying his sense of humour) commented that ‘I 
am, as a general rule, wary of revolutions. But in the case of Egypt, I see a good chance of 
success. […] My foundations are prepared to contribute what they can. In practice, that means 
establishing resource centers for supporting the rule of law, constitutional reform, fighting 
corruption and strengthening democratic institutions in those countries that request help in 
establishing them, while staying out of those countries where such efforts are not welcome’ 
(Soros 2011b: u.n.).  The ‘cutting edge’ had done its work, albeit creating a more revolutionary 
and fluid situation than desired, and the critical task of ensuring the right kind of expertise and 
knowledge underpinned the politics of the country was to begin. 
To assess securitisation theory in Wæver’s own terms then, what it ‘says’ is a desirable 
creation and support of ‘co-produced’ politics. What it does is legitimise liberal capitalist 
openings of societies – against securitising totalitarian forces - in a process which it is incapable 
of theorising or grasping within its conceptualisation of politics. 
 
Conclusion  
The considerations of Mary Kaldor and Ole Wæver have reflected on their individual ‘puzzles’ 
in their respective conclusions. These considerations have also demonstrated the compatibility 
of their thought with liberal interventionism of differing kinds and thus the potential for co-
option: Kaldor more akin to a modified global power Europe vision, Wæver to an assertive 
normative power conception of Europe. 
In the introduction to his chapter, however I also set the two trajectories the task of telling us 
something worthwhile about European IR and its relation to the renovation of Western 
hegemony, beyond this simple relation of appropriation.  What these trajectories tell us is 
about the nature of the construction of the new ‘great lie’ of international relations, of 
cosmopolitanism and the international community, and through this ‘why critical and 
emancipatory approaches are doomed to appear as little more than the theoretical wing of 
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contemporary liberal interventionism’ (McCormack 2009: 18). In demonstrating this In 
conclusion then I highlight how a political realist dual reading, as argued for in chapter four 
and developed in the trajectories, gives a more valuable understanding of their work than 
those that flatten it through this association with liberal imperialism.   I take Nik Hynek and 
David Chandler’s work as primary exemplars of this flattening here, due to its otherwise great 
strength and insight. 
Cosmopolitanism has been central to the shift in post-Cold War discourses, both academic and 
policy making, legitimising and shaping interventions by the West.  Within this the putative 
cosmopolitan nature of the EU has been central, with the US either folded into this ‘post-
modern’ camp (Cooper 2003), or seen as the primary obstacle to remaking the world in the 
European cosmopolitan image (Kaldor 2007c). Within accounts focusing on this relation 
however, the shift is understood instrumentally, with little consideration of the development 
of these discourses academically outside of their relation to policy making needs.  A focus 
therefore is on the direct linkages between (critical) security theorists and policy making.  
Kaldor is the pre-eminent figure here, but there have been ‘very few successful critical security 
academics who did not participate in policy advocacy’ (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 52), with 
academic work understood as ‘parasitical on the shift in Western policy discourses’, or 
‘derivative of existing policy rhetoric’ (ibid: 46;  Hynek 2012: 4; Chandler and Hynek 2011).  
Such an approach is only really able to grasp the most explicitly policy relevant academic 
discourses and lifts them out of their academic context, paradoxically also, through stressing 
the contemporary effects of the relation to policy, destroying the relationship of their 
development to the contemporaneous social conditions.  This is most clear-cut in its contrast 
to my development above in the case of the Copenhagen School, for which I have 
demonstrated consanguinity between it and ‘emancipatory’ approaches, especially that of 
Kaldor.158  In seeking to remove the ‘critical’ descriptor from critical security studies (CSS)  Nik 
Hynek and David Chandler take as their starting point Ken Booth’s post-Cold War work; this, 
constructed as the origin, being the ‘only basis’ upon which the field can be understood.   From 
                                                             
158 Hynek and Chandler include Mary Kaldor in their grouping of ‘emancipatory’ critical security theorists 
alongside Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, grouped around the securitising of the individual and/or 
human security. They particularly highlight Nicholas Wheeler’s work on the British Labour Party’s 
‘Ethical Foreign Policy’ and on R2P, alongside ‘[p]erhaps the most influential of these theorists Mary 
Kaldor’ (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 51). 
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here CSS is understood in its coeval development with greater freedom of intervention for the 
‘West’ – ‘Western states, international institutions and ‘global civic culture’’.  The Copenhagen 
School thereby becomes  a ‘second generation’ of CSS becoming ‘critical’ only  after Booth’s 
work and its relation to Western intervention made critique of such emancipatory critical 
security studies critical itself; thus as the ‘Copenhagen School of Security – otherwise existing 
since the late 1980s/early 1990s – became the Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies 
(the ‘second generation’ of CSS)’, ‘its broadened scope and emphasis on studying processes of 
securitisation, which was framed as ‘non-traditional’ security, quickly became the byword for 
CSS’.  For Hynek and Chandler the school’s rejecting of emancipatory approaches marks it as 
‘impartial’ and devoid of political content, its significance lying in its theoretical critique of 
human security serving to open the security studies field further. This critique enabled the 
‘incursion of post-structuralism into CSS’, thereby the snuffing of the critical from critical 
security studies, (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 53-54; Hynek 2012: 2), Critical security studies is 
thus understood only as a post-Cold War reaction to changed policy making needs. 
Whilst this draws out the most significant impact of this work, the unidirectional focus leaves 
them unable to understand the shift underlying this shift in policy making itself as it is in turn 
linked directly to problems faced by policy makers.  Consistent with my argument throughout 
they thus give a flattened image of the ‘West’ and ‘Western elites’ (Chandler 2006).  This is 
problematic as the shift identified within this post-Cold war discourse over time  points to the  
crisis of US hegemony and need for new legitimising rhetoric and practice – precisely as 
captured by Kaldor’s argument that her ‘new wars’ thinking is more effective than the old wars 
thinking persistent through the US’s unipolar moment .  Chandler elaborates via the growth 
and increasing hold of human security discourses the shift away from an interventionary 
model of liberal state restructuring and laissez faire economic imposition to the more 
comprehensive societal restructuring and focus on stability which we saw Mark Leonard mark 
out as the European alternative to the preceding US model of intervention.  
However, without consideration of the formation of the West, or its change in the post-Cold 
War world, these developments internal to post-Cold War legitimising discourse  are 
understood primarily in relation to the external problems faced – as problem-solving solutions 
to the failure of preceding model (cf. Duffield 2007:11-12).  David Chandler is left linking it to 
an existential crisis in the West, its elites incapable of strategic action as a result.   This leaves 
the shift and the cosmopolitan and related human security discourses as ad hoc reaction to 
problems. (Chandler 2006). 
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Nik Hynek's argument in this vein of distinctly different human security conceptions in Canada 
and Japan , related to the differing relations and ‘assemblages’ between state and private 
actors, highlights through its omission the central significance of the European discourse.  
Whilst I have not covered Canada or Japan’s development of the concept the centrality of 
Kaldor’s work to the overall development of the discourse is clear throughout both his and 
Chandler’s work but the central significance of her conception of human security suddenly 
disappears, and her central project of the EU as a human security actor is referenced only in a 
concluding comment as another suitable candidate for use of his approach (Hynek 2012: 197).  
Hynek is thus left with only the contrast between narrow and broad conceptions of human 
security (Japan and Canada respectively) understood instrumentally. 
The two trajectories I have given focus in different ways on coherence over time and the 
organic link of this political coherence to European experience- the social conditions within 
which their conceptualisations were formed.  The frequent references to the EU sharing the 
burden of ‘global governance’ within Chandler’s work should cause him to question whether 
this is linked to the shift in governance strategy and if so in what way.  The trajectories suggest 
that there is underlying the shift a replacement of US exceptionalism with EU exceptionalism: 
Kaldor draws together the different strands of post-modern’ ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral’ 
Europe to counterpose it to the US, standing against the formation of a global cosmopolitan 
order not by virtue of its military power but through its use of that power unilaterally, as the 
‘last nation-state’ (Kaldor 2003: 137; Kaldor 2007c: 150). 
Uncovering  the relation of European cosmopolitanism to the conditions of its production tell 
us much about the nature of the renovation of Western hegemony, through giving a different 
conception of ‘why critical and emancipatory approaches are doomed to appear as little more 
than the theoretical wing of contemporary liberal interventionism’ (McCormack 2009: 18). 
These theories and the European understanding of the experiences driving them are 
constitutive of the form the nature of this renovation takes. 
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Conclusion 
Summary of the argument  
I have argued that European discourses on international relations, within both the policy and 
academic fields, are central to the reworking of Western hegemony necessary in a ‘post-
American’ world.  Further, that this holds in most cases where the intent is consciously and 
nominally expressed as to provide an alternative to, or is even set explicitly against, the 
preceding US led Western hegemony.   
 
I also argued that these policy and academic discourses are inter-related, pushing this 
argument further than the direct, surface inter-linking already established by others between 
the two fields (e.g. Diez and Manners 2007).  Both reproduce the ‘illimitable narcissism’ 
underlying the universalisation of (idealised) European social structures, which underpins in 
turn interventions of various kinds to create and maintain these structures outside of the West 
(Anderson 2007).  In this, European self-perceptions, euphemised to varying degrees, are a 
replacement for the tarnished, and no longer so easily conceived of as universally desirable, 
‘American Way of Life’ (cf. Kagan 2012).  European post-Cold War confidence and the sense of 
a continent’s civilised transcendence of the political mire the rest of the world inhabits and 
recreates, intertwines with a greater freedom of action and increasingly cohesive 
expeditionary EU forces,  to re-establish a hegemonic interventionary project. 
 
Within this frame, the US too is looked down upon where it diverges from European models, 
most explicitly in reaction to the Bush doctrine – though only actors such as George Soros, 
standing ‘above’ the state system have the power to intervene meaningfully within the US to 
‘rectify’ these divergences, and accordingly he is most forthright on the US’s failing compared 
to Europe. In this we should take Soros as the leading global example of the combined ‘global’ 
capitalist and organic intellectual – capitalist in his position external to the states system and 
his use of this position directly to change the world in the interests of capital accumulation, 
both generally and specifically for his hedge fund ‘adventures’, and an organic intellectual in 
his universalising of the interests his interventions work to further. 
 
Within this commonality, as I have shown, the policy and academic discourses differ, in line 
with the field theory model of Bourdieu: the former, policy discourse, more explicit in 
valorising the European model in support of European backed, Western actions globally; the 
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latter more euphemised and ambivalent, though the continuity and homology I demonstrated 
becomes very clear when academics venture onto policy making terrain. 
 
Overall, European intellectual production on international relations has been at the forefront 
in establishing a new legitimate multilateralism to underpin Western hegemony, which US IR 
and policy is increasingly coming to recognise after the seductive febrile illusion of the 
‘unipolar moment’. 
 
Development of the argument  
In constructing this argument I started from Raymond Geuss’s expansion of Lenin’s realist 
definition of politics: who does what to whom, for whose benefit? This powerful formulation 
naturally cleaves from any idealist understanding or vision of politics – whether consensual or 
agonist - and aligns, to varying degrees, with class-based approaches.  Such a definition gives 
an approach focused on power, understood as a relation, and its use in the pursuit of interests.  
It also avoids the reification of the distinction between discourse and violence as things ‘done’ 
to people in pursuit of interests.  This is particularly important in clarifying the concept of 
politics as inseparable from both consensual and coercive forms of power: War then is a form 
of politics, and we can benefit from the insights of both the Clausewitzian concept of war as 
the continuation of politics by other means, and its radical reversal to politics as the 
continuation of war by other means. This then inoculates against sloppy idealist conceptions of 
creating an ‘alternate’ politics, as well as removing this central reification underpinning the 
conception of Europe as a fundamentally different form of actor, engaged in ‘civilian’ or 
‘policing’ interventions, potentially enabling of such an ‘alternate politics’ for example – rather 
than the imperialism of the US. 
 
This Leninist definition, ‘who/whom?’ necessitates consideration of class, precisely because its 
focus on actors removes the abstract ethical from political questions, to be replaced by the 
concrete reality of class relations and struggle – it matters who carries out an action, and 
whom it affects, rather than simply what that action is.  Its formulation of power as an active 
relation prevents reification of classes as acting as structural abstractions – the form of class 
formation is contingent upon these relational activities of both material and ideational kinds. 
Geuss’s expansion with the potential separation of actor and beneficiary further opens space 
for a host of intermediaries with various levels of consciousness of whose interests they are 
serving – whether characterised as a technocratic cadre, intellectuals as dominated 
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dominators, or organic intellectuals, this brings intellectual production squarely within the 
formulation. 
 
The internal relation between class formation and the states system established by the 
Amsterdam School then provides the underlying dynamic behind the changing geopolitical 
formation of the West that interacts with the intellectual production of these cadre and 
intellectuals to create the conditions for the projects seeking to renovate Western hegemony 
that I studied. 
 
To take this in stages, the creation of a Lockean transnational space across Britain and the US 
provided the conditions for the development of capitalism as we understand it – as an extra-
territorial force – exerted through a transnational ruling class; this class itself formed through 
these developments, and shaped into a class for itself – of a particular historical kind – by the 
challenges it faced in the pursuit of its interests.  This ruling class is a class in which capitalists 
and ‘state managers’ are not analytically separated a priori, but understood as forming as a 
(variegated) class for itself through this process. 
 
This formation – the Lockean heartland and its interaction through struggles to overcome the 
challenges from a series of contender states, that is those most powerful states modernising 
through passive revolutions in response to pressure from the heartland – form the framework 
for understanding change in the global political economy from the point of the formation of 
the heartland onwards.  
 
As the heartland overcame challenges from France and Germany, and as it faced that of the 
USSR, it incorporated Western Europe in the subordinate role so visible during the Cold War; 
whilst the USSR as primary contender during this period incorporated Central and Eastern 
Europe in a similar subordinate position, though one containing a radically different 
‘contender’ state-society complex.  Despite the initial appearance of, if not parity, then at least 
roughly matched superpower competition this division of Europe gave to those within Europe, 
the Cold War must be understood in the framework of this longer history – that is beyond the 
East–West perspective dominant in a divided Europe - to the dynamic of the Lockean 
heartland and contenders in the global political economy as a whole. Overcoming in this way 
the tendency to Western European parochialism in the region’s contemporaneous intellectual 
production allows both the study of such production as an object in itself as related to its 
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conditions of production, and concomitantly sets its concerns and the partiality of the 
concepts and definitions produced - for example of peace, democracy and state-civil society 
relations - in a wider global context. 
 
Post-Cold War however, following the crisis of US hegemony crystallised in the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, we find a ‘divided West’. By then the unipolar moment – which the crisis confirms 
never truly existed outside of febrile neo-con fantasy – had truly passed, seen through by all.  
This ‘divided West’, as even its coiner Jürgen Habermas makes clear, is in fact nothing of the 
kind on anything more than a superficial level. What it reflects is the need to reformulate the 
West’s mode of interaction with the rest of the world in line with the development of a bi-
polar West – the poles being the EU and US - and need for them to act cohesively to maintain a 
hegemonic position.   Habermas’ argument then, condensing and clarifying widespread but 
more inchoate reflections within Europe, comes down to the need for a Western European 
imprimatur for Western intervention. 
 
Whilst not approaching US capabilities the EU can and does launch independent expeditionary 
interventions, and from a US perspective is increasingly seen as having a zone of responsibility 
within broader Western global management.  Relatedly, the European ‘social model’- as I have 
developed as a more developed more sustainable and comprehensive model of neoliberalism - 
is needed in the wake of the rotted authority of the Washington consensus and de-
legitimation of laissez faire in general, as a legitimate base of authority for all Western 
interventions.   This European capability and its development is inter-related to the formation 
of a European capitalist class, separable but not separate from the Western transnational class 
as a whole.  Indeed, within this broader Western formation this increasingly cohesive 
European element is increasingly central, increasingly core, as the gravity of capitalist networks 
and activity shits to Europe. 
 
So far this is largely a retooling of the Amsterdam School for the post-Cold War, post-American 
world in order to set the context with which the European foreign policy and academic IR fields 
are imbricated: a retooling that I have shown has significant implications for the understanding 
of these fields and their developmental history.   Whilst the two fields of academia and policy 
stand in different relation to the field of power, and contain their own logics and structures, 
politically effective expressions within them must not only reflect the logic of the field they are 
expressed within but also be organically related to the totality of contemporary social 
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conditions (politico-economic dominant amongst these).  Thus ideas only ‘represent an 
independent force when maintained in dialectical connectivity, or internally related, with the 
social relations of production’ (Bieler and Morton 2008: 119). 
 
The distinction here is between willed arbitrary expressions and those formulations ‘capable of 
moving a mass of men’ – that is politically significant expressions, significant due to their 
relation to political conditions. This then is not (simply) a conditioning of agency – after all 
there are innumerable arbitrary expressions in both the policy and academic fields – but a way 
of understanding politically significant agency, and in ‘reverse’ identifying it and its relation to 
political conditions through its effects.  This then gives a powerful way to understand this 
relation for both the conscious ‘organic intellectual’ strategically playing their role, but also 
how this relation has been internalised, via the medium of the field, in other expressions – 
even where the ‘self-declared action’ stands in opposition to maintenance and development of 
the contextual political conditions. 
 
This is also not a deterministic, or economistic unidirectional process, as, in addition to the 
field’s relative autonomy, the understanding, directing and forming of these conditions are 
dependent on the ways in which the concrete situation is captured by these expressions.  That 
is, current conditions are formed through action based upon preceding understandings and 
expressions (with attendant errors, miscalculations and unintended effects), and whilst these 
conditions ‘delimit’ the significant organic expressions possible, they do not determine them. 
Rather than any conspiratorial or mechanistic relation between ruling class formation and their 
organic intellectuals then, such linkages and the ideas produced which take on independent 
force are formed by the powerful struggling with the tools available to tackle contemporary 
problems facing them, in addition to struggle in relation to one another in their respective 
fields and the field of power. 
 
Whilst focusing on discourse this approach differs from constructivist accounts in tying 
intellectual production to extra-discursive material power. In doing so I do build on the 
opening the Amsterdam School have established in relating such intellectual production to the 
social conditions of production.  Nevertheless, this angle is so far underdeveloped in their 
work, so whilst I based my work on the school’s many strengths and rely on developing their 
work in delineating the material bases of the development of the social conditions of 
intellectual production, I added an important missing element. 
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To do so the thesis developed the Amsterdam School concept of comprehensive concepts of 
control in a specific way.  Comprehensive concepts of control are the ideological development 
of competing hegemonic projects, and their theorisation is a significant contribution from the 
school, underused in the discipline more widely.  Through their use the ideational elements of 
hegemony are related to shifting material conditions - they express the ‘ideological and […] 
hegemonic structure of particular historical configurations of capital’ (Overbeek and van der 
Pijl 2002: 3) – and through this the dialectic of structure and agency is captured.  With this 
theorisation, studying the struggle between competing comprehensive concepts of control 
allows us to grasp the inter-relation between the grounding structural conditions for, and the 
strategic agency of, blocs within the bourgeoisie.  It is this dialectic, with this struggle 
understood as the ongoing process of class formation and change, that makes a discourse 
analysis based upon comprehensive concepts of control distinct from constructivist accounts: 
the discourse is integral to processes of class formation related to shifts in the structural 
composition of capital.  
 
Thus far within the school however, the ideational aspect of this has been developed 
principally in relation to capital structures.  So, whilst the specificity of European and EU 
capitalism has been richly explored its understanding remains dominantly derived from how 
struggles within a European ruling class have developed a specific synthesis between the ideal-
typical world-views of money capital and productive capital: the former containing a liberal 
internationalist concept of control privileging freedom of movement for capital and free trade, 
the latter being tied to real existing factors of production opposing the volatility of money 
capital. These ‘abstract categories have been manifested in the class fractions of industrial and 
financial capital’ and have been handled with considerable sophistication in the school’s work, 
always being ‘understood in their historically specific configuration’ within ‘concrete processes 
of class formation’ (Horn 2012: 52). Nonetheless, whilst this aspect of class formation – the 
relation of fragments of the ruling class to abstract categories of capital – certainly works to 
help set the parameters of organic, or politically efficacious, discourse, my aim has been to 
treat the members and intellectual affiliates of a ruling class as real agents, as more than 
actually existing carriers of structural agency.  
 
To do this I added and took seriously the effects of existing ideational structures, and their 
interaction with political agency, with my focus throughout on class formation in relation to 
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these ideational structures.  This brings to the fore the framing understanding of politics 
expressed in who/whom, of individuals exercising agency as whole individuals, and thereby 
operating not just within the worldview of structures of capital but the ideational structures of 
their societies as a whole also.   
 
Here then I focused on such ideational structures as related to Europe as an international 
actor.  Firstly, in the idea of Europe as an ‘alternative’ and the relation of this to its scope for 
legitimate action in the world.  This is a self –conception of Europe that shapes the form of the 
money capital-productive capital synthesis of the EU’s competing comprehensive concepts of 
control in both foreign and domestic policies in non-trivial ways, and consideration of this 
factor should be developed further in Amsterdam School / critical IPE work. 
 
Secondly, in studying the structures of the relevant academic field in Europe I moved beyond 
the direct linkages into policy making circuits and relations to corporate interests, to 
understand European IR through the specific European precursor structures of thought 
contained in peace research and security studies.   Again these shape academic  thought and 
input into policy-making discourse in non-trivial ways that should be considered seriously 
within European security studies and critical security studies more broadly – certainly it helps 
cut through the current ‘debate’ over what is or isn’t critical in critical security studies. 
 
This approach also allowed me to develop the inter-relation between the policy and academic 
fields at a deeper level than study of their mechanistic linkages allows.  Again, this moved this 
study of discourse beyond constructivist accounts to account for the specific social conditions 
of intellectual production shaping production in these two fields.  Here the concepts of Europe, 
and its role as an international actor, are seen to develop from specific, and specifically 
European, liberal and social democratic understandings of the Cold War and its ending – as 
reflected in my development of the social fabric containing policy intellectuals, and the 
political sociology of academic IR in Europe.   
 
All of this I have argued shapes the form of the development of an EU comprehensive concept 
of control. Whilst this concept must express a particular concrete money capital-productive 
capital synthesis, its development in Europe by Europeans means that its formation is affected 
in fundamental ways by European ideational structures too. Thus the distinctions between US 
and EU foreign policy discourses cannot just be understood as refractions of differing 
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syntheses between money and productive capital.  For such discourses to be organic, that is 
politically effective expressions, they must also be generated from the existing resources of 
either US or EU exceptionalism. In this way my approach considerably develops existing 
considerations of discourse contained within the Amsterdam School, without drifting into 
constructivist waters. 
 
Using this approach, and having established the class basis and ability to project power for the 
‘Europe’ that is significant to us here, I turned first to study the inter-relation between capital 
and policy representations of Europe as an international actor and its related legitimacy. The 
overview of established work examining the developing conceptions from civilian power 
through to global power Europe - and of the relation between academic study of Europe and 
policy discourses – established the simple correlation between European freedom to act in an 
expeditionary fashion, and self-conceptions and models of legitimacy that enabled it to do so.   
In a sense this is a simple stating of the necessity of a coercive moment in hegemony; more 
then needed to be done to establish global power Europe discourses as part of a hegemonic 
project, and to understand this project’s form. I set to doing so through studying the relation 
between capital and such policy discourses through examining the field of EU foreign policy 
focused think tanks.  The aim was to establish the organic relation between these expressions 
and their conditions of production, against the voluntarism underpinning the established 
accounts I already used in establishing this progression of self-conceptions.  
 
My main contribution here was a comprehensive development of the sketches of the role of 
think tanks in this process that Ian Manners and James Rogers give, moving beyond their 
disembodied discourse approach.  Seeing the think tank field as the primary engine of 
ideological production, for the formation of a class and construction of hegemonic projects 
through which such a class gains a sense of itself, means the contours of the think tank field in 
Europe, especially that concerned with defining Europe’s global role, becomes of great 
significance to the understanding of international relations.  This reinforces the significance of 
the overall argument of the organic link of politically successful thought to contemporaneous 
power conditions, with the parameters, control and stakes of intellectual production much 
clearer in a field so deeply imbricated with the field of power. 
 
Mapping this global power Europe think tank network reveals it to be relatively cohesive 
around a small core of think tanks, the most significant of which is George Soros’ European 
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Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).  Further mapping the position of the ECFR within a 
putative hegemonic bloc confirmed the central location of think tanks and their governance 
and advisory boards within the transition from a corporate community to its forming as a class 
for itself and potential political action.  This provided a novel and geographically located 
development of work within neo-Gramscian approaches examining the role of policy planning 
bodies in the establishment of Western hegemony; in doing so, against ‘global capital/ruling 
class models’, it established the relation between a post-Cold War, post-American world and 
the development of a bi-polar West and discourses of Europe as a different kind of 
international actor, here captured in the global power Europe discourse. 
 
George Soros early diagnosed the crisis of hegemony in the US led West and set about doing 
his part to reconstruct Western hegemony around a bi-polar West; the establishment of the 
ECFR being his institutionalisation of the project.  The positioning of ECFR shows his success in 
cohering discursive constructions of Europe’s role within the European think tank field around 
this vision.  On the flip side of this, his success also demonstrates the organic link between 
contemporary conditions and such a vision – the wide compatibility of his vision with others 
contemporaneously developed making clear that Soros is not a perspicacious haruspex, but 
well positioned within and sensitive to the changing context. 
 
Overall it is clear the power of the discourse coalition for a liberal interventionary global power 
Europe has grown considerably since first identified by Ian Manners in 2006.  As December 
2013’s European Council meeting, focusing on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
made clear we are studying an ongoing hegemonic project; this meeting, whilst lacklustre in 
developing EU competence overall,  did however mark a ‘real step forward in building Defence 
Europe’ and perhaps signalled a reawakening of European appetite for interventions as 
unanimous support was given to  French intervention in the Central African Republic, with 
options for European security and defence activities in support to be discussed at the next 
Foreign Affairs Council on 20 January 2014.159  
 
Moving on to the broader ideational context with which the above project is inter-related we 
found that for academic IR in Europe, we have now moved on from a Cold War field that 
                                                             
159
 http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Ministers-outline-results-of-EU  
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consisted of on one hand ‘clones, copies and franchises’ of the US discipline, reflecting 
Europe’s subordinate position, and on the other hand a European Peace Research tradition 
challenging the core of IR in realism and strategic studies from a specific Western European 
perspective and set of interests. However this history of an accepted US hegemony and a 
constructivist escape from the Western European role in both the Cold War and the 
construction of a neoliberal world during this struggle with the latest contender underlies the 
post-Cold War development of the IR field in Western Europe.  What was initially an artificial 
and accordingly barren field in European academic life has developed organically from this, 
most significantly with the post-Cold War shift in Europe’s relation to the US and the world.   
Tracing developments in this manner then allows both an understanding of the enduring 
significance of the image of an American Social Science and an indication of where politically 
significant work within this field will be located; elements that cannot be deduced from the 
existing synchronic accounts of the current discipline that point to a developing bi-polar 
Western IR but not to the significance of this. 
 
I argued that to understand the role of academics one must get beyond derivations from their 
structural position to consider agency.  Not that the structural position or the structures of the 
disciplinary fields in which they work is insignificant, but that their significance lies in the 
strategic navigation of these by actors.  This gives a methodology focusing on ‘persons not 
paradigms’ within IR, through which the inter-relation with both social conditions of 
production and the ethico-political drive of these individuals can be grasped.  This restores 
humanity to academics otherwise seen as functionaries, and authenticity to protestations of 
‘critical’ or progressive intent otherwise too easily dismissed as cant.   Altogether this gives a 
far better grasp of Europe’s specific role and the development of conceptualisations of this 
role - founded as they are precisely on this conception of legitimacy stemming from a 
European self-conceptualisation of the EU as a normatively superior entity.  
 
Pursuing this methodology I identified two academics whose trajectories covered the salient 
meeting point of Cold War peace research and activism, academic IR, and an intellectual focus 
on Cold War and post-Cold War development within Europe within a global frame: these being 
Mary Kaldor and Ole Wæver (and the Copenhagen School).  These two were selected in part 
because of their presence within the discipline – the ‘noise’ generated by their own prolific 
output and reactions to it, and secondary literatures developing their work.  More though for 
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their application of the content of the European pole of this bi-Western IR that is to be found 
within cosmopolitanism.   
 
Mary Kaldor represented the ‘easy’ case of explicit cosmopolitanism and a direct concern for 
application of European force; focusing in on the question we saw lay at the core of the 
cosmopolitanism debate, of the role of force in establishing cosmopolitan political orders.  Ole 
Wæver represented a ‘hard’ case, outside of the cosmopolitan discourse and seemingly 
engaged in discourse analysis. Tracing these two though revealed their relation to the social 
conditions of their intellectual production and from this cast them together within a 
coherently European IR, the affinity at a deeper level than surface theoretical opposition over 
the referent objects of security.  Of main significance within this was their Arendtian politics 
built upon the figure of the citizen. As the discussion showed this leads to a more socially 
invasive and restructuring intervention – taking us back to the birth of biopolitics in response 
to the specifically European neoliberalism Foucault was concerned with.  Through this a strong 
relation to the shifts in global governance is revealed (or confirmed and developed in Kaldor’s 
case) with the contribution here that through this method it is tied to the social conditions of 
production and thus organically European. 
 
The two approaches used in the two parts of the thesis taken together make good on the 
promise of transnational historical materialism to treat the material and ideational dialectically 
and therefore offer just such a transnational historical materialist understanding of the 
renovation of Western hegemony through European alternatives as it relates to class 
formation. 
Significance 
The significance of this argument for IR is twofold. Firstly, it necessitates a fuller consideration 
of Europe’s contemporary role in Western hegemony.  The West is still far, far, too often 
elided to the US, or at best, a US-led West.   Such views give theorising on the post-American 
world a false post-Western content – this is only one possible outcome, occurring if the 
renovation of Western hegemony in line with the developing bi-polarity of the West fails and 
leaves a ‘divided West’. Similarly Europe is too easily seen as humanising, or even standing as 
an alternative to loosely conceptualised visions of US or neoliberal hegemony.   
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The conception of a bi-polar West and its implications is of central significance for those, like 
myself, who take the West (or ‘heartland’ or ‘core’) and its relations to the rest of the world as 
still the driving structure of the global political economy.  Considering Europe’s role in this way, 
and the changing form of hegemony it creates, also forces deeper thought about what 
Western hegemony is based upon: the correctly noted difference in forms of European 
external action and neoliberal disciplines pointing to a deeper base for neoliberal hegemony, 
and the need for consideration of the implications of its adaptability, than the forms it took 
and reflections prompted during the (sui generis) US led period. 
 
Secondly, despite ‘reflexivity’ being the ‘buzzword that is driving current debates within the 
field of International Relations’ this reflexivity has been only partial (Tickner 2013: 267).  
Taking seriously my argument would entail a more Bourdieusian reflection on our role as IR 
scholars and the way our intellectual production is structured by the field of IR, and the field of 
power it is produced within.  Further, as Arlene Tickner notes (ibid), such a Bourdieusian 
reading requires the geopolitical element– so disciplinary self-reflection must reflect too on 
the discipline’s relation to a bi-polar West. This is especially so for those that take the West 
and its relations to the rest of the world as the driving structure of the international. Finally, 
understanding this relation and its relation in turn to the shift in forms of global governance is 
of central significance for ‘critical’ IR if it is indeed to be critical. 
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Appendix A – Institutional development of independent European military 
capability 
 
1992 
 
 
Maastricht Treaty (TEU), 
establishes CFSP as second pillar of 
EU. 
 
Petersberg Tasks established for 
WEU 
Post-Cold War ‘breakthrough’ in co-ordinating foreign and 
security policies. 
 
 
Western European Union (WEU) given an operational role 
in humanitarian interventions, crisis management and 
peacekeeping. Territorial defence remains NATO 
prerogative. 
 
 
1993 
 
 
 
EU’s Copenhagen Summit 
 
 
 
 
NATO defence ministers meeting in 
Travemünde, Germany  
  
The first step towards Eastern enlargement: 
“The European Council today agreed that the associated 
countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire 
shall become members of the European Union”. 
 
NATO Partnership for Peace program, a precursor to 
NATO expansion, presented as an American initiative. 
 
1994 
 
 
NATO Summit meeting, Brussels 
 
 
NATO Partnership for Peace agreement. 
 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept endorsed.  
CJTF marks a shift in purpose of NATO, as it allows subsets 
of NATO members to undertake military operations not 
involving the defence of the Alliance territory, such as 
humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.  
 
‘Separable but not separate’ European military capability 
established as a goal.  
 
1996 
 
 
 
NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, 
Berlin 
 
 
 
 
 
CJTF agreement signed.  The ‘Berlin Agreement’ allowed 
European countries, through the WEU, to use NATO asset: 
subject to unanimous agreement amongst the Alliance.   
 
Western European Union (WEU) to oversee the creation 
of a European Security and Defence Identity, as a 
European 'pillar' within NATO.  Identification of  
‘Separable but not separate capabilities, assets and 
support assets’ to allow WEU led operations160. (WEU still 
dependent on such assets for operations.)  
 
 
1997  
 
 
Amsterdam Treaty Petersberg tasks of the WEU incorporated in the Treaty 
on European Union, framing the EU’s common security 
and defence policy. 
 
Establishes role of High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
1998 Anglo-French St. Malo Summit UK and France agree that the "[European] Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
                                                             
160 Final communique of Berlin Ministerial Meeting, 3 June 1996: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm  
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international crises’ establishing objectives of ESDP 
1999 Cologne European Council 
 
Helsinki Headline Goals 
 
15 members of EU sign up to ESDP objectives. 
 
Setting of a European military capability target, including 
the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force. 
 
Javier Solana appointed appointed first High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). 
2000 Nice Summit  Incorporation of WEU into EU, and establishment of the 
ESDP institutions: the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) 
and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 
2002 Copenhagen European Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint EU-NATO declaration of 2002 
 
Berlin Plus Agreements: establishing a direct relationship 
between EU and NATO (no WEU intermediation), the 
‘pre-identification’ of assets and capabilities with a 
presumption of availability to the EU, and assured aces to 
NATO planning assets.  Use of alliance assets remains 
decided on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Political principles underlying the relationship between 
NATO and ESDP set out, including: partnership, effective 
mutual consultation and cooperation, equality and due 
regard for ‘the decision-making autonomy and interests’ 
of both EU and NATO, and ‘coherent and mutually 
reinforcing development of the military capability 
requirements common to the two organisations’ 
2003 Anglo-French summit at Le 
Touquet  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Berlin Plus finalised and in force 
 
Operation Artemis 
 
 
 
European Security Strategy  
 
 
‘Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation in 
Security and Defence’: ‘the potential scope of ESDP 
should match the worldwide ambition of the European 
Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
should be able to support effectively the EU's wider 
external policy objectives to promote democracy, human 
rights, good governance and reform’ 
 
 
 
EU mission in Congo.  First independent EU operation, 
conducted without any recourse to NATO assets, 
including strategic airlift (so not a Berlin Pius operation) 
 
Whilst commonly seen as short on strategy, sets out a 
political framework for ESDP.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
218 
 
 
Appendix B – Tabulation of Global Power Europe Think Tanks 
Global Power Europe Think Tanks 
 Notre Europe Project EGS Project James Rogers (2009a)  
Core/convener Notre Europe Istituto Affari Internazionali 
(IAI) 
Polish Institute of 
International Affairs (PISM) 
Real Instituto Elcano (RIE) 
Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs (UI) 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
Centre for European Reform 
Demos 
Egmont Institute 
European Council on Foreign 
Relations 
European Union Institute for 
Security Studies 
Broader/affiliates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carnegie Europe 
Centre for European Policy 
Studies 
Centre for European 
Reform 
Cyprus Centre for 
European and 
International Affairs 
demosEUROPA 
Egmont Institute 
European Council on 
Foreign Relations  
European Policy Centre 
Real Instituto Elcano 
Europeum  - Institute for 
European Policy  
FRIDE 
Hellenic Foundation for 
European & Foreign Policy 
Istituto Affari 
Internazionali  
Notre Europe 
Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies  
SWP - German Institute for 
International and Security  
Affairs  
 
Analytica 
Austrian Institute for 
European and Security Policy 
Celare  
Centre for European and 
North Atlantic Affairs  
Centre for European Policy 
Studies 
C.E.S. Centre for European 
Studies 
Clingendael 
Egmont 
Estonian Foreign Policy 
Institute  
Eurisc Foundation  
European Institute of Romania 
European Policy Centre 
Group for Legal and Political 
Studies – Kosovo  
The Hague Centre for 
Strategic Studies  
Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy 
HIIA – Hungarian Institute of 
International Affairs  
IMO - Institute for 
International Relations, 
Zagreb 
IERI – Insitut Europeen Des 
Relations Internationales  
Centre for Small State Studies 
(University of Iceland) 
Institute of International 
Relations, Prague 
Institute of International 
relations and Political Science, 
Vilnius University  
International Union of 
Socialist Youth 
Latvian Institute of 
International Affairs 
Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs 
SWP - German Institute for 
International and Security  
Affairs  
ThinkTank (defunct) 
James Rogers (2009b) 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
Centre for European Reform 
Chatham House 
Clingendael 
Demos 
Egmont Institute 
European Council on Foreign 
Relations 
European Policy Centre 
European Union Institute for 
Security Studies  
Foreign Policy Centre 
Federal Trust 
Foundation Robert Schumann 
Friends of Europe 
French Institute for 
International Relations 
German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP) 
Institute of International and 
European Affairs 
International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 
Notre Europe 
Policy Network 
Security and Defence Agenda 
 
Ian Manners (2006) 
New Defence Agenda (NDA) 
Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) 
International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 
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Appendix C – Numbered reference list of Global Power Europe ‘linkers’ 
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